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1. Introduction
1.1. Book Topic, Methodology and Results
The topic of this book is related to the rising field of behavioral public
policymaking. Scholars belonging to this movement propose policy inter-
ventions that address systematic and predictable violations of rationality to
steer agents’ behavior in directions that are self-beneficial, possibly without
limiting individual autonomy or restricting freedom of choice. The intuition
at the basis of behavioral public policies is that humans are characterized
by limited cognitive abilities and their choices are often influenced by details
not included in models of standard decision-making. Therefore, the policy
analyst that is able to identify, explain and predict nonstandard behavioral
regularities could make use of this knowledge to promote welfare-improving
policies. The interest surrounding behavioral public policies comes from the
fact that its proposals are easy to implement, relatively cheap and in many
cases respectful of individual freedom of choice.
This book proposes a detailed introduction to behavioral public policymaking
and three original contributions. The introductory chapter focuses on specific
issues of welfare analysis. Welfare analysis is a two steps procedure. First,
the analyst determines how a policy affects individuals’ well-being. Second,
the analyst aggregates the well-being across individuals. In the remaining
sections of the introduction, I focus on the first step of the procedure. I pro-
pose an overview of the literature and of the still open debate regarding this
issue between behavioral science scholars. I focus on the second step of the
welfare analysis procedure in chapter 2. Beside introducing and discussing
the problem of aggregation of individuals’ utility and proposing an overview
of the literature, in this chapter I also suggest a methodological contribu-
tion concerning the social analyst’s choice of the social welfare function. In
chapter 3 and 4 I discuss two innovative policies that make use of behavioral
regularities in order to increase social welfare.
While I introduce the reader to the philosophy behind behavioral public
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policymaking and I provide a summary of actual applications, possible de-
velopments and critiques, the main focus of this book is not to provide a full
discussion regarding its merits and the flaws. Instead, my main objective
is to contribute to the discussion within the behavioral public policymaking
movement, suggesting new ideas and original contributions. To investigate
the social policy issues object of this book, I employ state of the art method-
ologies and techniques of economic analysis. Specifically, in chapter 2 I pro-
vide a quantitative analysis of the choice of the social welfare function when
performing economic analysis of social policy. The problem of choosing a
specific form of social welfare function is a key aspect not exclusively of be-
havioral public policymaking, but of public choice, social choice and welfare
economics as well. My goal in chapter 2 is to suggest a methodological ad-
vance for this problem by deriving quantitative relationships between a set of
social welfare function specifications that aggregate individuals’ well-being.
To achieve this goal, I formally prove the results and the propositions con-
tained in this chapter using mathematical analysis. I show that, in general,
results obtained representing social welfare through a particular combination
of individuals’ well-being and a method for the aggregation of individual util-
ities can only be generalized to a subset of the possible social welfare function
specifications. Moreover, I highlight under which conditions different combi-
nations of individual well-being representation and aggregation method rank
in the same order alternative states of the world. I then derive quantitative
conditions under which the policy analysis results could be extended to dif-
ferent social welfare functions. Imposing some restrictive conditions on the
redistributive transfers considered, I also demonstrate that it is possible to
generalize a set of analysis results. Finally, I show how quantitative condi-
tions necessary to generalize the results obtained assuming particular social
welfare functional forms vary when the interest groups affected by the policy
have different sizes.
In chapter 3, I discuss the application of a behavioral policy to contrast
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indirect tax evasion. Governments both in developed and developing coun-
tries are facing the problem of value added tax (VAT) and retail sales tax
(RST) evasion. This explains a growing interest in policies alternative to the
traditional methods of deterrence. This chapter describes the achievements
resulting from a zero cost policy against VAT and RST evasion based on
rewards. Customers are encouraged to request an invoice by changing the
invoice into a lottery ticket, thereby making VAT and RST fraud and evasion
more difficult for suppliers. Such a policy has, for example, been introduced
in some Asian countries. My goal in this chapter is to explain the puzzling
empirical evidence of the policy success and to propose a model that allows
policymakers to predict the outcomes of the policy when applied in specific
contexts. The methodology that I employ is a combination of mathematical
analysis and of empirical work based on a calibration exercise. After having
characterized VAT and RST evasion as a special kind of public good situa-
tion, a theoretical model based on non-expected utility theory is presented.
Given this theoretical framework, I provide examples based on calibration
exercises showing the possibility to predict the policy outcome in different
socio-economic contexts. Finally I discuss the possible countervailing effects
as well as the positive long-term effects generated by the introduction of the
policy.
In chapter 4, I study the effects of social influence on third-parties’ decision to
engage in costly punishment. My chapter is the first contribution investigat-
ing the topic. My goals in this chapter are to isolate and estimate the causal
effect of social influence on third-party punishment and to identify the chan-
nels through which social influence operates. To achieve these objectives, I
first propose a mathematical model of decision-making that includes social
influence effects. I test my model predictions setting up a laboratory exper-
iment based on the methodology of experimental economics. I then analyze
the resulting data employing state of the art econometric tecniques. The de-
sign of the experiment is based on a dictator game. I exclude payoff comple-
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mentarity among punishers and I elicit punishment decisions both in isolation
and after having provided information regarding actual peers’ punishment.
I find evidence that the amount of punishment chosen by third-parties is
influenced by beliefs about the amount of peers’ punishment. Moreover, the
larger the difference between third-parties beliefs about the level of peers’
punishment and actual peers’ punishment, the more likely the third-parties
modify the initial punishment decision. I also find that more self-regarding
third-parties are less affected by social influence. I then disentangle the effect
of normative social influence from that of informational social influence and I
show that some subjects are responsive to the former type of social influence
but not to the latter. Finally, I discuss the possibility to enact policies that
exploit this behavioral regularities.
Before proceeding with my original contributions, in the remainder of this
chapter I introduce the reader to the central topic of this book providing
a detailed discussion of behavioral public policymaking. Specifically, in the
next section, I provide an overview of the concepts underlying behavioral pol-
icymaking, I highlight the analogies and the differences with classic public
policy analysis and I discuss a set of nonstandard behavioral regularities in
individual decision-making that could be exploited in order to enact behav-
ioral policies. In section 1.3 I discuss a fundamental methodological problem
of behavioral public policy, that is the choice of a suitable welfare criterion
for conducting social policy analysis, and I report an overview of different
possible criteria proposed by scholars. In section 1.4 I then summarize the
debate between Paternalism and Libertarianism connected to the implemen-
tation of behavioral policies and I discuss a third-way that could in principle
reconcile these positions, the so called ”Libertarian Paternalism” approach.
This chapter is concluded by section 1.5 where I discuss the challenges faced
by scholars operating in behavioral sciences that are interested in increasing
their direct influence on policymakers.
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1.2. Behavioral Public Policy1
1.2.1. Definition and Main Challenges
”If you see a man with a razor in his hand yelling that he wants to cut his own
finger”, says a common joke among economists, ” then you should help him
sharping the blade”. What makes the joke (at least for someone) funny is that
its counter-intuitive suggestion is derived from a straightforward application
of the utility maximization principle based on revealed preferences (Samuel-
son, 1938), the benchmark commonly used in welfare economics analysis2. In
fact, welfare analysis in neoclassical economics typically assumes that people
reveal preferences through their chosen actions. Therefore, according to this
theory, the choices that an individual makes are also those that maximize
her utility. Accordingly, the objective of the social planner is to promote
interventions aimed at maximizing people’s utility, that is satisfying agents’
preferences revealed by their choices. Therefore, if for whatever reason the
person in our joke prefers having his finger cut, and his action is not affecting
anyone else’ utility, why should the social planner stop him?
By relying on the revealed preference approach neoclassical welfare economic
analysis does not distinguish between individuals’ choices and well-being. To
be more precise, the neoclassical policy analyst infers the nature of well-
being from the action chosen by individuals and he acts like an individuals’
proxy, deriving their policy choice from observed actual consumption choices
in similar situations.
Neoclassical economic models typically assume that people make decisions
following the principle of rationality3. Broadly speaking, a rational agent
makes decisions as if he would be able to consider and process all the available
information, to engage in cost-benefit evaluations and to smooth present and
1This section is mostly based on materials discussed in Bernheim and Rangel (2012).
2I will discuss in details both the utility maximization and the revealed preferences
approach in section 1.3.
3I discuss the key assumptions of rationality in subsection 1.3.2.
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future consumption according to his expectations. As a consequence, given
preferences, constraints and available information, the agent would end up
making the choice that guarantees him the maximum (expected, if we talk
about future outcomes) well-being4.
However, in the last decades, experimental psychologists and behavioral
economists documented that in some situations of great economic relevance,
individuals systematically depart from economists’ neoclassical assumption
of rationality (for an overview see for example Della Vigna, 2009, Kahneman,
2003 and Akerlof and Shiller, 2010). Researchers found that decision-making
processes are the result of two coexisting and interacting mental systems:
an impulsive, short-term focused one (”System 1”) and a reflexive, long-
term oriented one (”System 2”) (see Kahneman, 2011 for a discussion of this
point; see Hsu et al., 2005 for a contribution that identifies the neural cor-
relates responsible of the activation of different areas of the brain connected
with the two systems). While decisions made by System 2 would be fairly
consistent with neoclassical economic predictions, nevertheless the influence
of System 1 is responsible for the aforementioned biases (Loewenstein and
Haisley, 2007). The problem with System 1 is that, when people make deci-
sions on the basis of emotions, neglecting information or attaching exagerate
weight to the present, they might end up making choices contrary to their
own self-interest. For example, they could take excessive risks, make deci-
sions that they will later regret or forego possibilities of high future gains in
order to avoid small immediate costs (Camerer et al., 2004).
For the purposes of the present work it is important noticing that the direc-
tion of the aforementioned deviations from the optimal behavior are often
predictable. As a consequence, scholars have been able to produce models of
decision-making that incorporate these regularities (Ariely and Jones, 2008;
Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004a). Exploiting these predictions, behavioral
4Economists usually employ the concept of ”utility”. I will discuss this concept below.
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policymakers have suggested policies to counteract biases and redirect pat-
terns of behavior that usually hurt people to enhance the optimality of deci-
sion making (Loewenstein and Haisley, 2007). Therefore, behavioral policies
in principle aim at correcting patterns of behavior that produce ”suboptimal”
outputs and redirecting them to alternative choices that make people ”better
off”. However, what is the ”optimal” choice and what does it mean to make
someone ”better off”? It is obvious that behavioral policies cannot rely on
the preference-based criterion for optimality. In fact, as we have mentioned
utility maximization theory relies on the assumption that whatever action
an individual voluntarily chooses must be welfare-enhancing. Thus, it does
not make sense to evaluate if an agent is making a suboptimal decision using
a benchmark measure built on the premise that people always make optimal
choices.
However, recognizing that individuals might not choose what they want cre-
ates problems with respect to the identification of a suitable welfare criterion.
So far, among behavioral economists no consensus regarding standards and
criteria to adopt has emerged. Broadly speaking, it is possible to identify two
schools of thought. On the one hand, in the opinion of some scholars pol-
icy evaluations must maintain a strict adherence to the doctrine of revealed
preferences. According to this view, observed “anomalies” in individuals’
decision-making should be explained by an extension of the preferences do-
main, as for example in Gul and Pesendorfer (2001, 2004).
On the other hand, other researchers investigated the possibility to relax,
modify or depart from the principle of revealed preferences in conducing wel-
fare analysis. A number of proposals have been advanced in in this direction
and in section 1.3.3 I report a detailed overview of major contributions. A
common distinctive tract of all these proposals is the division between a
positive analysis of a policy effects and a normative evaluation of the well-
being. This division allows behavioral policy analysts to engage on issues of
great social importance. They can, for example, meaningfully address the
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questions raised by self-destructive behaviors (considering the example at the
beginning of this section, would you take seriously the policy prescriptions
of someone that suggests sharping the blade?) or make a sense of the claim
that the average household saves “too little” for retirement.
However, departing from the revealed preference approach creates also seri-
ous concerns. In principle, this approach guarantees individuals’ freedom of
choice and it protects their choices against a-priori condemnations. Nonethe-
less, once this approach is abandoned, governments become entitled of the
possibility to condemn individuals’ choices and to set “beneficial” restric-
tion of personal freedom. Therefore, given this danger, the determination
of precise standards of evidence for departing from the principle of revealed
preferences and the determination of a normative welfare criterion acquires a
fundamental importance in behavioral public policymaking. I devote section
1.3 to an investigation of this problem and a review of the literature this
area. Moreover, I provide in section 1.4 an overview of the debate between
supporters of paternalistic interventions aimed at counteracting behavioral
biases and defendants of liberalistic policies based on individual freedom of
choice. I conclude this introduction discussing in section 1.5 some of the
practical challenges that scholars in behavioral sciences face when they have
to transplant results of their research into the political arena and the policy-
making process.
Before proceeding to the next section, below I revise some common behavioral
regularities that can be counteracted and used by policymakers. I will delay
the discussion of overweighting of small probabilities and social influence
respectively to chapter 3 and 4, where I suggest two behavioral policies based
on these nonstandard behavioral regularities.
1.2.2. Occasions for Behavioral Public Policy Interventions
Immediate Feedback, Reinforcement and Default Rules
It is perfectly natural (and consistent with standard economic model pre-
dictions) that people evaluate the same good more if consumed today than
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tomorrow. In economists’ words, people discount the utility obtained from
future consumption. Hence, for example an agent facing the choice to receive
x money right away or to wait and receive (x + y) money a month from now
will accept the later option only if y is positive and large enough. However,
how large must y be for the agent to choose the waiting option? In principle,
there is not a correct answer: people have heterogeneous preferences (”time
preferences” in this context) that could vary a lot across individuals. An
impatient person for choosing to wait will require a high y compared to a
more long-term oriented person. Similarly, for a given y, different individuals
might maximize individual utility either consuming the good immediately or
waiting, according to their time preferences.
However, even assuming that an agent could be extremely impatient, in
practice a consistent fraction of people systematically fail to make decisions
involving negligible short-term costs and huge long-term gains, showing a
behavior that is hard to justify from any reasonable perspective (O’Donoghue
and Rabin, 2001). These choices often represent important determinants
of the welfare of the decision-makers themselves, as in the case of saving
for retirement or investment in cost-saving technologies. Even worse, these
choices could be detrimental for people’s own health, as in the case of smoking
(Volpp et al., 2009), obesity (Jeffery et al., 1983) or drug addiction (Higgins
et al., 2000).
What is most strinking about the behavior of people making these decisions
that go against their own self-interest is that often they want to select the
opposite option. In situations like the one just described, people show to be
affected by self-control problem and ”present-biased preferences” (Benhabib
et al., 2010). These agents ”hyperbolically discount” future consumption,
trading off the possibility of high future welfare gains in favor of an immediate
but small benefit (Laibson, 1997). Moreover, if asked about their future
plans regarding the same situation, people report that they will modify their
actual behavior (and, of course, when the future becomes the present, they
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fail to do it). These time-inconsistent behavior is generated by the so called
”projection bias”: people fail to recognize that their future selves will have
the same present-biased preferences when the time to make a decision comes.
The result is an endless procrastination and failure to modify the status quo,
even when inertia generates clearly suboptimal outcomes (O’Donoghue and
Rabin, 1999).
In all the situations described above, behavioral policy interventions might
help individuals affected by behavioral biases that would like but are unable
to make welfare-improving decisions, without reducing other people’s free-
dom of choice. For example, researchers document that small but frequent
financial incentives conditioned to compliance with some predefined behavior
are significantly effective in reducing drug addiction (Higgins et al., 2000) and
investments in the use of fertilizer, that in turn greatley increase subsequent
harvest (Duflo et al., 2011). Moreover simply reminding on a regular basis
people about the opportunity to save for retirement increases the saving rate
(Karlan et al., 2010).
Finally, in light of the effects of inertia and procrastination, default rules
acquire a special importance (Johnson and Goldstein, 2013). Our lives are
complex and we have to make hundreds of decisions everyday, most of which
- even if important - we do not know enough about or we do not pay attention
to. As a result, people often tend to avoid choosing and stick with whatever
default option has been selected (if you are reading these lines on a computer
screen or have your cellphone in your pocket, think about how many of
the hundreds of default options that were already set for you when first
bought these items have been modified!). This ”yeah, whatever!” behavior is
quite common for people in many decisions, and setting a default rule that
helps achieving welfare-improving behaviors could benefit naive or careless
individuals, allowing the others to freely select their preferrred option (Dinner
et al., 2011).
Furthermore, in many situations deciding what is going to happen if people
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fail to make an explicit choice is simply not avoidable. For example, it is
well known that in the US a substantial fraction of workers fail to choose the
rate of saving for retirement for the current year (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008,
pp.40-52). What should the employer or the state assume in this case as a
default? One option is to confirm the previous year’s saving rate. A second
possibility would be to assume that the worker saves nothing. From the
above discussion about the power of inertia and procrastination, it is evident
that the two default options would have very different consequences for the
aggregate level of pension savings and future welfare, even if in principle
workers could freely and in any moment opt-out from the default plan.
Loss Aversion
People hate losses more than they love gains. Roughly speaking, gaining
something increases a person’s utility by half of the amount losing the same
thing makes the person worse-off. Researchers call this behavioral regularity
”loss aversion”. Attempting to explain this empirical evidence that clashes
with the prediction of standard economic rationality, Kahneman and Tver-
sky proposed the famous theory of decision under risk and uncertainty that
they called ”Prospect Theory” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992). According to Prospect Theory, in decisions involving
probabilistic outcomes agents assume their status quo as a reference point
and they attach higher weights to changes happening in the domain of the
losses than to changes involving gains.
Therefore, in many choices involving risk and uncertainty, loss aversion could
exacerbate the problem of inertia and procrastination: agents are reluctant
to modify the status quo even when the choice involves gains with high
probability and a loss otherwise because of the fear to worsen their actual
position (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). However, behavioral policies could
counteract the effects of loss aversion and even exploit them for helping agents
increasing their welfare. An example of such a policy is reported in Volpp
et al. (2008). The authors run a field experiment with people that voluntarily
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enroll in a program for losing weight. In this program, participants have to
deposit a certain amount of money in an account and the experimenters
match this amount. However, participants must sign a contract stating that
they could withdrawn the money only if their weight, measured weekly, falls
below a predetermined threshold that implies losing one pound per week.
Consistently with non-experimental data coming from similar experiences
in different frameworks (Mann, 1972), treated participants lose significantly
more weight than participants assigned to a control group where they simply
pay for losing weight5.
Framing Effects
Researchers repeatedly show that framing a decision situation, modifying
some apparently uninfluential details, has a tangible impact on people’s
choices (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). So for example, labelling a Pris-
oner’s Dilemma game6 ”The Wall Street game” or ”The Community game”
significantly modifies the level of cooperation (Liberman et al., 2004; Rege
and Telle, 2004). So, why not framing situations in a way that redirects
agents toward desirable outcomes?
Bertrand et al. (2006) report evidence that framing effects are a powerful tool
to increase the take-up into an health care spending account sponsored by
employers that is beneficial for employees. In a field experiment sponsored by
5There is plenty of funny anecdotical evidence about the power of loss aversion. For
example, the captain of the Italian national volleyball team in the ninties, world-champion
for twelve consecutive years and considered the best national selection of all times, when
asked about the secret for winning so much replied: ”Well, it’s very simple, the other
teams play to win, instead we play to avoid losing.” (Notice that in volleyball even results
in a match are not possible...).
6The Prisoner Dilemma is a well-known and widely used game in social sciences. Two
players have to make a simultaneous decision among two possible choices, cooperating
or not-cooperating, and each player’s payoff depends on his individual choice and on the
choice of the other player. While from a social welfare perspective the optimal outcome
would be the cooperation of both players, however each player has incentives to free-ride
on the cooperation of the other player. Therefore, according to standard game theory
predictions, the unique Nash equilibrium of the game is that players do not cooperate.
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a large telecommunications company, women employees were invited to view
a 15-minute videotape providing information about the importance of taking
a mammography. They were randomly divided in two samples: half viewed
a video called ”The Benefit of getting a Mammography” while half where
exposed to a video titled ”The Risks of Neglecting a Mammography”. While
the information contained in the videotape was essentialy the same, framing
the decision to take a mammography as an opportunity to avoid a potential
loss induced a significantly higher percentage of employees to do it in the
subsequent month with respect to the sample of employee exposed to framing
as a gain. Studies on framing effects obtained similar results in situations
concerning people’s decision to subscribe insurance policies (Johnson et al.,
1993) and to contribute to charities (Davis et al., 2005).
Goal Gradients
Runners and bike racers sprint with renewed energies when approaching the
finish lane. Default rate on mortgages drops almost to zero when the final
total repayment is close. Students drop out rate falls when the last exams are
approaching. And PhD candidates become able to work unbelievable number
of hours when the dissertation deadline is approaching (procrastination plays
a role too here). In fact, proximity to the final objective increases motivation
(Kivetz et al., 2006) and people often fail to achieve a goal because they feel
”stuck in the middle” (Bonezzi et al., 2011; Hull, 1932).
Given this evidence, why do not reducing the distance between the start-
ing point and the finish lane, splitting the total distance in multiple shorter
starts-and-arrivals7? Many microfinance institutions use this principle to re-
duce default rate on loans (Morduch, 1999). The same principle is also at
the basis of Individual Development Accounts (IDAs). IDAs are savings ac-
7This tecniques is applied on a regular basis among extreme hikers, including the person
that is writing: if one focuses on going through the 20 miles and 13000 feet of altitude gap
of the Pico Tarquino in Cuba within one day, he would never even consider to get out of
bed.
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counts in which the state or a selected organization matches the deposits
with the objective to help low income families to either buy their own house,
open a small business or invest in children education (Schreiner and Sher-
raden, 2007). IDAs have proved to be successfull in increasing poor people
savings not only in developing countries: in a field experiment conducted
in Oklahoma, Mills et al. (2008) found that in a 4-years time horizon par-
ticipants assigned to the treatment where they could open an IDA account
significantly increased both savings amount and the probability to become
houseowner.
Moreover Loibl et al. (2012) report preliminary results of a series of exper-
iments where the authors test different strategies to increase savings and
retention rates in IDA programs. The preliminary evidence suggests that,
holding constant the total cost of matching, in the IDA programs where the
match rate increases overtime saving deposits are higher than those where
the match remains fixed.
1.3. A Fundamental Methodological Problem: What Welfare Criterion?
In the section above I discussed behavioral policies based on the presump-
tion, supported by empirical evidence, that individuals’ actual choices are
not always welfare-improving. It has been underlined that a fundamental
methodological problem for behavioral policymaking is determining which
welfare criterion to embrace. Scholars have proposed different concepts of
welfare suitable for behavioral policy analysis. I discuss in details some of
these criteria in paragraph 1.3.3. However, before presenting welfare criteria
that depart from the revealed preferences approach, in the next paragraph I
report an historical overview of the schools of thought in welfare economics
and of the non preference-based concepts of utility proposed.
1.3.1. Schools of Thought in Welfare Economics
A fundamental step in the economic analysis of social policy is concerned
with evaluating the desirability of policies effects, that is, to produce norma-
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tive statements. This normative analysis is the core of welfare economics, the
branch of economic science evaluating well-being from the allocation of pro-
ductive factors in terms of economic efficiency and desirability or resources
allocation. Scholars over the years embraced different positions and enriched
the debate concerning a series of methodological and normative issues re-
garding welfare analysis. In the following paragraphs I provide an overview
of the different schools of thought.
Welfarism
According to social welfare philosophy (or utilitarian philosophy), it is nec-
essary to evaluate different states of the world in terms of their end-state
distributional results. In fact, the purpose of welfare economics is to obtain
a social ordering over alternative possible states of the world, thus promot-
ing, when possible, welfare-improving policies. In order to achieve this social
ordering, welfare economics embraces well defined normative principles8:
1. The utility principle: rational individuals maximize their welfare by
ordering and choosing the preferred option
2. Individualism: individuals are the only judges of what contributes most
to their utility
3. Consequentialism: utility is derived only from the outcomes of behavior
and processes
4. Welfarism: the goodness of any state of the world could be judged only
by the level of utility attained by individuals in that situation
The theoretical basis for the determination of individuals’ ordering over alter-
native states of the world is the utility maximizing theory of consumer choice,
whereby consumers rank alternative states according to a set of preference or-
8In the following paragraph, I only provide an overview of the normative foundations
of welfare economics. For an in-depth discussion see Arrow, 1951; Harsanyi, 1977; Sen,
1997
21
derings. The concept of utility9 has been for a long time the center of debate
within welfare economics scholarship. Two possible main interpretations are
commonly assumed: preference satisfaction and hedonic welfare (Van Praag,
1993). Hence, utility includes any element affecting individual preference sat-
isfaction or welfare, expressively excluding any other element. The process
of utility measurement assigns numerical values to different bundles, goods
or states of the world, representing an individual preference ordering among
alternatives.
The individualism principle restricted the source of utility in welfare eco-
nomics to individual judgements and to goods and services that he himself
consumes10. This principle implies for the policy analysts operating in the
framework of welfare economics to discard any other aspect not affecting
individuals’ utility.
The consequentialism principle states that the focus of the analysis must
be restricted to outcomes, excluding from the analysis any other element.
Some attempts have been made to enlarge this principle in order to include
additional factors other than outcomes, notably processes and procedures
(see Birch et al., 2003 for an example and further references). Nonetheless,
this further enlargement only considers processes and procedures affecting
individuals’ preferences and so individual utility.
Finally, the welfarism principle directly links social welfare to the utility of
individuals, excluding from social analysis considerations not directly linked
9If there is uncertainty about the future, economists talk about “expected utility”. In
this case, the representation of preferences refers to a more elaborate theory compared to
the case of certainty about the future, the Expected Utility Theory proposed by Von Neu-
mann and Morgenstern (1944). I will discuss in chapter 3 the Expected Utility Theory. In
fact, in some situations social decision results could be affected by performing the analysis
before the resolution of uncertainty or after (Myerson, 1981). However, in order to avoid
technical complications, since the focus of my work is on a different topic I do not consider
the possibility of uncertainty about the future in the discussion presented in this chapter.
10It is however common among welfarist economist to enlarge the source of utility also
to some other dimensions. See for example the analysis of Becker (1968a); Becker and
Becker (2009) on the family and marriage or Culyer (1971) on health care and donations.
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to individual utility.
Welfare economics scholars commonly assume also anonimity. According to
the anonymity principle, each individual’s well-being affects social welfare
in a symmetric manner. This implies that under the framework of welfare
economics, no individual or interest group’s achievements of well-being can
be considered more important than those of others. As in the cases of indi-
vidualism and consequentialism, the anonimity principle has been sometimes
superated. Indeed, some scholars argue that utility functions weighting dif-
ferently subjects endowed with unequal level of utility reflect individuals’
preferences for redistribution (see for example Roemer, 1998).
The traditional welfare economics stream is based on the above tenets. Fol-
lowing Sen (1977), we will call this school ”welfarist economics”, and we will
point out its discrepancies with the recent development of extra-welfarism
in the next paragraph. Within the framework of welfarist economics, some
divisions mirror different approaches to some specific point. The ”classical”
welfarist economic school considered utility cardinally measurable and pos-
sible to be added and compared across individuals (Diamond, 1967). Hence,
maximizing the sum of individual utilities constitutes optimality and the
objective of the social analyst is to achieve ”the greatest happiness of the
greatest number that is the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham, 1776,
Preface, p.ii). Economists nowadays tend to considered the idea of cardinal
utility sorpassed. However, in specific contexts like decision making under
risk and welfare analysis cardinal utility comparison are sometimes still em-
ployed (Ko¨bberling, 2006).
Conversely, the ”neo-classical” school questions the possibility to measure
utility cardinally. As a consequence, scholars of the neoclassical school in
their welfare analysis consider an ordinal measure of utility.
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Neoclassical welfare analyisis is based on individuals’ preferences, that are
revealed by means of chosen actions11. Once individuals’ preferences are
known, it is subsequently possible to aggregate them using the Pareto prin-
ciple. The Pareto principle implies that a social state X has to be preferred
to an alternative Y if every agent is at least as well in X as in Y, and at least
one agent is better off in X. Up to this point, the policy analist could pro-
duce welfare evaluation without having to engage in any ”unscientific value
judgement”12 (Fleurbaey and Hammond, 2004).
However, this procedure presents two problems. First, it is not per se pos-
sible to identify one desired state of the world from the set of all possible
Pareto states. A second problem comes from the fact that most of the policies
that modify the status quo make some agents better-off while reducing the
utility of others. The solution to these problems adopted by many welfare
economists is to weight and then compare the utilities of different house-
holds according to some ex-ante value judgment. However, it should be
noted that some distinguished scholars question the possibility to produce
meaningful interpersonal comparison of individual utility (See for example
Robbins, [1932 Or. Ed.]-2007; Buchanan, 1959; Buchanan et al., 1979 and
Boadway and Bruce, 1984). I do not enter here in the highly debated ques-
tion regarding the possibility of interpersonal comparison of utility. I redirect
the interested reader to the wide strand of literature in economics and other
social sciences, for example Baron (1993); Binmore (1989); Harsanyi (1980);
Hammond (1991); Luce (2010); Sen (1973).
Assuming that interpersonal comparison of utility is possible, two criteria
have been developed for verifying whether, under the assumption that the
gainer is able to compensate the loser, a modification of the status quo
leads the economy toward Pareto-optimality: the “Kaldor criterion” and the
11The next paragraph is devoted to a in-depth analysis of this point.
12To be more precise, the only value judgement implied by this analysis is that people’s
preferences could be estimated from the observation of the choices they perform.
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“Hicks criterion”. The Kaldor criterion states that a change in the status
quo would increase Pareto efficiency if the gainer is ready to pay an amount
greater than the minimum amount the loser is willing to accept in order to
achieve this change. By contrast, the Hicks criterion states that if the loser is
prepared to offer a maximum amount smaller than the minimum amount the
loser is willing to accept in order to prevent the status quo modification, the
change increases Pareto-efficiency. At this point, the social planner interven-
tion is justified through the concept of asset egalitarianism, introduced by
Arrow (1973). The asset egalitarianism principle considers society’s assets as
part of a unitarian common wealth of humanity, the social welfarists’ object
of maximization. Therefore, a change in the status quo through redistributive
policy becomes desirable if it raises social welfare.
Now, I have to stress here that welfare results derived from this analysis de-
pend on the aforementioned value judgements. In fact, these value judgments
are implicitly reflected in the specification of the analytical tool employed by
social analysts in order to perform social policy analysis, namely the social
welfare function. I devote chapter 2 of this dissertation to discuss the impor-
tance of social welfare functions for policy analysis, so I redirect the reader
there for definitions and discussions of concepts.
Before turning to the next paragraph, below I report an overview of the
extra-welfarist schools in welfare economics. Extra-welfarism is expecially
important for the purposes of this work, since the welfarist tradition bases
its welfare analysis on the theory of revealed preferences, a position that
contradicts the fundamental idea of behavioral policymaking.
Extra-welfarism
The tenets on which welfarist economics is founded have been considered
too restrictive by some scholars working on the economic analysis of social
policy. Early articles introduced concepts like merit goods (Musgrave, 1959),
specific egalitarianism (Tobin, 1970), spheres of justice (Walzer, 1983), basic
goods (Rawls, 1971) and capabilities (Sen, 1980; Sen et al., 1993), whose the-
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oretical foundations lie outside the welfarist approach. In recent years, this
school of thought was named ”extra-welfarism” to emphasize the distinction
with traditional welfarist economics. Extra-welfarism has been gaining par-
ticular importance in health economics literature (Culyer, 1989). According
to Brouwer et al. (2008), welfarist economics is a special subset of extra-
welfarism where the evaluative space is narrowed down, and both schools fit
within the (widely interpreted) paradigm of welfare economics. In an attempt
to draw a distinction between welfarist economics and extra-welfarism, the
authors point out four main factors.
First of all, the source of evaluation of utility is not anymore confined to the
individual affected by the social choice, but includes also expert third parties
and representative samples of the general public not directly affected. Sec-
ond, extra-welfarism explicitly allows attaching different weights to distinct
individuals. Specifically, the policy analyst could paternalistically introduce
ethical considerations, most notably related to equity and justice. Third,
the interpersonal comparison of the relevant outcomes is explicitly allowed.
However, differently from welfarist economics, cost-benefit (or cost effectiven-
ness) analysis does not only compare utilities, but also capabilities and other
characteristics according to the field of application. Finally, extra-welfarism
includes as a relevant outcome individual utility and other possible measures
of well-being, that could be selected by the analyst according to the specific
field of interest. Hence, the choice of the analyst becomes explicitly norma-
tive and acquires further importance compared to the welfarist framework.
This point acquires the highest importance in light of the discussion about
the choice of a welfare criterion for behavioral public policies, since a strict
application of the preference-based criterion commonly assumed in welfare
economics is not a suitable option.
In the next paragraph I focus on the assumptions implicit in neoclassical
welfare economics analysis. I will make this assumptions explicit and un-
derline their implications for the policy analyst. In the following section I
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present instead an overview of the approaches proposed by the behavioral
literature in the attempt to proceed with a welfare analysis that allows for
the relaxation of these assumptions.
1.3.2. The Neoclassical Welfare Analysis and its Assumptions
In the previous paragraph, we mentioned how neoclassical welfare analysis
is based on the principle of individualism: what is good or bad for society
reflects what is good or bad for the individuals belonging to the society.
Therefore, this principle guides the policy analyst in the comparison and
choice among alternative policy options. The analyst is indeed supposed to
suspend his individual value judgment and act as each individual’s proxy
(Bernheim and Rangel, 2005, pp. 5). In this paragraph we focus on the
meaning of ”act as each individual’s proxy”.
For a given set of conditions, the neoclassical policy analysts derives which
policy choice to make from the observation of private consuming choices made
by individuals. Indeed, standard consumer theory allows to extrapolate pub-
lic policy outcomes from the observation of private choices. Therefore, the
analyst discovers the preferences of the private individual through the obser-
vation of her chosen actions. A common way of interpreting the neoclassi-
cal approach is that people have well-defined preference rankings and these
rankings form the basis for welfare analysis. Following Bernheim and Rangel
(2012), we can say that this approach is based on some key assumptions:
1. Coherent preferences: each individual has coherent and well-behaved
preferences.
2. Preference domain: the set of state-continget consumption paths that
an individual exibits during his life constitutes his preferences domain.
3. Fixed lifetime preferences: individuals do not change overtime or across
states of the world the rank order of lifetime state-contingent consump-
tion paths13.
13It is worth noticing that this assumption does not rule out the possibility that pref-
27
4. No mistakes: Each individual always choose the preferred option among
the feasible ones given his choice set.
In the next paragraph I consider these assumptions one by one. I report
scholars’ attempt to relax them and to identify a suitable welfare criterion
for behavioral public policymaking.
1.3.3. Relaxing the Neoclassical Assumptions
Relaxing Coherent Preferences
The assumption of coherent preferences implies that people’s decision are
well-defined and that they are not influenced by irrelevant details or by the
context in which they are taken. However, starting with the pioneering work
of Tversky and Kahneman (1981, 1986), behavioral scientists show that ob-
served choices are highly context-dependent and that framing greatly influ-
ences individuals’ decision. Given these observations, some scholars proposed
welfare criteria that are not anymore based on the notion of allocation of re-
sources. These contributions introduce a sharply separation between positive
model describing choices and normative models describing welfare.
Along this line is developed the capabilities approach is first advocated by Sen
(1985, 1999) and developed by (Nussbaum, 2001). This approach rejects the
standard preference-based measurement of welfare on the basis of the concept
of hedonic adaptation: people adjust individual preferences and expectations
to social conditions and to the surrounding environment. Therefore, choices
made by agents in a specific situation might not just reveal individual pref-
erences but instead could show that people adapted their preferences to the
specific circumstances in an attempt to achieve feasible goals. Therefore, Sen
erences ranking changes with age or with some other factors (e.g. mood). However, the
assumption states that, holding constant the state of the world, an individual would keep
considering the choices made at any specific time as welfare-maximizing. In the same way
this assumption implies that an individual in a certain state of the world (e.g. when he is
happy) would keep considering as welfare-maximizing the choices made when he was in a
different state of the world (e.g. when he was depressed).
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and Nussbaum argue in favor of a normative theory of welfare that is based
on what people are capable of achieving given surrounding social conditions
and the opportunity offered to them. Nussbaum goes further proposing a set
of fundamental human capabilities on which this theory should be based.
A notion of welfare based on opportunities and that share some common
points with the capabilities approach is the one advocated by Sugden (2004).
In his contribution, Sugden formulates a rigorous welfare criterion that jus-
tifies the use of opportunities as a welfare standard.
Both the capabilities approach and the opportunity criterion solve the prob-
lem of hedonic adaptation and overcome the revealed-preference theory as-
sumption that choices are always welfare enhancing. Nonetheless, these cri-
teria create for the policymaker the problem to determine which capabilities
or opportunities must be valued. Despite this critique, I nonetheless discuss
in the next chapter how it is often unavoidable for policymakers to engage
in some sort of value judgements when performing policy evaluations.
Relaxing Preference Domain
It is possible to identify two classes of behavioral anomalies that are inexpli-
cable through the neoclassical approach but that allow for a welfare analysis
if one extends the preference domain. The first anomaly involves temptation
and self-control, the second is constituted by social preferences.
Empirical evidence suggest that in a variety of situations individuals engage
in time-inconsistent choices and that they rely in various form of precommit-
ment (Ameriks et al., 2007). The solution proposed by Gul and Pesendorfer
(2001) consist in defining the preference domain over both allocations and
choice sets. If individuals are sophisticated and can correctly forecast the ef-
fect of future temptations, they could prefer to constrain future alternatives
even when constraints should not have any impact on actual choices. For
example, a sophisticated individual wanting to save for the Christmas period
could correctly forecast his inability to avoid shopping during the summer
sale season. Therefore, she could prefer a commitment device that limits her
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future choice set. For example, she could opt for a special saving account
that, holding constant the benefits offered, additionally imposes the payment
of a penalty for money withdrawn before the month of December14.
It is important to notice that the Gul-Pesendorfer framework however does
not imply a depart from the revealed preference approach. Indeed, individu-
als maintains, as in the neoclassical framework, the same lifetime preferences
ranking at every moment in time (e.g. absent the penalty for withdrawn,
the individual would recognize as welfare-maximizing the decision to shop
on the summer sale, and she explicitly imposes a constraint because she un-
derstands the value of temptation). Therefore, welfare evaluation could be
performed by discovering the revealed preferences, assuming that the policy
analyst imposes a suitable structure on the choice data.
Behavioral anomalies within the class of social preferences include sharing
allocations even absent reputation or reciprocity (see Engel, 2011 for a meta-
analysis of the Dictator game), the equality concerns (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt,
1999) and the conformity and social influence effects (for a literature re-
view see Cialdini and Trost, 1998 and chapter 4 of this work). Behavioral
economists proposed models where individuals’ preferences are defined both
over their own and other individuals’ consumption bundles. Again, this pro-
cedure does not imply abandoning the revealed preferences approach: once
a suitable structure is imposed on consumption data, the policy analyst can
infer individuals’ preferences by observing their consumption choices
Relaxing Fixed Lifetime Preferences
The aforementioned evidence of time-inconsistent behavior and various forms
of precommitment motivate also the relaxation of this assumption. Broadly
speaking, scholars have adopted two modelling strategies. One possible strat-
egy consists in endowing individuals with well-behaved lifetime preferences
14These kind of special bank account in recent years registered an exponential growth
in the US.
30
that vary at different points in time (Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue and Rabin,
2001). Alternatively, one can allow lifetime preferences to be different across
states of nature (Loewenstein, 1996; Loewenstein and O’Donoghue, 2004).
Once these preferences has been measured, then in order to conduct wel-
fare analysis the policy analyst has to aggregate them. Aggregating these
preferences within a single individual requires a procedure similar to the
aggregation of preferences in a multi-agent situation (indeed, here the mod-
elling strategy implies that we aggregate over “multiple selves”). A branch
of the literature exploits this analogy (e.g. Laibson, 1997). Since the intro-
ductory section of chapter 2 in this book is devoted to the analysis of the
aggregation problem in welfare analysis, I redirect the interested reader there
for a detailed discussion of the topic. Another branch of the literature in-
stead proposes to base welfare analysis on the selection of reasonably stable
components of preferences (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 1999). Bernheim and
Rangel (2012) provide a formal justification for the use of this criterion.
Relaxing No Mistakes
Evidence that preferences and choice diverge motivate a relaxation of the
fourth assumption. First of all, there are cases where almost everyone agrees
that individuals do not necessarily make choices following their own self-
interest, as in the cases of children or agents that are affected by serious
mental disorder. More generally, any of the behavioral anomalies we mention
as a motivation for the relaxation of the first three assumptions could justify
the relaxation of the fourth.
However, assuming that people do not choose what they prefer raises several
problematic issues. As we mentioned above, abandoning revealed prefer-
ences in favor of some alternative generic normative criterion might entitled
governments to interfere with individuals’ freedom. Therefore, a first major
challenge consists in setting precise criteria and standards for abandoning the
revealed preference approach. The literature on this topic is still in its in-
fancy. An interesting proposal is advanced by Bernheim and Rangel (2004).
31
The authors propose to use findings and advances in applied psychology and
neurosciences in order to establish evidence of errors in the brain process
mechanisms.
A second issue concerns the identification of preferences. Two basic ap-
proaches are possible. Some scholars propose to identify preferences using
choice data through an estimation of structural models that incorporate be-
havioral assumptions on the decision-making processes (see for example Laib-
son et al., 2007). This process might sounds odd at a first glance: how is it
possible to falsify the revealed preferences principle using choice data only?
However, this models test the hypothesis of no mistakes jointly with the hy-
pothesis regarding the structure of the decision-making processes that are
implicit in the model. Therefore, any evidence of discrepancy between pref-
erences and choices hold as long as the specific non-choice evidence used to
motivate the behavioral assumptions of the model hold.
A second approach for the identification of preferences consists in combining
choice and non-choice data. One possibility advanced first by Kahneman
et al. (1997) is to measure individual well-being on the basis of self-reported
evaluations of happiness. Kahneman names this approach ”experience util-
ity” as opposed to the ”decision utility” usually embraced in economics based
on revealed preferences. Experience utility has received significant attention
by economists and in recent years there have been important methodological
advances regarding the possibility to implement this measure for welfare eval-
uations (see for example Kahneman et al., 2004; Frey and Stutzer, 2010). In
particular, some scholars propose to use this measure of utility in the context
of policy evaluations and for identifying appropriate societal trade-off (Layard
and Layard, 2011; Bruni, 2007). Moreover, some scholars even argue that
happiness should consitute the main goal of policy (Duncan, 2013). From
the perspective of behavioral policymaking, happiness measures of welfare
have the advantage to be independent from individual choices. Therefore,
people’s self-reported happiness as a consequence of different choices made
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could be employed as a criterion for steering behaviors toward the happiness-
maximizing alternative.
However, happiness as a welfare criterion presents several problems (see
Loewenstein and Ubel, 2008 for a detailed discussion of each of the follow-
ing points). First, people seem to adapt relatively quickly to circumstances
and to set the reference point for happiness evaluation accordingly. Empir-
ical evidence show that people suffering from permanent disabilities place
a high value to their health loss but do not show significant differences in
the happiness level if compared with a control sample of non-disable people
(Ubel et al., 2005). Hence, measures of welfare grounded on experience util-
ity would suggest policies that fail to capture people’s preferences. Moreover,
happiness measures are extremely sensible to a wide range of non-normative
and volatile factors, such as the happiness of surrounding people, states of
mind, emotions or weather conditions (Kahneman and Krueger, 2006). These
problems question the possibility to use happiness as the welfare criterion for
policy analysis.
In this section I discussed in details some of the technical challenges and
problematic issues of behavioral public policymaking. Scholars did not reach
a consensus yet on many point and the research agenda is still open. In fact,
as I mentioned before, there are significant political danger in abandoning
the revealed preferences principle. In the next section I move the debate
from the technicalities of the welfare analysis to the broader political debate
regarding welfare evaluation.
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1.4. Paternalism and Libertarianism15
After decades of discussions, the debate between supporters of interventions
limiting individuals’ action space in potentially self-damaging situations and
opposers who instead defend the value of agents’ freedom of choice still per-
meate the political arena. The former view is known as ”paternalism”, the
behavior by a person, organization or state which limits some agent’s lib-
erty or autonomy for their own good (Dworkin, 2010). Supporters of pa-
ternalism advocate interventions claiming that often agents face important
decisions without having sufficient information or the ability to foresee the
consequences of their choices (Conly, 2012). For example, smokers might not
be fully aware of the long-term consequences of their behavior and workers
tend to save too little for retirement possibly because they are unable to
correctly foresee their future needs.
Moreover, even assuming full information and perfect capability of prediction,
often humans are unable to self-control and self-direct themselves toward
what consitutes the ”optimal” decision. Hence, a smoker could be perfectly
aware of the risks connected to smoking and willing to quit but nonetheless
being unable to resist the temptation of the immediate pleasure given by
a cigarette (O’Donoghue and Rabin, 2003). Or a worker might want to
subscribe to a pension plan that implies high savings but instead he sticks
to the default pension plan with minimal savings offered by his firm because
of reticence to modify the status quo or simply because he does not pay
attention (Chabris and Simons, 2011; Thaler and Benartzi, 2004).
According to the paternalistic view, in these situations a social planner is
entitled to promote policies that mandates agents’ self-serving choices, or
15The still ongoing debate between supporters of paternalism and defendants of liber-
tarianism generates an endless amount of contributions. For the purposes of the present
work, in this introduction I will only provide a limited overview of these contributions and
I will devote a sizeable part of the discussion to forms of ”soft” or ”libertarian paternalism”
as defined below in this section. For an in-depth literature review of arguments pro- and
contra paternalism in its broadest acceptation see the recent article of Sunstein (2013).
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the choice people would undertake had they been able to pursue their own
self-interest. Paternalism has a long traditions and legal provisions containing
paternalistic elements permeate legal systems of modern societies (Burrows,
1995).
Conversely, opponents of paternalism support the principles of ”libertarian-
ism”. Libertarianism includes ”any political position that advocates a radical
redistribution of power from the coercive state to voluntary associations of
free individuals” (Long, 1998, p.304)16. According to libertarianism princi-
ples, any paternalistic intervention aimed at increasing agents’ own utility by
reducing their freedom of choice can only have detrimental results for welfare.
In fact, advocates of libertarianism reject paternalistic policies arguing that
individuals necessarily know better than the state what satisfy their pref-
erences17 (Friedman and Friedman, 1990) and suggesting that bureaucrats
would not use laws and regulation to improve agents’ welfare but rather to
achieve their own personal objectives (Becker, 1976; Buchanan, 1959; Stigler,
1971). Furthermore, some supporters of libertarianism argue that autonomy
of choices is a fundamental ingredient of welfare (Wright and Ginsburg, 2012).
Therefore, any form of paternalism that limits individual’s autonomy should
be carefully considered, since the increase in material welfare derived from
paternalistic regulation might not compensate the welfare losses connected
16According to the context, the term libertarianism could assume different and more
specific meanings compared to the very broad definition I use here. For example, some
libertarian thinkers advocate a role for the central state limited to a set of basic activities
(Nozick, 1974) while others propose to completely replace governmental functions with
private alternatives (Friedman, 2008). In this work I label ”libertarian” any positions
that refuse policy interventions trying to limit internalities - costs that people impose on
themselves that they don’t internalize (Herrnstein et al., 1993).
17This position was first expressed by Mill ([1859]/2010, p.80): ”The only purpose for
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against
his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a
sufficient warrant. He cannot righfully be compelled to do or forbear because it will be
better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in the opinion of others,
to do so would be wise, or even right”.
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from deprivation of autonomy (Rebonato, 2012).
1.4.1. Libertarian Paternalism or ”The Real Third Way”
In the wake of progresses in behavioral economics and experimantal psychol-
ogy, scholars in recent years have proposed a new policymaking movement
that on one hand addresses the concerns of libertarian philosophy and on
the other hand suggests policy interventions that discourage agents from en-
gaging in non-optimal choices. This new movement has been alternatively
labeled ”light paternalism” (Loewenstein and Haisley, 2007), ”soft pater-
nalism” (Sunstein, 2013), ”asymmetric paternalism” (Camerer et al., 2003;
Loewenstein et al., 2007) or (as we will refer to) ”libertarian paternalism”
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003; Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). According to some
authors, libertarian paternalism represents the ”real third way” in policy
intervention. In the words of Richard Thaler and Cass Sunstein:
”Libertarian paternalism is a relatively weak, soft, and nonintrusive type of
paternalism because choices are not blocked, fenced off, or significantly
burdened. If people want to smoke cigarettes, to eat a lot of candy, to
choose an unsuitable health care plan, or to fail to save for retirement,
libertarian paternalists will not force them to do otherwise — or even make
things hard for them. Still, the approach we recommend does count as
paternalistic, because private and public choice architects are [...]
self-consciously attempting to move people in directions that will make
their lives better. They nudge.” (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, pp.5-6).
Libertarian paternalism make use of specific behavioral policies that address
systematic and predictable violations of rationality to steer agents’ behavior
in directions that are self-beneficial without limiting individual autonomy or
restricting freedom of choice. In fact, models of decision-making typically
assume that people consider only the key features of a decision and calculate
costs and benefits of any possible outcome. The intuition at the basis of lib-
ertarian paternalism is the same of any behavioral policy: in reality humans
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are characterized by limited cognitive abilities and their choices are often in-
fluenced by apparently insignificant details (Loewenstein and Haisley, 2007).
For example, the order in which food is presented in a cafeteria greatly in-
fluences the amount of vegetables consumed as a fraction of unhealthy items
(Thaler and Sunstein, 2003) and the savings retirement plan that a company
offers as a default tends to be choosen by a large fraction of employees, no
matter which is the contribution rate (Choi et al., 2003; Carroll et al., 2009).
Therefore, the cafeteria manager and the employer in the examples are
”choice architects”, since the way they choose to present the situation to
customers and employees will affect the aggregate outcomes. Hence, assum-
ing we all agree that on average people save too little for retirement and that
unhealthy food causes diseases and reduces life expectancy, the employer
could choose a default option that implies adequate retirement savings18 and
the cafeteria manager a food disposition that maximizes healthy food con-
sumptions. On the other hand, those employees that prefer a retirement plan
different from the default could freely choose to opt-out and the customers
preferring to consume unhealthy food of course have the freedom to pick up
what they desire without facing higher prices or other kinds of constraints.
What distinguishes libertarian paternalism from other forms of behavioral
policies is that, in steering agents’ behavior toward self-interested choices,
it refrains from the forms of coercion typical of the classic paternalism and
employs instead a ”nudging” approach. A nudge could be defined as an
aspect of the choice architecture that will have an influence on agents’ deci-
sions in a systematic and predictable way without limiting individuals’ choice
or modifying the economic incentives. Nudging interventions are therefore
characterized by not mandating any particular behavior and by the fact that
they are cheap to avoid (Thaler and Sunstein, 2008).
18See for example the Pension Protection Act enacted by the US government in 2006
with bypartisan support (Beshears and Weller, 2010).
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Critiques to Libertarian Paternalism
Beside encountering the enthusiastic interest of many scholars and policy-
makers, libertarian paternalism raises also critiques coming from different
perspectives. In this section I summarize the most common points made
against libertarian paternalism19. I divide the critiques into two broad cat-
egories: those focusing on autonomy and objections concerning welfare and
welfarist arguments. I also underline how the welfare critiques naturally shift
back the discussion to the fundamental methodological problem of identify-
ing a welfare criterion suitable for behavioral public policy that we discussed
in section 1.3.
Autonomy
The concept of autonomy has always attracted considerable attention among
social scientists (Feinberg and Feinberg, 1989). Defenders of autonomy con-
sider freedom of choice, not welfare, as the polar star for policymaking.
Therefore, according to this idea, the problem is not whether policymakers
interventions are effective or not: the mere intrusion by an external author-
ity in individuals’ freedom of choice constitutes an impermissible action, no
matter what the outcomes would be. Individuals must have the ”right to be
wrong” in performing their choices (Thaler and Sunstein, 2003, p.241). Ac-
cording to supporters of autonomy of choice, people should be treated with
respect by the government and judgements of individuals cannot be overriden
without harming liberty (Rebonato, 2012).
Of course, even among supporters of autonomy of choice there are differ-
ent views about the acceptability of libertarian paternalistic policies. Some
scholars argue that autonomy is an important component of welfare, but they
19Since the main objective of this work is not to discuss merits and flaws of libertarian
paternalism but rather to propose original contributions within the more general frame-
work of behavioral public policy, I limit myself to report the critiques raised. For a detailed
reply to any of the objections reported in this work, I re-address the interested reader to
Sunstein and Thaler (2003); Thaler and Sunstein (2008); Loewenstein and Haisley (2007).
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still recognize that it is not the only one. Therefore, according to this mild
position, any paternalistic intervention, even those libertarian and not man-
dating behaviors, causes a reduction of welfare. Nonetheless, the same schol-
ars recognize that in certain situations the gains from policy interventions
more than compensate the welfare loss caused by a reduction of autonomy.
Therefore, even if reluctant to give up autonomy of choice, supporters of this
mild position might still accept libertarian policies in some specific contexts
(Conly, 2012).
Conversely, other scholars hold a more radical position with respect to lib-
ertarian paternalism: it harms people’s freedom, and freedom is an end not
a mean. Therefore, libertarian paternalistic interventions should be rejected
as well as any other policy that overrides individuals’ judgements (Wright
and Ginsburg, 2012). This critique is anti-consequentialist in nature20 and
scholars supporting this position most often depart from economic reasoning
on welfare and focus on the violation of a fundamental right to choose freely
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003).
Welfare
A second set of critiques against libertarian paternalism focuses on its welfare
implications. I present below a series of welfaristic objections raised against
libertarian paternalism.
Information. How possibly could a public official know better than myself
what makes my life go well? This is a common and powerful critique that
defendants of the freedom of choice raise against any form of paternalism
and state intervention. The central argument is that people could some-
times make wrong decisions but on the other hand regulators are certainly
more likely to err than individuals. In fact, public officials lack information
about individuals’ preferences and they could fail to correctly interpret what
20For a definition of the consequentialist principle see the next section in this introduc-
tion.
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people’s ends are or what are the best means to achieve these ends. There-
fore, according to this argument, as long as an action is not harming others’
well-being, individuals should be left free to choose whatever they prefer.
Market Solutions. Suppose that consumers care about saving energy and that
refrigerators currently in the market are inefficient: companies competing
to achieve market shares will start producing energy-saving refrigerators,
people will buy them and companies unable to satisfy people’s needs will be
driven out of the market. If people have heterogeneous preferences regarding
the trade-off between price and energy efficiency, companies will produce
differentiated goods that satisfy both needs. Of course companies could
occasionally fool consumers, but in the long run competition ensures that
inefficient companies are driven out of the market.
Moreover, companies could create new products and services that counteract
people’s self-control problems. For examples, in order to help those people
that want to make sure they have enough money for Christmas presents,
banks offer special saving accounts: subscribers can deposit money through-
out the year but not withdraw them until the month of December (Thaler
and Sunstein, 2008). Other companies produce alarm clocks that run away
and hide if a person does not get out of bed on time in order to prevent
oversleeping. Free markets are more dynamic than public officials in un-
derstanding the needs of people. If individuals have self-control problems,
companies will create devices that solve them. Paternalistic interventions
instead have the negative effect of freezing competition.
Learning by Mistakes. We learn, and improve ourselves, from our own mis-
takes. Libertarian paternalism deprives people of the most powerful tool to
discover what they like: making wrong choices (Klick and Mitchell, 2006).
Therefore, libertarian paternalistic interventions prevent people from step-
ping ahead in the process of self-determination and create a world of infan-
tilized citizens (Sugden, 2009). As a consequence, libertarian paternalism
impairs people’s welfare by eliminating the process of learning-by-doing.
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Heterogeneity People’s preferences present a great deal of variation. Indi-
viduals can occasionally make mistakes, but a regulator can only propose a
standardized solution that, in the best case scenario, accomodates the taste
of the majority but decreases the welfare of the others. According to this cri-
tique, people should be left free to choose different ends and to pursue these
ends with different means (Glaeser, 2006). In fact, people’s choices that we
consider as errors might instead just reflect heterogeneity in individual pref-
erences. The private sector is in general more able to recognize and satisfy
people’s variegated needs than public interventions.
Public Choice and the Capture of the Regulator. Private citizens suffer from
behavioral biases, but public officials share the same problem. As a conse-
quence, regulations and interventions enacted by the government will reflect
the same biases of its officials (Glaeser, 2006). Moreover, even if public
officials are trained to overcome behavioral biases, they might promote in-
terventions aimed at reaching their own objectives rather than increasing
citizens’ well-being. On the same line of arguments, lobbies and interest
groups could capture the regulator and push him to adopt public policies
that pursue private interests at the expense of social welfare (Tullock et al.,
2002). This risk is even more pronounced when we consider soft policies that
are not totally transparent and involve risk of subconscious manipulation
(Wright and Ginsburg, 2012).
1.5. Behavioral Science and Policymaking
In this section I tackle a controversial, however vital, issue for the develop-
ment of behavioral public policy: how to increase the interest of policymakers
for behavioral research. Indeed, in recent years the behavioral public policy-
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making movement stepped ahead both in Europe21, in the UK22 and in the
US23. Nonetheless, I agree with the “manifesto of complains” written by On
Amir, Dan Ariely, Alan Cooke and some others among the most prominent
behavioral scientists, where the authors state that “The failure of psychology
and behavioral sciences more generally to influence public policy is particu-
larly painful and frustrating in light of the success of its sibling, economics,
as the basis for policy recommendations” (Amir et al., 2005, p. 444).
In this section, I first analyze some of the possible causes that prevented a full
implementation and development of behavioral public policy. With respect
to this issue, I argue that the comparative advantage of economics and the
main problem for behavioral sciences is that behavioral scholars too often
provide loose definition of concepts and engage in normative welfare evalu-
ations that are not grounded in comprehensive theoretical analysis. I then
underline the fact that behavioral scholars often provide too vague policy
prescriptions. Moreover, I suggest that the technology used to derive policy
prescriptions that intend to be immediately implemented requires more field
experimentation. Finally, in the next paragraph I report some examples of
possible clear and practical solutions suggested by scholars for the funda-
mental problem of behavioral public policy, the determination of a suitable
welfare criterion.
21For an overview of the applications of behavioral policies in the EU see the policy re-
port of Van Bavel et al., 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/health_consumer/
information_sources/docs/30092013_jrc_scientific_policy_report_en.pdf; for
an example of applied policy see the Consumer Rights Directive, art. 31.3, that incorpo-
rates important behavioral insights.
22The Behavioral Insight Team officially established by UK governments in 2010, see
http://www.behaviouralinsights.co.uk/about-us
23The Obama administration officially stated its intention to starte a Behavioral In-
sight Team under the direction of Cass Sunstein that resemble the one already estab-
lished in the UK, see http://www.foxnews.com/politics/interactive/2013/07/30/
behavioral-insights-team-document/.
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How Can Behavioral Science Influence Policymakers?
Theoretical Versus Applied Research. The first point it is important to discuss
is the relationship between theoretical and applied research for behavioral
policymaking. As we have discussed in the previous section, neoclassical
economic theory provide an elaborate benchmark of analysis for empirical
works, that in turn are able to generate a set of precise policy prescriptions.
Behavioral scholars have been someway weak in two respects regarding this
point. First, too often empirical findings lack a clear theoretical framework
that coherently unify the positive and the normative analysis24. The strug-
gles that we documented in section 1.3 of behavioral economists for finding
a suitable welfare criterion might appear odd at a first glance. However,
this theoretical accuracy reassures policymakers (even those not directly in-
volved or interested by the technical discussion) about the validity of the
analytical methodologies applied and would eventually provide a framework
to develop precise policy prescriptions. Behavioral scientists should increas-
ing the amount of research on methodological issues, for example focusing
on determining standards for measuring preferences using non-choice data.
The second problems concerns the gap between scientific publications in be-
havioral sciences and translation into policy applications. Indeed, the gen-
eral principles derived from scientific research too often are not translated
in specific policy prescriptions (Amir et al., 2005, p. 447). Behavioral sci-
entists interested in having direct impact on the society should not expect
policy-makers to do the extra steps required for deriving from a scientific
publication a specific policy prescription, especially in a situation where a
comprehensive theoretical framework has not been established yet. Scholars
and researcher should instead actively engage in the policymaking process
and exploit channels of communication commonly used by policymakers, in-
cluding publications in non-scientific journals and direct consultancy.
24The same concern applied to empirical legal studies in general is expressed by Fis-
chman (2013), that claims a reunification of “is and “ought” within the legal discipline.
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Technology. The goal of scientific experimentation is to isolate and identify
the causal effects of a specific factor on the theoretical construct. Therefore,
experiments often involve the construction of artificial settings that abstract
from context-dependent circumstances. Conversely, policies have always to
be applied in specific settings, where multiple concurring stimuli and forces
act simultaneously. Therefore, to make behavioral researches more directly
applicable to policymaking, researchers should sometimes trade-off scientific
precision for field experimentations that are robust to specific context situa-
tions.
Vaguely Correct or Precisely Wrong? In principle, the precise answer to a
policymaker’s question regarding the effects of a specific policy should always
been “it depends”. In fact, scholars provide a substantial body of evidence
that situational factors and even apparently minor details play a key role
in determining how certain stimuli affect human behavior (see Kahneman,
2003 for an overview). Conversely, policymakers require clear-cut answers.
Therefore, behavioral scientists wanting to engage in the policymaking pro-
cess sometimes face a trade-off between the need to follow rigorous scientific
prescriptions and the necessity to provide clear recommendations.
The next paragraph discusses a situation where this trade-off is present,
finding a suitable welfare criterion for behavioral public policymaking. Above
I discussed how crucial is this issue for welfare analysis and we have seen that
scholars did not reach a consensus regarding the standards to adopt. I report
possible solutions that attempt to balance the need of scientific rigor, thus
offsetting the risks of an indiscriminate abandon of the revealed preferences
approach, with the practical problems faced by policymakers that want to
apply behavioral public policies.
What Welfare Criterion? Provide an Imperfect but Pragmatic Approach to
Policymakers
A welfare criterion that does not truly depart from the basic assumption of
the preference-based approach is known as ”Informed Decision Utility”. This
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criterion requires policymakers to ensure that agents are truly informed when
they are making their choices. Hence, it suggests to provide warnings against
possible decision biases and to facilitate agents’ gathering of information
about the object of choice. Furthermore, in situations where agents tend to
underappreciate the risks or the long-term consequences of certain actions,
informed decision utility policies expose and make these consequences salient
to agents25.
One problem with this approach is that policymakers have to engage in value
judgements, deciding among the infinite range of situations where informa-
tion could be improved which ones require policy interventions. Moreover,
as we discussed before, information is unlikely to be ”neutral”: the choice
involved might be affected in opposite ways according to the framing of the
information provided. Therefore, deciding how to convey the information
involves some form of welfare criterion that is not specified. A second lim-
itation of this approach is that it addresses only problems of suboptimal
decisions deriving from a lack of attention or information, but does not of-
fer solutions for mistakes deriving from self-control problems. Either naive
agents unaware of the behavioral biases leading them to poor decisions or
sophisticated individuals that are seeking for solutions of their self-control
problems would actually derive little benefits from just being told about the
problem without being offered a solution.
Another criterion for the adoption of behavioral policies has been proposed by
Camerer et al. (2003). The authors specify the ”ideal” conditions being that
the policy would help people that behave suboptimally but has no impact on
the behavior of the people that already make optimal choices. Hence, default
rules or framing alternatives seem to satisfy this criterion, since they may
steer inattent people toward advantageous alternatives without imposing any
25For example Loewenstein and Haisley (2007) report an existing program that aims
at discouraging childbearing by young mothers not ready for it by providing dolls that
require constant attention to teenagers at risk for pregnancy.
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mandate to others. On the other hand the authors recognize that many poli-
cies, while beneficial for biased agents, would impose costs on those who are
rationally choosing the optimal outcome. Hence, they propose a ”looser but
pragmatic” criterion based on cost-benefit analysis: to implement a policy
any time its aggregate benefits to behaviorally biased individuals exceed the
costs imposed to unbiased agents. While this criterion is useful in shifting
the discussion from the abstract concepts of autonomy and freedom to the
more concrete measures of benefits and costs (where losses of freedom and
autonomy are treated as a cost), nonetheless it does not address the main
point of finding a welfare measure that is not preference-based.
Finally, a more comprehensive proposal has been advanced by Loewenstein
and Haisley (2007, p.221). The authors argue that behavioral policies should
be safely implemented when ”welfare judgement tend to be relatively straigh-
forward”. In order to identify these situations, they propose a set of sufficient
conditions:
• Dominance: there are frequent situations in which people simply ”leave
money on the table”, as in the case of an employee that could con-
tribute to her saving account, benefitting from the employer’s match
and withdrawing the full deposit the same day without penalty (Choi
et al., 2011). Unless we rely on the unrealistic assumption that people
show non-monotonic preferences for money, in these situation it is clear
that some behavioral bias is the cause of suboptimal decision outcomes.
This criterion could be also extended to stochastic dominance. Accord-
ing to stochastic dominance, policy interventions are justified if, in a
situation involving an agent’s choice under risk, the returns are maxi-
mized at any possible level of risk. For example, people including their
own stock in their retirement portfolio show a behavior that violates
stochastic dominance.
• Clearly Negative Outcomes: sometimes people’s decisions generate out-
comes that are detrimental under any perspective. For example, many
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householders in the US borrow from credit cards at a rate of approxi-
mally 18% and at the same time lend money getting a fix return of 6%
(Sunstein and Thaler, 2003). In a situation like this, people simply fail
to take advantage of an arbitrage opportunity, leaving therefore money
on the table. Libertarian policy interventions seem not to require fur-
ther justifications in similar situations.
• Self-officiating: Obese people, gamblers or drug addicted constantly
report they would be better off were they able to modify their behavior
regarding food, gambling or drug consumption. In these situations, it
seems reasonable to implement libertarian paternalistic policies to help
them achieving the desired goals. Loewenstein and Haisley (2007) state
this condition specifying they embrace a concept of welfare based on
preferences rather than choices. In fact the authors recognize that in
certain situations behavioral biases might drive individual choices in
directions not reflecting inherent preferences.
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2. From Individual to Aggregate Welfare: Policy Analysis and the
Choice of the Social Welfare Function26
In the last section of the previous chapter, I discussed one fundamental
methodological problem specific of behavioral public policymaking, that is
finding an appropriate welfare criterion to conduct social policy analysis.
In this chapter, I consider a related however different methodological prob-
lem, the aggregation of individuals’ well-being in a unique measure of social
welfare. This problem is not specific of behavioral public policy but, more
generally, affects every approach to social policy analysis.
In order to introduce the problem that the social analyst faces when he
has to perform a social policy analysis consider an example. Imagine the
major of a city that faces the possibility of a traffic plan reorganization.
The plan considers opening to traffic a new street in the city center. The
new street would cause an increase of daily earnings of Bill’s mini-market
located there from $2 to $3. On the other hand, it will overall increase
the number of people shopping in the area instead of driving outside town,
and nearby John’s supermarket will decrease its daily earnings from $6 to
$4.5. The reorganization does not affect any other agent in the city and
the major in evaluating the plan only cares about the well-being of business
and people belonging to his city. Should the major proceed with the plan
implementation?
In analyzing the situation, the major could be interested in maximizing the
26This chapter is largely based on my paper ”When Choosing the Social Welfare Func-
tion Really Matters: a Quantitative Analysis”, Rotterdam Institute of Law and Economics
(RILE) Working Paper Series No. 2013/01, that I coauthored with Diogo Gerard. The
idea to write this paper was originnaly suggested by Francesco Parisi during a private con-
versation: I am deeply indebited with professor Parisi for his comments, suggestions and
the support received while writing this work. I also thank Emanuela Carbonara, Robert
Cooter, Michael Faure, Jonathan Klick, Louis Visscher and also conference and workshop
participants at the 2013 European Association of Law and Economics Annual Meeting,
the 2013 German Association of Law and Economics Annual Meeting and the Institute of
Law and Economics at Erasmus University Rotterdam. The usual disclaimer applies.
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sum of his fellow citizens’ wealth. Therefore, since implementing the plan
would reduce total wealth from $8 to $7.5, the new plan will be dropped.
Alternatively, the major could be interested in increasing proportional wealth,
that is he would implement the plan only if the percentage increase in wealth
of the benefited agent exceeds that of the agent made worse off. In this second
case the plan would be implemented, since $(2*6)=$12 < $(3*4.5)=$13.5.
Or again, the major could be interested in maximizing the sum of his fellow
citizens’ utility27. If he estimates that agents have a utility function of the
form f(x)=
√
x, then the plan will be dropped, since $(
√
2+
√
6) = $3.86
> $(
√
3+
√
4.5) = $3.85. Alternatively, it is possible that the major, in
light of some extra-welfarist consideration, attaches a greater weight to Bill’s
achieving and so he will decide to implement the plan. De facto, the initial
question does not have a clear-cut answer.
Before proceeding, let us move from our example to a more general framework
of analysis. Consider evaluating the welfare-effect of any policy affecting
two agents or interest groups, A and B. The policy determines a welfare
increase for group A while worsening the wealth of group B. The status
quo is W = (wa, wb), while the allocation after the policy is implemented is
W ′ = (wa+k, wb−), where k and  are positive numbers. We could interpret
the parameter k as the degree of inefficiency implied by the redistribution.
For example, when k=1, the system of redistribution is perfectly efficient and
resources can be freely transferred between individuals at no cost. Instead, if
k<1, we are in a ”leaky bucket” situation, whereby redistributing resources
implies an overall deadweight loss. While k∈[0;1] represents the majority of
the situations involving redistributions, nevertheless in some specific cases,
it also possible that k>1. For example, we could think of situations where
the transfer happens from an unproductive agent (e.g. a rent-seeker) to an
agent that creates new wealth (e.g. a start-up). Therefore, every time k 6=1
27Assuming utility is strictly a function of wealth and interpersonal comparable.
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there is a trade-off between equity and efficiency.
The aforementioned difficulty to provide a clear-cut policy evaluation is con-
nected on the one hand to the problems involved in estimating the correct
subjects’ utility functional form. On the other hand, the result of the social
policy evaluation is affected by the value judgments that the policy ana-
lyst implicitly assumes. Policy analyst’s preferences for redistribution are
in fact expressed in the specific method chosen for aggregating individuals’
well-being. The analytical tool employed by the social analyst for aggregat-
ing individuals’ well-being in a unitarian measure is called the social welfare
function (SWF onward; I will use this acronym also for the plural cases).
The concept of SWF was introduced by Bergson (1938) and Samuelson (1947)
in order to enable formal analysis in the area of welfare economics. Very
broadly speaking, a SWF could be defined as a real value function deter-
mining social welfare, ”the value of which is understood to depend on all
the variables that might be considered as affecting welfare” (Bergson, 1938,
p.417). Indeed, the analytical representation of aggregate individuals’ prefer-
ences by means of a SWF allows obtaining a social ordering over alternative
possible states of the world. Therefore, the construction of a SWF involves
a two-step procedure that follows the process described above: first, mak-
ing interpersonal comparisons of utility and subsequently aggregating the
measures of individual utilities.
Regarding the first step, interpersonal comparisons of utility involves provid-
ing a description of individuals’ preferences. Economists describe individual
preferences indirectly by means of a utility function, an analytical tool that
ranks individuals’ ordering of alternative states of the world. By defining
a utility function, a policy analyst assigns utility indexes to different states
of the world in order to reflect their ranking. However, the choice of any
particular numerical representation of a utility function that maintains the
original ordering is in principle correct, given that utility numbers have no
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intrinsic value other than to describe the rank-ordering of the individual28.
Therefore, a policy analyst may choose different numerical representations
of a utility function, which means that ex-ante there is not one most appro-
priate choice. Hence, it must be noted for the purpose of the present work
that this analyst’s choice implicitly produces normative statements regarding
income distribution. An example presenting the problem graphically is also
proposed in Figure 1.
Also regarding the aggregation of individual preferences, value judgments
concerning the issue of redistribution are involved in the choice of an aggre-
gation method. In fact, it is possible to choose different functional forms in
order to aggregate individual preferences, with each of these functions re-
flecting a different normative view of what constitutes social welfare. For
example, as we discuss in detail in the next section, while social welfare is
composed by the sum of individuals’ utilities under the utilitarian approach,
under the approach usually associated to the philosopher John Rawls (1971),
the utility of the least well-off individual determines the social welfare of the
society.
The present work aims to enrich the existing literature on social policy anal-
ysis concerned with the problem of efficient and fair resources allocation.
Throughout the chapter, I revise some fairness criteria among those com-
monly used in law, economics and political science when performing policy
analysis. However, I do not enter into the debate on which is the ethically
or philosophically appropriate criterion the policy analyst should embrace.
Instead, I provide a quantitative analysis of the relationship among alter-
native criteria specifications that reflect different distributional preferences.
My goal is to quantitatively define the implicit relationships existing between
different criteria of fairness that are commonly embraced by the analyst in
28For the discussion about cardinal and ordinal utility functions and further references
see the Introduction to this thesis.
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Figure 1: An example of a redistributive policy evaluation that might lead to opposite
outcomes according to the social welfare function chosen for the analysis. Given agents’
wealth W1 and W2, BWsq and NWsq represent the social welfare of the status quo, calcu-
lated respectively by the sum of individuals’ wealth and by its multiplication. Conversely,
BW’ and NW’ represent the social welfare after the redistribution of a quantity  of re-
sources from W2 to W1. BW’ and NW’ are plotted as a function of k, the level of efficiency
in transferring resources among agents. NW’ is evaluated as a welfare improvement of the
status quo for levels of efficiency in transferring resources bigger than k∗NW , while BW’
is considered an improvement of the status quo when k>k∗BW . Therefore, if the actual
level of efficiency in transferring resources k∗ is k∗NW<k<k
∗
BW , the analyst’s choice of the
social welfare function will determine the policy evaluation result.
performing social policy evaluations.
A multitude of fairness criteria has been proposed in philosophy and social
sciences. In this chapter I restrict the analysis to a selected subset of these
criteria. On one hand, I distinguish between individual wealth and utility as
indicators of individual well-being. Within the utility specification, I further
differentiate between the cases of exponential, polynomial and logarithmic
utility functions. Furthermore, I consider different aggregation methods that
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correspond to alternative perspectives on the idea of fairness, namely: the
sum of individuals’ welfare (”Bentham criterion”); the multiplication (”Nash
criterion”); and the maximization of the less well-off individual’s welfare
(”Rawls criterion”).
I restrict the analysis to these three notions for the following reasons. First,
I want to limit the discussion to cases that are the most prominent and com-
monly used in law and economics, as well as in welfare economics literature.
Moreover, as I will discuss in section 3, precise definitions and axiomatic
characterizations have been provided in the context of economic theory for
the three criteria considered. Finally, the three cases cover the entire range of
possible redistribution considerations, from the fairness-neutrality perspec-
tive of utilitarianism to the focus on the least well-off agent of the Rawlsian
theory, passing through the intermediate position adopted by Nash. As an
additional extension, I further investigate the possibility of generalizing re-
sults from a policy evaluation under the two following cases: first, transfer
happens strictly from better-off agents to worse-off agents (”Robin-hood con-
dition”); or, second, the transfer happens only from poorer to richer agents
and increases total wealth (”Efficiency Increasing condition”).
I make the following contributions to the debate regarding the choice of the
social welfare function for conducting policy analysis:
1. I formally show that, in general, different combinations of individual
well-being evaluation and aggregation methods rank alternative states
of the world differently.
2. However, I demonstrate that some apparently distinct combinations
always rank alternative states of the world in the same order.
3. Considering a two-agent situation, I derive quantitative conditions nec-
essary to generalize the policy evaluation results obtained implementing
a specific combination of individual utility and aggregation method to
the other social welfare functional forms considered.
4. I extend the analysis by allowing weight attached to agents (or groups
53
size) to differ.
The present work is the first of its kind in the fields of law, welfare economics
and policy analysis.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In section 2.2, I
provide an overview of the literature in economics and law and economics
dealing with resources allocation. In section 2.3 I introduce notation, spec-
ify formal definitions and provide a discussion about the three aggregation
criteria considered. In section 2.4 I formally show the impossibility of gen-
eralizing results obtained with a specific SWF, underlying exceptions and
special cases. In section 2.5 I derive the quantitative conditions necessary for
the generalization of results in a two-agent scenario. Section 2.6 concludes
the chapter, summarizing the results obtained and possible applications. Ta-
bles reporting the quantitative results and relative proofs are provided in
Appendix A.
2.1. Fairness and Justice, still an Open Debate: Literature Review
Researchers in the social sciences take very different philosophical and ethical
positions regarding what constitutes social welfare and the proper distribu-
tion of resources. As a consequence, in the branches of welfare economics
operating interpersonal comparison of well-being, different SWF forms have
been proposed, each reflecting a specific interpretation and value judgment
(in the following discussion, I focus on the SWF forms most common in the
literature; for a survey considering also less commonly use SWF forms, see
Young, 1995 and for a discussion see Foster and Sen, 1997; Ng, 2007). Due
to this multiplicity of normative criteria, the assessment of a social policy
desirability in practice might depend upon the analyst’s choice of the SWF.
Aware of the importance of this issue, welfare economics scholars have ex-
tensively contributed to the discussion in recent decades. Axiomatic charac-
terizations of the concept of distributive justice and various SWF forms have
been proposed, with each of them reflecting a different standard of fairness
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(see for example Mirrlees, 1971; Mas-Colell et al., 1995; Sen, 1973; Muller,
1989; Ng, 2000; in the next section, I discuss in detail some of the norma-
tive positions advanced by these authors). I am aware that the concepts of
“fairness” and “justice”, while sometimes difficult to disentangle, neverthe-
less refer to different notions (for an in-depth discussion, see Rawls, 2001).
Despite such differences, scholars in the social sciences sometimes use them
interchangeably, following Rawl’s argument that a society may in practice
only be “just” if it is also “fair” (Rawls, 1958, 1985; however, there are cri-
tiques of this position, see for example Knight, 1998 and Sen, 2009). Whereas
a discussion of this issue lies beyond the scope of the present work, I strive to
be consistent by employing the notion of “fairness” referring to a “perceived
appropriateness of the distribution of goods and services”. Furthermore, I
also specify in the text when contributions that use the word “fairness” with
a meaning distinct from mine are reviewed, as for example in Kaplow and
Shavell (2009, 2001, 1999).
Indeed, the relationship between the concepts of efficiency and justice also re-
mains an open issue in other fields that apply economic analysis, for example
law and economics (Parisi and Rowley, 2005). Posner (1985) contributes to
the debate, defending the concept of wealth maximization as a guide for judi-
cial action. According to the concept of wealth maximization, judicial action
should promote the activities implying the creation of the highest achievable
level of wealth for the society. By contrast, Calabresi (1970, 1985) argues
that justice is an end of different order with respect to efficiency, which is
only one of the components of this more complex notion. Hence, from his
perspective an increase in wealth may not realize a social improvement if
disconnected from fairness considerations. Therefore, in Calabresi’s view the
function of law and economics discipline involves the analysis not of justice
itself, but rather of certain ingredients, such as efficiency, concurring to shape
the notion of justice.
In a series of papers, Kaplow and Shavell (1999, 2001, 2009) adopt a strictly
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welfaristic approach and defend the idea that social decisions must be based
exclusively on their effects on individuals’ well-being, thus excluding any el-
ement of what they call “fairness” from the analysis. However, it should be
noticed that what the authors mean by “fairness” substantially differs from
the concept we use in the present work. In order to define the notions of
fairness, the authors state that “evaluations relying on it are not based ex-
clusively – and sometimes are not dependent at all – on how legal policies
affect individuals’ well-being” (Kaplow and Shavell, 2009, p.39). Hence, ac-
cording to the authors’ terminology, the concept of fairness includes ideas of
justice, natural rights and similar concepts that do not have a direct link with
individuals’ welfare. However, it must be underlined that by excluding fair-
ness from social decision-making, Kaplow and Shavell do not suggest that
economic analysis should avoid making normative statements, particularly
regarding the problem of redistributive justice. As the authors makes clear,
the argument of their contributions applies independently of which partic-
ular position regarding distributive justice has been embraced (Kaplow and
Shavell, 2009, Ch.II, pp.15-38). Kaplow and Shavell’s works contributed to
arouse the discussion among legal and economic scholars concerning what
constitutes social welfare, as well as its relationship with the concept of jus-
tice (see, among others, Craswell, 2003; Chang, 2000; Dorff, 2002; Fleurbaey
et al., 2003; Spector, 2004).
Nonetheless, despite such rich series of qualitative investigations of the con-
cept of fairness, there has been little work in welfare economics, legal disci-
plines or political science to quantitatively define the relationship between
the different SWF specifications. In fact, contributions deriving quantitative
results have been produced almost exclusively outside the specific domain
of social sciences. For example, the relationship between fairness and effi-
ciency in resource allocation problems has been investigated in engineering
applications in communication networks (Luo et al., 2004), air traffic flow
management problems (Terrab and Odoni, 1993) or financial applications
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and the multi-account optimization problem (see for example Khodadadi
et al., 2006). However, such works usually focus on specific situations and
thus their results cannot be easily generalized.
Bertsimas et al. (2011) is the only contribution that quantitatively provide
insights regarding the relationship between fairness and efficiency in a more
general framework. The authors consider different fairness schemes in the
context of a resource allocation problem involving multiple agents. Adopting
the allocation that maximizes the sum of utilities as a reference point for
optimality, they calculate the loss of efficiency implied by switching from an
optimal allocation to other more fairness-concerned schemes. Accordingly,
Bertimas et al. quantitatively estimate this ”price of fairness” in the context
of a resources allocation problem, showing how the loss of efficiency associ-
ated with fairness-concerned resources allocation schemes variates with the
number of players involved in the allocation problem.
Before proceeding with my contribution, in the next section I provide a formal
definitions of the concepts I employ.
2.2. Definitions and Research Questions
Following Sen (1970), I define a SWF as a real-valued function that ranks
conceivable social states (alternative complete descriptions of the society)
from lowest to highest. Inputs of the function include any variables consid-
ered to affect the economic welfare of a society. One use of SWF relevant for
the present discussion is to represent prospective patterns of collective choice
regarding alternative social states.
Formally, a SWF could be defined as follow:
SW(W): Rn −→ R
where W = (V1, V2, V3, ..., Vn) is a vector containing the welfare of each single
individual in the population. The only assumption I impose is the function
to be weakly increasing in the welfare of each single individual. Formally, if
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W 1 ≥ W 2, then SW (W 1) ≥ SW (W 2).
Note that, in principle, this formulation is general enough to accommodate
any desired measure of welfare as a maximand. In this work, I consider the
cases where it is defined as an individual’s wealth or utility, given that these
are the most commonly used in the literature.
Regarding the specific form of SWF, the widespread interest in fairness within
social sciences has resulted in a multiplicity of principles that have been pro-
posed and applied. However, in practice the criterion used in most policy
analysis is restricted to a small number of SWF forms. Specifically, these
most frequently applied functions critically diverge in the way in which they
embody the trade-off between efficiency and fairness (for an in-depth discus-
sion on this topic see Young, 1995 and Sen and Foster, 1997). I present the
three most commonly used SWF forms in the social sciences.
First of all, I introduce the SWF inspired by the work of the British philoso-
pher Jeremy Bentham, labelled ”classical utilitarianism”. The utilitarian
principle has the objective of maximizing the sum of agents’ welfare, or, us-
ing Bentham’s words, ”the greatest happiness of the greatest number that
is the measure of right and wrong” (Bentham, 1776, Preface, p.ii). Hence, I
define a ”Bentham” SWF as:
SWB(W ) =
N∑
i=1
Vi (1)
The problem with any utilitarian solution, also called the Bentham-Edgeworth
solution, is the entire absence of fairness considerations. Hence, from an ethi-
cal standard, the acceptability of the utilitarian principle has been questioned
from more perspectives (see for example Gauthier, 1963; Nagel, 1970; Rawls,
1971).
A different perspective is derived from Nash’s studies of bargaining solutions,
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the Nash standard of comparison (Nash, 1950)29. Under the framework pro-
posed by Nash, a transfer of resources between agents is justified if the per-
centage of welfare increase of the gainer is greater than the loser’s percentage
loss. Therefore, a ”Nash” SWF can be defined as:
SWN(W ) =
N∏
i=1
Vi (2)
Finally, I consider a SWF form inspired by the work of the American philoso-
pher Rawls (1971, 1974a,b). According to this theoretical position, the wel-
fare of a society is constituted by the welfare of its least well-off individual.
Hence, any welfare-enhancing policy should involve maximizing the welfare
of the worse-off agent. Therefore, a ”Rawls” SWF could be formally written
as:
SWR(W ) = minNi=1 {Vi} (3)
The three forms of SWF I consider in this chapter could fairly represent
the full range of preferences concerning the trade-off between efficiency and
distributive fairness. The Bentham SWF implies a full concern for efficiency
and no consideration for fairness. In fact, an increase in the total amount
of wealth is considered a welfare improvement, no matter if it comes at the
expense of the worse-off agent and if it further increases inequality. The
opposite position is implied by the Rawls SWF, that is only concerned about
fairness and does not consider efficiency. In fact, according to a Rawls SWF
the welfare of a society is evaluated by the welfare of its worst-off individual.
29Kalai and Smorodinsky (1975) propose and axiomatize an alternative solution to the
Nash standard of comparison. The two solutions differ for the set of axioms that they are
able to satisfy. In particular, the Nash solution satisfies Pareto optimality, symmetry, affine
invariance and independence of irrelevant alternatives. The Kalai-Smorodinsky solution,
beside the first three axioms of the Nash solution, satisfies also monotonicity, however it
is not able to satisfy the independence of irrelevant alternatives.
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Therefore, no social welfare increase is achievable if the poorest agent does
not increase his situation. Finally, the Nash SWF assume an intermediate
position between Bentham and Rawls. On the one hand, it is concerned
about efficiency and in some situations might consider a welfare improvement
an activity that further increases the welfare of the better-off agent while it
reduces the welfare of the worse-off agent. On the other hand, the Nash SWF
implicitly weights more the welfare of the poorest agent, since to consider
welfare-improving a policy it requires that the percentage of welfare increase
of the gainer is greater than the loser’s percentage loss. In fact, holding
constant a given amount of resources, the poorer an agent, the greater is the
percentage of total wealth represented by this amount.
I now move to another dimension of the problem, presenting the forms of
maximand that I consider in this paper. In broad terms, within the litera-
ture one most frequently chooses to use either the wealth or some measure of
utility as a measure of individual well-being. These possibilities differ in two
fundamental aspects that are closely related. First, since marginal utility of
wealth is commonly assumed to be strictly decreasing, choosing utility as a
maximand is equivalent to stating that individuals are risk averse to some
degree. However, the same does not apply to wealth, which implies risk
neutrality concerning individuals’ welfare. The second point is that, due to
decreasing marginal utility, the use of the utility function as a maximand em-
bodies some distributional concerns because one extra unit of wealth is more
valuable to a worse-off individual in comparison to someone better-off. The
degree to which the utility function embodies risk aversion and distributional
concerns hinges on the particular choice of the utility function and its degree
of concavity. Therefore, I consider three forms of utility function commonly
used: polynomial (constant relative risk aversion), logarithmic (constant rel-
ative risk aversion) and exponential (constant absolute risk aversion). To
summarize, I consider the following maximands:
• Wealth: Vi = wi , where wi is the wealth of the individual i
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• Polynomial Utility: Vi = u(wi) = wαi , where α ∈ (0, 1)
• Logarithmic Utility: Vi = u(wi) = ln(wi)
• Exponential Utility: Vi = u(wi) = 1− e−αwi , where α ∈ (0, 1)
By combining these 4 maximands with the three aggregation methods de-
scribed above, I find the twelve specifications analyzed in this chapter and
summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Social Welfare Function Specifications
Maximand/SWF Form Bentham Nash Rawls
Wealth
∑N
i=1wi Π
N
i=1wi min
N
i=1 {wi}
Polynomial
∑N
i=1w
α
i Π
N
i=1w
α
i min
N
i=1 {wαi }
Logarithmic
∑N
i=1 ln(wi) Π
N
i=1ln(wi) min
N
i=1 {ln(wi)}
Exponential
∑N
i=1(1− e−αwi) ΠNi=1(1− e−αwi) minNi=1 {(1− e−αwi)}
In the next section, I formally show that, in general, it is not possible to
extend the result of a policy evaluation obtained choosing a particular form of
SWF to analysis that employ different SWFs. However, I discuss separately
exceptions and particular cases in which the results obtained are robust to
generalizations.
2.3. General Results and Special Cases
2.3.1. Generality of Results obtained under a particular SWF: different SWFs
rank alternative states of the world in different orders
In this section, I show that any specific form of SWF could potentially rank
preferences over states differently to other SWF forms. Hence, an improve-
ment in welfare a reseracher claims when he analyzes a situation employing
a specific SWF specification might not be confirmed by other analyses that
use different SWF. An exception to this statement is represented by some
special cases discussed thereafter.
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The intuition behind my way of proceeding is the following. I start by consid-
ering the marginal effects of two distinct individuals’ welfare on a particular
SWF form. I subsequently compare the ratio of these marginal effects with
the ratio of the same marginal effects derived assuming a different SWF
form. If the ratio of individuals’ marginal effects differs among the two SWF
specifications, this means it is always possible to reallocate resources within
individuals in such a way that the new allocation is welfare-improving for
one of the SWFs considered. Specifically, when I subtract one unit of welfare
from individual j, the amount of resources I need to give to individual i to
compensate the social welfare loss is lower in the SWF that has the lower
relative value of j over i. Therefore, an increase in agent i’s welfare that re-
stores social welfare to the initial level in the low-interpersonal value SWF is
not sufficient to restore initial social welfare under other higher-interpersonal
value SWFs.
Let SW 1 and SW 2 be two social welfare functions ordering the social plan-
ner’s preferences over states of welfare, W, which is a vector of ”n” compo-
nents containing the wealth of each individual.
Proposition 1. If
∂SW1
∂wj
∂SW1
∂wi
and
∂SW2
∂wj
∂SW2
∂wi
exist, and for some j,i,
∂SW1
∂wj
∂SW1
∂wi
6=
∂SW2
∂wj
∂SW2
∂wi
,
then SW 1 and SW 2 are not equivalent, in the sense that they do not rank
all possible allocations in the same order.
Proof. See Appendix A
Corollary 1. Given the same maximand, Bentham, Nash and Rawls SWFs
do not necessarily rank alternative states of the world equally.
Proof. See Appendix A
Proposition 1 shows that in order to have two distinct SWFs ranking all
the possible states of the world equally, the relative value of all pairs of an
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individual’s wealth must be the same among the two functions at any point in
the domain. This implies that a modification of the status quo may or may
not be considered welfare improving, depending on the SWF specification
selected by the policy analysts.
To conclude, I have shown that the evaluation of a policy derived using a
specific SWF does not necessarily hold when performing the analysis with
other SWF forms. However, I show in the next paragraph that there are
exceptions and particular cases to this proposition.
2.3.2. Exceptions and Special Cases
Now I show that, even though different forms of SWF generally yield distinct
preferences over states of the world, there are nevertheless particular cases
where generalizations are possible. I proceed by showing that some commonly
used SWFs provide equivalent policy evaluation results.
Proposition 2. The following paired choices of SWF form and maximand
always rank alternative states of the world in the same order:
• Nash SWF with wealth: SWNw(W ) = ΠNi=1wi
• Nash SWF with polynomial utility: SWNpol(W ) = ΠNi=1wαi , α ∈ (0, 1)
• Bentham SWF with logarithmic utility: SWBlog(W ) = ∑Ni=1 lnwi
Proof. See Appendix A
Proposition 2 states an interesting equivalence between some forms of Ben-
tham and Nash aggregation methods paired with different maximands. It
is worth noticing this analogy, because Bentham and Nash criteria reflect
distinct perspectives regarding the trade-off between equity and efficiency.
Indeed, a Bentham aggregation method gives more weight to efficiency than
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a Nash one. However, I have shown that the choice of a logarithmic maxi-
mand coupled with a Bentham SWF would produce exactly the same results
as a Nash-polynomial SWF. Hence, the alternative ethical and philosophical
values embodied by these two aggregation methods do not lead to differ-
ent policy evaluation results when specific individual utility functions that
”counteract” such differences are chosen.
As shown in the present and previous subsections, the generalization of re-
sults is only possible within a subset of SWF specifications. Therefore, in
the following section I derive quantitative results for the possibility of gener-
alizing policy evaluation results across the SWF forms considered.
2.4. Assessing Generality of Policy Analysis Results
From what I have shown in the previous sections, one might be tempted to
argue that any policy evaluation result is only valid as long as the ethical
and philosophical values embodied in the SWF chosen by the policymaker are
considered acceptable. In particular, I have already underlined that choos-
ing a specific SWF in evaluating a redistributive policy implies a normative
value judgment regarding the trade-off between inefficiency due to redistri-
bution and fairness. However, despite the aforementioned impossibility of a
straightforward generalization, in this section I investigate and compare the
robustness of policy results obtained through different SWF. In particular, I
want to check whether, all things being equal, there are SWF specifications
whose results are more general than others, in the sense that they accommo-
date a broader class of value judgments.
I consider a two-agent (or interest groups) scenario. One reason for the
introduction of this simplified framework is that it is often the case in either
theoretical literature or applications that a policy introduction only directly
affects two specific interest groups, leaving the other population members
unaffected. Moreover, a two-agent scenario allows deriving useful general
quantitative insights about the relationship intercurring between alternative
SWF specifications, avoiding at the same time analytical complications. I
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initially derive quantitative conditions required for extending results without
imposing restrictions. I then proceed in later subsections by focusing the
analysis on either fairness-improving or efficiency-improving transfers. In
the former case, I restrict the attention to the reallocation of resources only
benefitting the worst agent at the expense of the best-off. Instead, in the
latter case I consider transfers that increase the overall quantity of social
wealth at the cost of decreasing equality. As we will see, these restrictions
allow for some generalizations of results. Furthermore, they also reflect the
majority of real world situations in which a prospected policy is evaluated,
given that it would be straightforward to evaluate as desirable a policy that
increases societal wealth and at the same time reduces inequality.
I further differentiate the analysis with respect to group size30. While I
consider interest groups to have the same population size in the next subsec-
tions, by contrast, I investigate how the relationship between different SWF
changes when group sizes are non-homogeneous in the final subsection. The
idea is to consider the effects of a policy change that affects both parties,
increasing the welfare of one party while making the other worse-off. The
objective is to determine how the conditions necessary to register a societal
welfare-improvement vary across different SWFs.
2.4.1. Groups of Homogeneous Size
In this section I consider aggregation methods and maximands summarized
in Table 1: three aggregation criteria, Bentham (B), Nash (N) and Rawls
(R), combined with four possible individual utility function specifications,
utility equal to wealth (W), polynomial utility (P), logarithmic utility (L) and
exponential utility (E). Table A.4 in Appendix A reports the minimal level of
k necessary to rank the new allocation generated by the redistribution weakly
30It is also possible to interpret this situation as assigning different weights to individ-
uals in a two-agent resources allocation problem, a procedure commonly used in extra-
welfaristic policy analysis.
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preferred to the status quo for any of the combinations examined. While it
is not possible to prove general results if we do not impose restrictions, Table
A.4 could be useful for conducting a case-by-case analysis. In fact, although
results are not very tractable closed forms, it is possible to check whether
the results of a policy evaluated as welfare-improving when analyzed with a
given SWF are confirmed under other SWF specifications.
Let me provide an example in order to clarify the procedure. Assume for
instance that a redistributive policy analysis is conducted using a Bentham-
exponential (B-E) maximand. The welfare of the groups in the status quo is
WA,B = (10, 6), the amount eventually lost by B is  = 2, the gain of A is k
and the exponential discount factor is α=0.3. Hence, given the status quo
welfares and the parameter , it is sufficient to plug these values into table A.4
to derive the minimum level of the inefficiency parameter k that makes the
policy desirable under B-E. In our example, the policy is welfare-improving
under B-E if k≥0.474. Given this result, it is possible to check which SWFs,
holding the parameters value constant, require a lower level of k in order
to also consider the policy welfare-improving. In this example, it turns out
that N-E and the R specifications require a lower level of k and thus derive
a higher level of social welfare from the policy implementation. In fact, a
smaller value of k means that, given the welfare loss borne by group B, the
welfare increase of group A required in order to increase the overall social
welfare vis-a`-vis the status quo is lower than that required by the original
B-E specification. On the other hand, all the other SWF specifications in the
example require a higher minimal level of k, and hence according to these
SWFs the policy would be considered welfare-reducing.
It should be noted that Bentham-Logarithm, Nash-Wealth and Nash-Polynomial
share the same k. In fact, as shown in Proposition 2, these SWFs rank alter-
native states of the world in the same way. Another interesting result is that
Bentham-Wealth only requires the net difference in wealth to be positive.
Finally, it is worth underlining that Bentham-Wealth, Bentham-Polynomial
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and Bentham-Logarithm (and Nash-Wealth and Nash-Polynomial) are not
sensitive to the unit of measure of wealth. In fact, if we proportionally in-
crease the wealth of both groups and , k does not change. This happens
because, in the former cases, multiplying the wealth of each individual in
the population by a constant is equivalent to a monotonic transformation
in these SWF, thus preserving the ranking over all possible states. How-
ever, the same is not true for Bentham-Exponential, Nash-Logarithm and
Nash-Exponential.
2.4.2. Groups of Homogeneous Size and Restrictive Conditions on Transfers
Now consider a policy redistribution where transfers are subject to specific
conditions. First of all, consider the situation in which transfers of resources
are only possible from the best-off to the worst-off group. I name this kind of
transfers ”Robin-hood” (RH). Furthermore, I also consider the situation in
which transfers strictly occur from the less wealthy to the wealthier group and
increase total wealth. I label these transfers “Efficiency-increasing” (EI). The
intuition is that a policy implementing EI transfers would further increase
inequality, but could nonetheless be desirable from a social perspective if
the wealthiest group’s gains more than compensate the losses borne by the
poorest group31. Under the condition that transfers are either RH or EI, I
derive the following results:
Proposition 3. After a RH or EI transfer, if the social state alternative
to the status quo is preferred according to a certain SWF, it is possible to
precisely define the set of SWF that always produces the same result. Specif-
ically:
• under a RH transfer, B-W =⇒ B-P =⇒ B-L ≡ N-W ≡ N-P =⇒
N-L =⇒ R; also B-E =⇒ N-E =⇒ R; and also B-W =⇒ B-E
31I do not include in the analysis transfers that reduce inequality in situations where
k≥1, for the obvious reason that such a transfer would always produce a Pareto improve-
ment and thus would be desirable according to any SWF specification.
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=⇒ N-E =⇒ R.
• under an EI transfer, N-L =⇒ N-P ≡ N-W ≡ B-L =⇒ B-P =⇒
B-W; and also N-E =⇒ B-E =⇒ B-W.
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 3 shows that some policy evaluation results are more robust
than others and are able to accommodate a broader class of subjective ethi-
cal values. For example, consider a RH transfer that is desirable if evaluated
assuming a N-P SWF. Given the results presented, one can be sure that the
new social state after redistribution would also be preferred by N-W, B-L,
N-L and all the R combinations, independently from parties’ wealth in the
status quo, transfer levels and deadweight losses associated to inefficiency in
transferring resources. However, the same is not true if we consider for exam-
ple a B-P or a B-W SWF. Tables 2 and 3 provide a summary of Proposition
3 results.
Table 2: Generality of Results under RH Transfers
Maximand/SWF Form Bentham Nash Rawls
Wealth {∀B;∀N ; ∀R} {B-L; N -P ; N -L; ∀R} {∀R}
Polynomial {B-L; N -W ; N -P ; N -L; ∀R} {B-L; N -W ; N -L; ∀R} {∀R}
Logarithmic {N -W ; N -P ; N -L; ∀R} {∀R} {∀R}
Exponential {N -E; ∀R} {∀R} {∀R}
Proposition 3 states that it is not possible to generalize results obtained
by, for example, an R-L SWF outside the Rawls aggregation method, even
imposing some restrictions on transfers. Hence, any result obtained assuming
R-L holds as long as the value judgements implied by the choice of this specific
SWF are considered acceptable. By contrast, the result is not necessarily the
same if other subjective values are assumed for the analysis. The intuition
behind this fact is that, in the case of RH transfers, some redistribution
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Table 3: Generality of Results under EI Transfers
Maximand/SWF Form Bentham Nash Rawls
Wealth ∅ {B-W ; B-P ; B-L; N -P} EI¬R
Polynomial {B-W} {B-W ; B-P ; B-L; N -W} EI¬R
Logarithmic {B-W ; B-P} {B-W ; B-P ; B-L; N -W ; N -P} EI¬R
Exponential {B-W} {B-W ; B-E} EI¬R
policies are desirable for high inequality-averse SWF specifications, even if the
inefficiency deriving from the transfer of resources is huge. Conversely, SWFs
reflecting higher concerns for efficiency might evaluate the gains deriving
from equality as insufficient to compensate the deadweight loss associated
with redistribution. Hence, if a policy that reduces inequality is considered
desirable when evaluated assuming highly efficiency-concerned SWFs, it is
also likely to be supported under a more fairness-concerned SWF. However,
the opposite might not be true as well.
On the other hand, a policy could aim at increasing overall efficiency, even if
its implementation would further increase inequality. In an EI transfer sce-
nario, a highly equity-concerned SWF would require higher efficiency gains
compared to an efficiency-concerned one. Hence, a higher level of k is required
from the former SWF in order to be considered welfare-improving. Finally,
we should note from Table 3 that an EI transfer by definition excludes the
possibility of any Rawls improvement. In fact, Rawls SWFs are only con-
cerned with equality and, according to the ethical position they reflect, no
efficiency gain could compensate an increase in inequality.
2.4.3. Groups of Non-homogeneous Size
I now consider a policy redistribution that affects two interest groups whose
number of members differs. Similarly, we could think about a two-agent
situation where the analyst assigns different weights to individuals. Let N
be the total number of individuals in the two groups. Individuals 1,...,j
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belong to group A and j+1,...,N belong to group B. I assume that wealth is
homogenous among group members, hence w1 = w2 = ... = wj and wj+1 =
wj+2 = ... = wN . Let W = (w1, w2, ..., wj, wj+1, ..., wN) be the status quo and
W ′ = (w1 +k, w2 +k, ..., wj +k, wj+1− , ..., wN − ) be the new allocation
where individuals belonging to group A increase their wealth by k each, and
group B individuals have their wealth reduced by .
Table A.5 in Appendix A shows the minimal level of k that makes the new
allocation weakly superior to the status quo according to each SWF con-
sidered. To present the results obtained in a more intuitive way I provide
a graphical example. Figure 2 compares the minimal k required by an RH
transfer between groups of homogeneous size against the situation where the
wealthier group has a size equal to 3
4
of the other. In particular, we could see
that the minimal efficiency level required in the latter situation is lower than
that in the former. This directly relates to the fact that a larger fraction of
the agents involved benefit from the policy compared to the homogeneous
group-size situation. Therefore, even lower level of efficiency in transfering
resources might result sufficient to increase social welfare. Furthermore, we
should notice that the variation in minimal k between homogeneous and non-
homogeneous cases differs among SWF specifications. This is due to the fact
that the group size variable introduces an element of non-linearity in some of
the equations determining k, while it only results in linear transformations
for other specifications.
2.5. Conclusions of Chapter 2
In this chapter, I perform a quantitative analysis of the possibility to gener-
alize policy results obtained implementing a specific social welfare function.
I consider common combinations of aggregation methods (Bentham, Nash
and Rawls) and utility functions, formally showing that different social wel-
fare functions rank alternative states of the world in different orders, except
in a well-defined subset of particular cases. Moreover, adopting a scenario
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Figure 2: An example of different group-size effects on the evaluation of an RH transfer.
The graph on the left has homogeneous groups, while the one on the right involves the
wealthier group size being 34 of the less wealthy group. All things being equal, increasing
the size of the benefitted group reduces the efficiency level required for evaluating the
transfer as welfare-improving.
with two interest groups, I define the quantitative conditions under which
a policy is considered welfare-improving for any social welfare function con-
sidered. These conditions allow a case-by-case assessment of the generality
characterizing the policy evaluation result.
I subsequently proceed by imposing the restrictive conditions that trans-
fers have to be either strictly equity-improving or efficiency-improving.Under
these two scenarios, I considered the possibility to generalize the result of a
policy evaluation. For each SWF in each scenario, I derived the subset of
SWFs that always produce the same policy evaluation result. I show that the
possibility of generalizing policy evaluation results crucially depends on the
degree of inequality implicitly accepted by a social welfare function. Finally,
I repeat the same analysis and derive the same quantitative relationships
allowing the two groups of interest considered to have different sizes.
This chapter aims to further enrich the discussion regarding the choice of the
most appropriate social welfare function in policy analysis. The results de-
rived in this chapter are important in two respects. First, they have academic
relevance for scholars and researchers that employ formal social welfare anal-
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ysis. In fact, these scholars could easily verify to what degree the predictions
derived in the analyses conducted are sensitive to the specific way they choose
to model the situation. Second, findings of this chapter are important for
decisionmakers that have the final word regarding policies implementation.
Indeed, they could identify to what degree the results obtained in a given
policy analysis are sensitive to the specific value judgements adopted by the
policy analyst. Threfore, the findings presented in this chapter strengthen
the methodology of social policy analysis by clarifying, in a systematic way,
the possibility of generalizing results obtained assuming specific normative
value judgements.
Finally, it is worth noticing that the applicability of the results derived in this
chapter is not limited to the area of behavioral public policy. Indeed, they
are relevant also for social policy evaluations grounded in traditional welfarist
economics. Moreover, the results are also valid in extra-welfarist analyses of
social policy, as for example in cost effectivennes analysis in healthcare. As
we have discussed in the previous chapter, the extra-welfarist approaches do
not have theoretical foundations in the welfaristic economic tradition nor
necessary employ agents’ utility as a relevant outcome. Nevertheless, the
policy analyst could consider measures of individual well-being other than
utility or unequaly weight relevant outcomes and still apply results presented
here, as long as the analyst’s interest is comparing decision outcomes in term
of their monetary cost per unit of effectiveness.
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3. Shaping Tax Norms Through Lotteries32
The focus of chapter 2 was on the choice of the social welfare function, a
methodological problem that characterizes behavioral public policymaking
as well as any other approach to social policy evaluation. Instead, in this
chapter and in the next one I get to the hearth of libertarian paternalism
and I discuss two original policy interventions that exploit nonstandard be-
havioral regularities in order to achieve welfare improvements. I investigate
throughout this chapter a zero cost policy based on rewards aimed at combat-
ting value added tax (VAT) and retail sales tax (RST) evasion. This policy
has been applied in some countries and the empirical evidence suggests that
it is quite effective. However, according to the theoretical predictions derived
from models of standard decision-making, the policy could not increase net
tax revenue. In fact, these models predict that the government has to incur
costs for the provisions of the rewards higher than the increase in tax revenue
collected. So far no explanation has been provided to this puzzling evidence.
My goal in this chapter is to propose a model that is able to explain the
empirical evidence relative to the policy success, in order to derive theoret-
ical predictions regarding the results of an eventual policy implementation.
I present a model based on non-expected utility that is able to explain the
policy success. Moreover, I show by means of a calibration exercise that it is
32The core sections of this chapter are mostly based on my article ”Shaping Tax Norms
Through Lotteries”, RILE working paper series, 2012/02. The introduction, part of the lit-
erature review and the sections where policy implications are discussed are mostly based on
my article with Sigrid Hemels ”Do You Want a Receipt? Combatting VAT and RST Eva-
sion with Lottery Tickets”, Intertax: international tax review, 2013, 41(8), pp. 430–443.
I am grateful to Emanuela Carbonara, Marco Casari, Michael Faure, David Gamage, An-
drea Geraci, Jonathan Klick, Francesco Parisi, Matthew Rabin, Louis Visscher and par-
ticipants to the 2013 European Association of Law and Economics conference, the 2013
Italian Association of Law and Economics conference, the IX Young Economists’ Con-
ference on Social Economics at University of Bologna, the VI IMPRS Uncertainty Topics
Workshop at Erasmus University Rotterdam and seminars at University of Bologna, Ham-
burg University, Erasmus University Rotterdam and University Paris II for their support
and helpful suggestions. The usual disclaimer applies.
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possible to state the conditions necessary to predict a successful implemen-
tation of the policy.
The findings of this chapter have relevant implications for policymakers and
decisionmakers that are considering the application of this policy and want
to predict the likelihood of its successfull implementation.
3.1. Invoices and Indirect Tax Evasion
’When I asked the decorator how much it would cost to paint my house, his
answer was: “Do you want a receipt?”.’ This conversation, overheard during
a Dutch birthday party, is an everyday example of an attempt to evade
value added tax (VAT)33. The decorator would probably ask for a lower
fee for painting the house without an invoice as, in that case, he would not
charge VAT. An invoice enables tax authorities to carry out controls. Invoices
are, therefore, very important in preventing tax evasion and the illegal non-
payment or under-payment of taxes. Most VAT and retail sales tax (RST)
systems, therefore, include the obligation to issue an invoice34. However, this
obligation is not always enough to ensure that invoices are actually issued,
even if it is accompanied by sanctions in case of non-compliance.
In addition to imposing sanctions on businesses that do not issue invoices,
governments can give an incentive to customers to request an invoice and thus
obliging suppliers to comply. In this chapter I discuss a specific kind of reward
complementary to sanctions and audits to combat evasion of RST and VAT:
turning the invoice into a lottery ticket. In the discussion I use empirical
Law and Economics research as this research field can give insight into the
effectiveness and efficiency of such a compliance strategy. This chapter does
33In a column in a Dutch newspaper a similar conversation was published: ‘ “Do
you need the receipt?” Everybody who hires odd-job companies knows this question.
As I have just bought my own house, I was not that experienced and asked “The re-
ceipt. . . eh. . . well. . . why?” The decorator answered “Well, without one I can give you a
good price”.’ Christiaan Weijts, Fraudeursdromen, NRC Handelsblad 23 October 2012.
34For example, article 220 of the Council Directive 2006/112/EC of 28 November 2006
on the common system of value added tax as amended later (hereinafter: VAT-Directive).
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not aim to discuss the whole issue of tax evasion and tax compliance: I
focus on one specific strategy which is applied to increase RST and VAT
compliance. For a general discussion on tax compliance I refer to the vast
literature on this topic: Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein even speak of a ‘tide
of research on tax compliance’ (Andreoni et al., 1998).
The structure of this chapter will be as follows. In section 3.2 I discuss
the traditional way governments combat VAT and RST evasion, the alter-
native approach of providing incentives instead of sanctions and engaging
consumers as ‘unpaid auditors’ in enforcing VAT and RST compliance by re-
quiring businesses to issue invoices. Section 3.3 discusses why consumers in
certain societies will not ask for invoices to combat tax evasion by comparing
this to contributions to public goods, Section 3.4 discusses how consumers
can be given an incentive to require an invoice, reports the results of the im-
plementation of lottery ticket invoices in China and discusses the explanation
Wan (2010) gave for the success of this policy. As I am not convinced by
this explanation, I develop an alternative explanation in section 3.5, propos-
ing a model which can enable governments to decide on introducing lottery
tickets or not. Section 3.6 discusses the model implications. Furthermore, in
section 3.7 and 3.8 I discuss respectively the possible unintended side-effects
and some long-term benefits of this policy. The conclusion in section 3.9
summarizes results.
3.2. Combating evasion of VAT and RST: Literature Review
Slemrod (2007) noted that no government can announce a tax system and
then rely on taxpayers’ sense of duty to remit what is owed. Andreoni et al.
(1998) observed that the problem of tax compliance is as old as taxes them-
selves. Webley et al. (2006) state that VAT evasion is widespread and involves
significant revenue losses. Evasion of VAT and RST is not only a problem
in developing countries or in countries in the south of Europe, but in north-
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ern European countries as well. In a report of May 201335 the European
Commission gave an overview of the Actual VAT revenue in 2010 as per-
centage of theoretical revenue at standard rates. The Commission concluded
that Member States are only collecting around one half of the VAT revenue
available to them 36. In the December 2012 Action Plan of the European
Commission, VAT fraud and evasion was identified as an important field in
which action was necessary. The European Commission shared this view
with the EU Member States: “Member States also emphasized the need to
adopt quickly the pending proposals in the Council and to pay particular
attention to the fight against VAT fraud and evasion.”37 Such evasion not
only erodes the income of governments; it also undermines the principles on
which government expenditure is shared by citizens of a country and, as a
consequence, the division of the tax burden(Slemrod, 2007). Tax evaders are
free riders: they benefit from government expenditures without contribut-
ing their share to the government income. If nobody would pay VAT or
RST, everybody would be worse off as the government would not be able to
meet its expenses. If a society is of the opinion that government expenses
35European Commission. Combating tax fraud and evasion. Commission contribution
to the European Council of 22 May 2013, p. 8.
36Several reports have been published on this so called ‘VAT gap’, the differ-
ence between the theoretical amount of VAT that should be due and actual VAT
receipts, for example the report of Reckon LLP of 21 September 2009 for the Euro-
pean Commission http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/
taxation/tax_cooperation/combating_tax_fraud/reckon_report_sep2009.pdf,
which gives an overview of the VAT gaps in EU Member States in 2006 and Eu-
rostat/European Commission Taxation trends in the European Union, 2013, p. 31
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/gen_
info/economic_analysis/tax_structures/2013/report.pdf. In this report it was
concluded that ten Member States collect less than 50 % of the theoretical amounts,
another thirteen countries collect between 50 and 60 % and for only four countries -
Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus and Luxemburg - the VRR is above 60 %.
37Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council,
An Action Plan to strengthen the fight against tax fraud and tax evasion, Brussels, 6
December 2012, COM(2012) 722 final, p.3, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
resources/documents/taxation/tax_fraud_evasion/com_2012_722_en.pdf.
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are too high, this should be resolved by reducing government spending in a
democratic way, not by the decisions of individuals not to pay their share of
democratically set taxes. Tax evasion is therefore undesirable both from an
economic and a legal (fairness) point of view. It, therefore, makes sense that
governments try to combat the evasion of all taxes, including VAT and RST.
3.2.1. Traditional methods: sanctions on tax evaders
Developing effective policies that promote tax compliance and combat tax
evasion is a challenging task for authorities and policymakers. In the words of
Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein: “How can an authority – with imperfect abil-
ity to monitor - design a taxation, audit, and punishment scheme to meet its
revenue objectives?”(Andreoni et al., 1998). Academic research in the field
of law and economics can give useful insights into this problem. Tradition-
ally, contributions in law and economics focus on monitoring and sanctions
to achieve compliance38. Economic models predict that higher penalties and
audit probabilities discourage non-compliance, the evidence suggests that
higher audit probabilities probably have more impact than higher penalties
(Webley et al., 2006). However, Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein (1998) ob-
served that econometric results suggest that the use of the ‘stick’ to enforce
compliance with tax laws may not have any long-run impact. Tax legislation
focuses on sanctions as well, such as fines for businesses that do not pay
the VAT due on their services and supplies. These traditional methods of
combating tax evasion are based on deterrence, the use of sanctions and pun-
ishment as a threat to deter taxpayers from offending. However, enforcing
the payment of indirect tax through deterrence methods can be costly for
the government. Auditing businesses and imposing fines requires that the
tax authorities have the means and sufficiently well equipped employees to
38Seminal contributions include Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Yitzhaki (1974).
For a survey of the Economics and Law Economics literature on tax evasion see Andreoni
et al. (1998).
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perform these tasks. Indirect tax payments are based on the financial records
of transactions. To establish whether supplies and services have been per-
formed ’outside the books’, the tax authorities have to do further research.
Due to the information asymmetry between taxpayers (in economic terms:
private agents) and the government, a revenue-maximizer taxpayer could be
tempted to under report the tax amounts due unless a costly system of mon-
itoring and sanctioning is in place. Sanctions are only effective if they pose
a sufficient threat to deter taxpayers from tax evasion.
Efficiency reasoning would lead to setting the sanction at such a level that
the marginal cost to the government of monitoring and sanctioning taxpayers
would equal the marginal benefit of preventing tax evasion. Theoretically,
Becker (1968b) suggests that increasing sanctions would reduce tax evasion.
In fact, for a given probability of being detected, the expected profits from
evasion are a decreasing function of the level of sanctions. However, there
are practical arguments in favor of imposing a sanction ceiling, for example
the necessity of preserving the marginal deterrence effect of sanctions and
the credibility of the threat made by the sanctioning authority. If strong
sanctions are combined with a low risk of tax fraud being discovered and of
miscreants actually being fined, these will not be very successful in combating
tax fraud. Hence, given the practical impossibility of raising the sanctions
level over reasonable thresholds - a death penalty for tax fraud, would, for
example, not be accepted in most democratic societies -, we could expect
that high monitoring costs will be associated with high levels of tax evasion.
Moreover, political constraints could prevent the implementation of sanc-
tions. A legislator interested in maximizing his chances of being re-elected
could be “captured” by interest groups benefitting from tax evasion and re-
duce the chances of effective policies being adopted to combat tax evasion
(Stigler, 1971). An example seems to be the failure (unwillingness?) of previ-
ous Greek governments to act on the so-called “Lagarde list” of Greeks with
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overseas bank accounts39. Finally, in specific segments of the population tax
evasion could be perceived as a morally justified behavior and pro-tax eva-
sion social norms could develop40. The Dutch decorator apparently thought
it very normal to offer to do a job with or without VAT. Tax evasion is so
deeply rooted in some cultures that it could be considered endemic. For ex-
ample, during the first half of 2012, in 38 % of the tax audits in Italy (with
peaks of over 50 % in some provinces in the south) the issuance of invoices
was found to be irregular41. These data are confirmed by a recent field exper-
iment run on bakeries in Milan (Battiston and Gamba, 2013). Within a time
span of 12 minutes, two customers bought a loaf of bread in 108 bakeries.
Only 73 (68 %) bakeries were fully compliant and gave a receipt to both
customers. This experiment was performed after much publicity was given
to tax audits in shops in several towns, including Milan, and a strong aware-
ness campaign in the mass media. Apparently these campaigns were not
enough to completely change the attitude towards the issuing of invoices. In
such situations, any coercive intervention by an external authority could be
perceived as a violation of the established norm by the targeted population
and could produce countervailing effects (Carbonara et al., 2012). Indeed,
empirical evidence suggests that, irrespective of the legal and socio-economic
context and the effort put into combating indirect tax evasion, it is still a
widespread problem (Cowell, 1990; Slemrod, 2007).
3.2.2. Stick and carrot?
The best way to reduce tax evasion would probably be to audit each and ev-
ery tax payer. However, given the limited means of governments, this is not
possible. Even though the traditional methods of deterrence could only miti-
gate the tax evasion problem, the tax compliance literature has traditionally
39L. Thomas. In Greece, Taking Aim At Wealthy Tax Dodgers New York Times 11
November 2012.
40See section 3.4 for a detailed discussion on this point.
41La Repubblica, 31 July 2012.
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been skeptical about the possibility of implementing alternative policies (for
a discussion of this point see Feld et al., 2006). Nonetheless, some researchers
have investigated the effect of implementing reward mechanisms instead of
sanctions. Falkinger and Walther (1991) show that a mix of sanctions and
rewards would outperform a system with sanctions only without increasing
expenditure for the government. Experimental Economics literature has also
investigated the effect of rewards compared to sanctions in achieving com-
pliance. For example, Torgler (2003) found in a field experiment among
Costa Rican taxpayers that a monetary reward is the most effective way of
increasing compliance. In the report of May 2013 on combating tax fraud
and evasion, the European Commission also recommended the use of both
sanctions and rewards to reduce the size of the shadow economy when it gave
the following examples of measures to combat tax evasion: criminalizing the
purchaser of undeclared work (sanction) and the use of monetary incentives
to declare (reward)42.
Other research outside the traditional tax policy literature seems to confirm
the positive effects of rewards on motivating desired behavior. Both so-
cial psychology (Nuttin and Greenwald, 1968; Molm, 1994) and neuroscience
(Gray, 1981; Larsen and Ketelaar, 1991) researchers have emphasized the
role and effectiveness of rewards in achieving individuals’ compliance. In
particular, it seems that punishments and rewards have asymmetrical ef-
fects on human behavior (Sims, 1980), hence making it possible to reinforce
compliance through a combination of the two methods.
However, simply rewarding businesses that comply with their tax obligations
seems a bit odd from a legal point of view. The question is, therefore, whether
it could be a solution to engage a third party who does not have a legal
obligation regarding the tax: the customer in the transaction over which the
VAT or RST is due.
42European Commission. Combating tax fraud and evasion. Commission contribution
to the European Council of 22 May 2013, p. 3.
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3.3. Combating Evasion by Engaging Customers: Importance of the Invoice
and the Public Goods Trap
In many countries, the invoice is proof of the existence of a taxable transac-
tion. Furthermore, it contains information on the amount of tax due. Once
a company has issued the invoice, it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to
hide information on the supply and RST or VAT due. Hence, a key strategy
adopted by businesses in evading RST or VAT is not to issue an invoice. If
customers demand an invoice, this kind of tax evasion is made more difficult.
Customers, in a way, act as unpaid auditors for the state, enforcing compli-
ance. In a VAT system, other businesses will ask for such an invoice, as this
is necessary for reclaiming the VAT they have paid. However, asking for a
receipt has virtually no benefits for individuals who are not taxable for VAT
and RST. In fact, as will be discussed in more detail in the next paragraph,
without any specific policy intervention, customers not only do not receive
benefits, they could also face high social and moral costs when asking for an
invoice if it is the social rule not to ask for a receipt.
In economic terms, from the perspective of a consumer, asking for an invoice
and thus preventing tax evasion can be compared with contributing to a
public good. A public good has two characteristics: it is hard to exclude any
person from benefitting from the good or the service even if this person does
not pay for it (non-excludability) and the consumption of the good or the
service does not prevent the consumption of it by others (non-rivalry). Com-
mon examples of such goods are the army and dikes. The non-excludability
characteristic of these goods implies that it may be hard to get some indi-
viduals to voluntarily pay an adequate share of the costs of a public good,
because they cannot be excluded from benefitting from it: the so called free
rider problem. Therefore, absent external interventions, the free rider prob-
lem would lead to an under provision of the public good. In this section I
will analyze whether having to request an invoice could be considered sym-
metrical to a public goods situation. Economic theory predicts that, because
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of the free rider effect, the supply of public goods will be at an inefficient
level, below the social optimum. Hence, if the proposed parallel is correct,
the enforcement of invoice issuance by customers remains suboptimal if the
government does not provide incentives (for a survey on experimental results
in public goods games see Ledyard, 1995).
In order to clarify the concept, consider the situation in which a consumer
has to claim an invoice from a fraudulent seller. For our purposes, think of
the buyer as a potential contributor to a specific public good, namely enforce-
ment of tax payments. The rational buyer evaluates the private costs and
benefits of asking for the invoice. For any transaction, the private benefit the
individual buyer derives from asking for a receipt is almost zero. The cus-
tomer hardly benefits himself from the tax the seller pays to the government.
In economic terms: the benefit is not fully internalized by the customer. In-
stead, it is shared with the rest of the population. This is a consequence of
the fact that goods financed through taxation are often public in nature and,
by definition, non-excludible. The individual buyer and his fellow citizens
share the benefit deriving from the tax paid in any transaction even if the
latter are not directly involved in the specific transaction.
On the other hand, not asking for an invoice has an economic benefit if
the customer can bargain for a discount as compensation for not obtaining
a receipt, basically sharing the profit deriving from the tax evasion with
the seller. Moreover, even in situations where bargaining is not feasible43,
scholars report evidence of the existence of moral, ethical and social costs
43It is often impossible or unprofitable to have a bargaining solution. For example, in
transactions involving small amounts of money (such as the loaf of bread in the Milan
bakery experiment discussed above), the discount would be negligible or the opportunity
cost of the time invested in bargaining would be higher than the discount itself. Moreover,
in situations in which face-to-face bargaining is not feasible (e.g. other customers present
in the shop, a crowded cafe´, etc.) reputational concerns could prevent a customer from
bargaining. Finally, in several countries, such as Japan, bargaining over prices is unusual
and considered impolite, so customers would simply reject this approach; on this point see
Berton (1998).
82
for buyers who ask sellers to comply with fiscal norms. McGee (2012) has
collected two decades of scholars’ contributions on the ethical aspects of
tax evasion. His book discusses philosophical and religious determinants of
tax evasion, explaining the formation of pro-tax evasion behavioral norms.
The author argues that, if the social norm is positive towards tax evasion,
individuals wanting to break these norms will face costs. Chang and Lai
(2004) proposed a model incorporating social norms into a collaborative tax
evasion agreement between a seller and his customer. They found that this
collusive practice tends to intensify the tax evasion problem and reduces the
effectiveness of tax enforcement. Kirchler (2007) also analyses the behavioral
aspects of tax compliance and evasion, focusing on the psychological reasons
that lead to customers colluding and accepting tax evasion.
The research mentioned above suggests that in some cultures and societies
costs are associated with not complying with the established norms favoring
VAT and RST evasion. While the consumer bears the personal costs and
sometimes misses the opportunity of a discount in expressly requesting an
invoice, he basically gets no benefit from this enforcing operation. Even
though requesting an invoice would be optimal from a social point of view,
in the above mentioned social contexts free riding on the associated costs
remains the individual dominant strategy. Asking for an invoice to prevent
tax evasion can therefore be compared to contributing to a public good:
government intervention is necessary, as otherwise ‘prevention of tax evasion’
will remain at a level below the social optimum (e.g. a high level of tax
avoidance).
3.4. Giving customers an incentive to ask for an invoice through the Lottery
Ticket Reward Policy
Given the findings in the previous section, the question is how to make cus-
tomers ask for an invoice. In some countries, customers could face sanctions
if they did not ask for an invoice. This was the case in Belgium and Italy.
In Italy the obligation to issue an invoice was introduced in the 1980s. Orig-
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inally, sanctions were imposed both on non-compliant business owners and
customers. However, in practice it was problematic to impose sanctions on
customers. The sanctions were strongly criticized by the population and the
public opinion. The main reason was the high number of sanctions imposed
on ignorant customers as a consequence of buyers’ mistakes44. Moreover,
customers had the troublesome duty of storing invoices for a period of time.
These factors generated in the population a feeling of resentment against the
monitoring authority and not only proved ineffective in fighting tax evasion,
but seemed even to produce countervailing effects. As a consequence, in 2003
the Italian government abolished sanctions on customers45. Similarly, sanc-
tions on buyers that did not request an invoice were in place in Belgium for a
while but they were difficult to impose, were mainly symbolic and have been
abolished as well.
An alternative to sanctioning customers is to give them a reward if they
ask for a receipt. However, it might be rather costly and lead to heavy
administrative burdens to give each customer a cash reward. Furthermore,
if the reward is not high enough, customers will not be induced to ask for an
invoice. For example, in the 1980s Bolivia tried to encourage people to require
VAT receipts by introducing a complementary withholding tax of 10% on all
income, which could be offset against the VAT paid as verified by invoices.
However, according to Bird it was far from clear that this device boosted
tax enforcement significantly, one of the reasons being that the stimulus to
collect receipts was weak given the alternative of making a deal with the
entrepreneur not to pay the VAT and splitting the difference (Bird, 1992).
Instead, countries can give customers who ask for an invoice a chance to ob-
tain a large reward. This is not only cheaper, but Alm et al. (1992) show in
44Newspapers often emphasized cases where sanctioned buyers were children or where
the sanction was the consequence of a accidental mistake (see for example Corriere della
Sera, 18 March 1998).
45D.L. n. 269 (2nd October 2003)
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a laboratory experiment that rewarding tax compliant behavior with partic-
ipation in a lottery increases the rate of compliance more than rewarding all
compliant individuals. In order to implement this reward policy, the govern-
ment starts a lottery. Each invoice issued becomes a lottery ticket by way of a
serial number that is printed on every invoice. Hence, in order to participate
in the lottery, customers have to request for an invoice and keep it until the
final draw. The winning numbers are drawn from all serial numbers and the
individuals owning the invoices with the winning serial numbers can claim a
prize. If the costs of organizing the lottery and of paying out the prizes are
smaller than the increase in tax revenue, the government increases its final
tax revenue at zero cost. Furthermore, the lottery might have the effect that
customers become so used to asking for a receipt that over time prizes may
decrease in value or eventually be abolished. Thus it could be a means of
strengthening tax morale in a country. This reward policy is also known as
the Lottery Ticket Reward Policy (in short: LTRP).
While formal analysis of this topic started only in recent years, the idea of
using lotteries and contexts in order to finance public goods is not a novelty.
For example according to Karoshi (2008) already during the Chinese Han
dynasty (205 – 187 B.C.) the construction of the Great Wall of China has
been partially financed through lotteries. The seminal contribution in eco-
nomic literature is due to Morgan (2000). The author theoretically analyzes
the performance of lotteries and raﬄes compared to voluntary contribution
in the private provision of public goods. He sets the conditions under which
lotteries outperform voluntary contribution mechanism, finding that the de-
gree of efficiency obtained is an increasing function of the prize size. After
Morgan’s contribution, several papers have sought to confirm and further
investigate his findings through laboratory (Carpenter et al., 2010; Corazz-
ini et al., 2010; Faravelli and Stanca, 2012; Lange et al., 2007; Morgan and
Sefton, 2000; Orzen, 2008; Schram and Onderstal, 2009) or field experiments
(Landry et al., 2006; Onderstal et al., 2011). A common finding in this
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literature is that fixed-prize lotteries or auction mechanisms outperform vol-
untary contribution mechanism in the private provision of public goods46.
However the focus of these studies is on which mechanism for awarding the
fixed-prize works the best (lotteries vs. auctions; single- vs. multi-prize lot-
teries; first-pay vs. all-pay auctions; etc.), independently from the capability
of the fundraising mechanism to finance itself the value of the prize. Indeed
results reported by Landry et al. (2006) and Lange et al. (2007) show that
in their environments individual contributions were insufficient to cover the
fixed-prized value.
For the purposes of the present paper, the ability of LTRP to self-finance itself
is a key issue. The only contribution investigating the performance of lotteries
compared to voluntary contribution mechanism on the private provision of
public goods under the condition that the public good provision must be self-
financing is Duffy and Matros (2012). The authors consider an environment
where the public good is provisional instead of exogenously given. That
means the public good is created only if the total contribution collected
is greater or equal than the lottery prize value, otherwise the public good
is not provided and individual contributions are returned. In a laboratory
experiment, the authors show that a set of conditions exists for which a fixed-
prize lottery incentivizes participants to positively contribute to the public
good and that participants’ total contribution exceeds the value of the lottery
prize.
Therefore, according to theoretical predictions and empirical evidences com-
ing from field and laboratory experiments, it is possible to increase the private
provision of public goods by means of self-financing lotteries. Hence, if the
46An exception are results reported by Onderstal et al. (2011). In a field experiment
comparing different charity fundraising mechanisms, the authors find that voluntary con-
tribution mechanism raises the most money followed by fixed-price private value lottery
and fixed-price private value all-pay auction mechanism. The authors conjecture that
the prize offered in the lottery and auction treatments may have crowded out intrinsic
motivation to contribute to the charity among the participants.
86
parallel between asking for an invoice and a public goods dilemma is correct,
the lottery mechanism underlying the LTRP could be exploited in order to
enforce invoices emission. In the next section I provide a model explaining
the mechanism on which the LTRP is based.
However, LTRP is not just a theoretical approach to combating VAT and
RST evasion, it has actually been implemented in several countries. Taiwan
implemented such a reward policy in 1951 which is called the Uniform-Invoice
Prize Winning Lottery. After the introduction of the uniform invoice system
in Taiwan, it turned out that firms tended to underreport sales by not issuing
an invoice at the time of sale. The tax authorities tried to induce customers
to ask for invoices with every purchase. Most importantly, this kind of be-
havior was being induced by the uniform-invoice lottery giving customers
the chance to win a large amount of money by obtaining an invoice at the
time of purchase (Lin, 1992). Every one of the roughly 11.5 billion receipts
issued annually by Taiwanese shops comes with a unique lottery number,
which enters a bi-monthly prize draw awarding prizes of up to $ 342,00047.
Customers can check on line whether they have won a prize48. This policy
is still in place, according to Giebe and Schweinzer (2013) because it proved
so successful. Some other countries that have applied the LTRP are the
Philippines, Malaysia, Chile, Puerto Rico and Brazil. According to Giebe
and Schweinzer (2013) these schemes have been highly successful in their
intended purpose of reducing tax evasion.
Recently, LTRP has been applied in some European countries as well. Por-
tugal introduced a peculiar version of LTRP in 2014, where the prizes paid
out to lottery winners are luxury cars. Also Slovakia adopted the policy in
2013 and the first data shows that more than 450,000 people took part to
the lottery registering more than 60 millions receipt and comparative statics
47Giebe and Schweinzer, 2013 and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uniform_
Invoice_lottery.
48http://www.etax.nat.gov.tw/etwmain/front/ETW183W6?site=en
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shows a huge increase of VAT collected compared to the previous year. Fur-
thermore, since the Slovakian version of the LTRP allows private citizens to
verify if the business owners correctly registered the transaction that origi-
nated the invoices, notifications to the tax authority of tax evading business
is 25 times higher compared to the pre-LTRP introduction period49.
Despite these practical experiences, until recent years there was nothing more
than descriptive statistics and anecdotal evidence for these positive results.
No systematic analysis was conducted on the impact of LTRP implementa-
tion. One of the reasons for this might be the technical difficulty in isolating
the causal effect of a policy introduction. If a policy is adopted at a state
level, it would be complicated to find a credible comparison. A suitable com-
parison could be another country that didn’t implement the policy but that
is otherwise similar to the country that did introduce it, but it is difficult
to find comparable countries. Cross-country comparison results are often
considered to be unreliable.
However, since 1998 a peculiar implementation of the LTRP in China makes
it possible to isolate the causal effect of the policy. At that time, one of the
turnover taxes levied in China was the so called business tax (BT), a turnover
tax levied mainly on specific services. This tax was generally collected by
local tax authorities. In order to reduce the negative effects of widespread
BT evasion, the Chinese government started printing a lottery number on
receipts registering business transactions. The invoice for restaurant or en-
tertainment expenditures is at the same time a lottery scratch card. The
idea is that customers will be incentivized to ask for an invoice and thus
oblige the service provider to pay BT. Each lottery pays out a prize after
some period of time. Once the receipt is issued, the seller cannot evade
BT on that transaction. Thus, the buyer has a direct incentive to ask for
the receipt and this indirectly obliges the seller to reveal information to the
49In Slovakia, Real Lottery Prizes go to Tax Men, New York Times, April 19th 2014.
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tax authorities. The peculiarity of the Chinese experience is the particular
form in which the LTRP was implemented. The Chinese State Commission
for Restructuring the Economic System50, a Chinese governmental agency,
decided to introduce the LTRP only in some experimental districts in the
period 1998 - 2003 in order to test its effects. At first, only some service
industries, such as food service businesses, issued lottery tickets. As of 2002,
the LTRP was applied to other service industries as well. Furthermore, the
trial area was expanded to involve a growing number of districts. Because
of this isolated implementation of the LTRP, it is possible to compare rela-
tively similar districts with and without the LTRP. Therefore, the Chinese
experience is a (quasi-) natural experiment.
There has only been one study conducted by Wan (2010) that investigates
the effects of this policy in China. Wan estimated that the lottery reward
policy increased revenues from BT by 17% in the experimental districts. He
estimated that the ratio between lottery prizes paid by the government and
increased tax revenue ranged between 1:30 and 1:40. This success induced
the Chinese government to extend the LTRP area progressively from the
initial trial area to the whole country51.
50See Note of Mainland China Government by State Commission for Restructuring the
Economic System, 1989.
51However, a word of caution on the implementation of the lottery policy in China is
necessary. Some scattered data collected in China during the experimental period show
that at the time of the lottery draft the Chinese government paid out only a relatively
small fraction of the announced prizes. For example, while the Beijing Local Tax Bureau
announced that prizes would amount to thirteen million Yuan in 2002 (see Beijing Local
Tax Bureau announcement on July 17th 2002) ex-post payments are on average less than
17% of the prizes previously announced. Such inconsistent behavior maximizes revenue
in one period but, needless to say, would kill any possibility of collecting revenues in
succeeding periods as soon as customers find out that prizes are not actually paid. Given
the lack of comprehensive data on this issue and the relatively short experimental period,
future research should test whether the success of the policy in the first years decreased
over time. In this chapter, I will focus on the explanations for the success of the lottery
policy in the initial stages, in which consumers expected prizes to match those previously
announced.
89
Understanding the determinants of the successful results of the LTRP is not
merely a theoretical exercise but a key element in effectively replicating the
policy in different contexts. After having decided to implement LTRP, a
government has to commit to pay a lottery prize to the winner of the lottery.
If the ex post increase in tax revenue is smaller than the prize, the government
incurs a loss. A theoretical model that captures and explains the key factors
involved in the LTRP mechanism would provide an indicator of the likelihood
of success in a specific socio-economic and institutional environment. That
would limit the probability of unsuccessful implementation of the policy and
possibly prevent monetary losses for the government.
In the next section I present a model based on non-expected utility that
explains the success of LTRP and that will help policy analysts considering
LTRP implementation in predicting the policy outcome.
3.5. The Model
Consider a public goods situation where it is not possible or feasible to in-
crease the level of private contribution by increasing sanctions. Define pa-
rameters as:
N : number of players.
t : 1,..., T : number of periods in which it is possible to contribute to the
public good.
yi : initial endowment player i.
xi : expected payoff player i.
ai,t : per period contribution player i.
a∗ : per period required level of contribution to get a lottery ticket (exoge-
nously settled).
m: marginal per capita return to the public good.
Under a voluntary contribution mechanism to the public good with no lottery
the expected individual payoff for each period is:
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xi = yi − ai +m
N∑
j=1
aj (4)
In order to replicate a public goods game situation set the parameters in such
a way that it holds: {
m > (1/N)
m < 1
(5)
Participants to the public goods game maximize individual payoffs with re-
spect to the chosen contribution level:
∂xi
∂ai
: −1 +m < 0 (6)
Hence, while it is a dominant strategy for individuals to completely free-ride,
it would be Pareto-efficient if everyone contributes the full endowment to the
public good. Indeed, theoretical predictions indicate that the contribution
rate would converge towards a suboptimal equilibrium level of total contri-
bution Aˆ (equal or close to 0 if it is assumed that a small fraction τ of players
always adopt strictly altruistic behavior):
Aˆ =
N∑
i=1
ai = τNa
∗
τ ' 0+
(7)
Now assume that a Central Authority interested in increasing the amount
of contributions to the public good collected introduces a lottery linked to
the public good, with the prize δt=z, z = 0, T, 2T,..., cyclically announced at
time t and assigned after period T. Each lottery ticket has a probability of
being drawn of 1/(N*T), while each subject has the possibility of acquiring
a lottery ticket in each period, providing a contribution to the public good
ai ≥ a∗. Therefore, the individual probability pi of winning the lottery prize
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depends on the individual player’s choices of contribution:
pi = (NT )
−1
T∑
t=1
ci,t (8)
where ci,t = 1 if (ai,t ≥ a∗) and 0 otherwise.
The individual per period payoff when the lottery policy is implemented
becomes:
xRi = yi − ai +m
N∑
j=1
aj + (1/T )piδz (9)
where δz is equal or smaller to the estimated quantity δˆ0 announced at the
initial period for t=0 and paid after T periods; while for t>0 δz is equal to
or smaller than the total public good contributions collected in the previous
T periods after subtraction of the sum of per period voluntary contributions
level Aˆ that is collected when no lottery policy is in place (Aˆ is assumed to
be constant).
Moreover to complete the feasibility constraint the Central Authority takes
into account that the lottery prize will not be paid out with probability (1-
p∗), where p∗ is the fraction of the total number of tickets emitted for each
lottery that has been acquired by contributors. Hence:
δˆz=0 = [
T∑
t=1
N∑
i=1
ai,t − TAˆ]p∗ (10)
δz>0 = [δz−T − TAˆ]p∗ (11)
p∗ = (NT )−1
N∑
i=1
T∑
t=1
ci,t (12)
Without loss of generality, assume that in each period agents face a single
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binary decision either to positively contribute to the public good or free-ride,
hence ai=0 or ai=a
∗=1. As discussed in the previous section, in the specific
context of sales tax evasion ai could be interpreted as the opportunity cost of
a lost price discount combined with the moral costs of requesting a receipt.
Moreover for simplicity consider the case where t=T=1 and z=0. Per period
pi becomes:
1
N
(13)
when ai=1 and 0 otherwise.
Now consider the individual choice over the binary alternative to either con-
tribute or free-ride. Individuals per period payoff given no contribution be-
comes:
xi = yi +m
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
(14)
Instead the payoff associated with a contribution to the public good that
implies the possibility to win the lottery prize is:
xRi = yi − 1 +m
N∑
j=1
+U(δˆ, p) (15)
To further simplify the analisys and without loss of generality, assume that N
is large enough to make the individual contribution is negligible with respect
to the quantity of public good provided:
N∑
i=1
'
N∑
j 6=i,j=1
(16)
The disequation reduces then to compare the value of the prospect δˆ with
that of the required contribution ai. Hence individual contribute to the public
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good iff:
U(δˆ, p) ≥ 1 (17)
Now introduce heterogeneity in population types. Assume that a fraction
(1-ψ), ψ∈[0,1], of the population behaves as an expected Von Neumann-
Morgenstern (VNM onward) utility maximizer (Von Neumann and Morgen-
stern, 1944). Hence individuals evaluate the probabilistic prospect δˆ through
maximization of expected utility. Given the probability to win the lottery
prize specified in (9), individuals contribute iff:
U(δˆ, p) =
U(δˆ)
N
≥ 1 (18)
where ∂U
∂δˆ
> 0 and ∂
2U
∂δˆ
≤ 0.
Proposition 4. For any VNM expected utility maximizer agent having a
utility functional form that does not imply risk seeking behavior the individ-
ual optimal strategy of contribution is ai=0, that is never enforcing invoices
emission irrispectively of the implementation of LTRP.
Proof. Consider the feasibility constraint in setting the prize δˆ in (6) and the
condition for contribution in (14). Furthermore, consider the extreme case
of a risk-neutral agent interested in maximizing wealth, and the best-case
scenario in which all members of the population contribute to the public
good. The condition for individual contribution becomes:
1
N
(δˆ =
N∑
a=1
ai ∈ [0, N ])− Aˆ < 1 (19)
Based upon the assumption that utility is marginally constant or decreas-
ing in wealth and risk-seeking preferences are ruled out, the case considered
represents the most attractive possibility for a VNM expected utility maxi-
mizer agent to accept the gamble opportunity. Hence, given that any other
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possible combination of risk-preferences and utility functional form results
in a decreased value of the left side of equation (15), it is possible to con-
clude that free-riding remains the dominant strategy for VNM-type agents,
independent of the implementation of the LTRP.
Now assume that the remaining fraction ψ of the population evaluates the
prospect δˆ through Cumulative Prospect Theory (CPT), which is a model
describing decisions under risk, proposed in their path-breaking articles by
Tversky and Kahneman (1992). The theory was introduced in order to cap-
ture some behavioral regularities in individual decision-making, such as risk-
seeking, loss aversion and the overweight (underweight) of unlikely (average)
events, which could not be explained by Expected Utility Theory. In partic-
ular, CPT modifies Expected Utility Theory by replacing final wealth with
payoffs relative to the status quo, replacing the utility function with a value
function that depends on relative payoff, and replacing cumulative probabil-
ities with weighted cumulative probabilities.
For the purpose of this chapter, the interesting aspect of CPT is the at-
tention paid to behavioral regularities (or anomalies, from the perspective
of VNM) such as nonlinear preferences and risk-seeking behavior in betting
and lotteries52. In fact, it is well-known that Expected Utility Theory cannot
explain why individuals buy insurances and at the same time like gambling
(Camerer et al., 2004). For example, according to the EUT, a rational agent
who prefers $800 as a certainty over the prospect of $2000 at a probability
of 50% will also decline the prospect of $1,000,000 at a probability of 0.1%,
since the two probabilistic prospects have the same expected value of $1,000.
52Additionally summarized by Camerer and Loewenstein (2004b, p.22): ”Expected Util-
ity hypothesis is like Newtonian mechanics [...]. Linear Probability weighting in Expected
Utility works reasonably well except when outcome probabilities are very low or high.
But low-probability events are important in the economy, in the form of “gambles” with
positive skewness (lottery tickets, and also risky business ventures in biotech and pharma-
ceuticals), and catastrophic events that require large insurance industries. [...] People are
typically averse to risky spreading of possible money gains.”
95
However, contrary to EUT predictions, the empirical evidence shows that a
consistent percentage of the population systematically prefers the certainty
of $800 to a 50% chance of obtaining $2,000 (showing risk-aversion) but at
the same time would also prefer the prospect of winning $1,000,000 at a 0.1%
probability or even at 0.01% probability in preference to the certainty of $800
(hence even showing risk-seeking in the last case, since the expected value
of the probabilistic prospect in the latter case is smaller than $800). CPT
explains by way of a formal theory the empirical evidence that individuals
systematically do not maximize expected utility when facing probabilistic
prospects with certain characteristics: they instead overweight the likelihood
of extreme events and remain relatively unaffected by changes close to the
average of the probability range.
Specifically, CPT implies that individuals non-linearly weigh the probability
of gaining the lottery prize and evaluate the lottery outcome by means of a
value function. In the discussion that follows, I adopt the same value and
weighting functional forms proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1992)53.
Proposition 5. When LTRP is established, it is possible to find a set of
conditions under which, for a CPT-type agent, contributing to the public good
and so enforcing invoices emission becomes the individual dominant strategy.
Proof. Consider CPT value and weighting functions as presented in Tversky
and Kahneman (1992). Substituting and plugging the terms defined above
in CPT model it is possible to derive individual conditions for contribution:
53A correct characterization of the most appropriate probability weighting function and
value functional form and a calibration of the functions’ parameters is beyond the scope of
the present work. In this chapter, I adopt a polynomial value function and the parameters
value reported in the original Tversky and Kahneman article. However, it should be
underlined that the estimation of the correct value function and the calibration of the
parameters remains an open issue. Nevertheless, note that it is possible to show that the
qualitative results obtained by assuming a polynomial utility function hold for any other
continue and quasi-concave functional form.
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U(δˆ, p) =
( 1
N
)σ
(( 1
N
)σ + (1− ( 1
N
)σ))
1
σ
δˆρ ≥ 1 (20)
where σ ∈ [0, 1] and ρ ∈ [0, 1] describe respectively the curvature of the
weighting function and the degree of risk aversion.
Since the fraction (1-ψ) of the population constitutes of VNM-type agents
will not contribute to the public good for any feasible amount of δˆ, the
feasibility constraint for the Central Authority setting the prize becomes:
ψδˆ ≤
N∑
i=1
ai − Aˆ (21)
because with probability (1-ψ) the lottery prize remains with the Central
Authority. Substituting Aˆ according to (7), rearranging (20), and solving for
δˆ restricting the attention to the case of equality the result is:
δˆ = N − τN
ψ
(22)
Plugging (22) in (20) results in a non-linear equation characterized by the
parameters N , τ , ψ, ρ and σ. Hence it is possible to derive the condition
under which it becomes a dominant strategy for individuals to contribute to
the public good:
U(δ) =
( 1
N
)σ
(( 1
N
)σ + (1− 1
N
)σ)
1
σ
(N − τN
ψ
)ρ − 1 ≥ 0 (23)
Given the population size and the value of the parameters ρ and σ, dise-
quation (23) is greater than 0 when τ
ψ
is sufficiently smaller than 1. This is
equivalent to say that, when the number of agents requesting an invoice even
absent the LTRP is relatively small compared to the number of CPT-type
in the population, it is possible to offer a prize δˆ such that requesting for an
invoice becomes a dominant strategy for all the CPT-type agents.
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Figure 3: Value of the ratio between proportions of agents enforcing invoices emission
absent LTRP and CPT-type in the population allowing for setting a LTRP prize such
that a CPT-type agent is indifferent whether to enforce invoices emission or not and the
LTRP is self-financed.
How small does the fraction of the population enforcing invoices emission
even absent the LTRP compared to the fraction of CPT-type agents has
to be? In Figure 3, I graph the value of the ratio τ
ψ
that allows setting
a LTRP prize δˆ such that a CPT-type agent is indifferent whether or not
asking for an invoice, as a function of the population size N54. Therefore,
given the population size of the situation the policy analyst is considering, τ
ψ
54I assumed ρ=0.88 and σ=0.61, as estimated by Tversky and Kahneman (1992).
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Table 4: Upper bound τφ allowing self-financed LTRP reward that makes agents indifferent
between enforcing invoices emission or not for given population levels (σ and ρ values taken
from Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
Population size 100 1,000 10,000 100,000 1,000,000
Ratio τ
φ
0.731 0.877 0.940 0.970 0.986
reported in Figure 3 represents the upper bound for the ratio τ
ψ
that makes
implementing the LTRP policy possible without earning negative expected
profits. For any value of the ratio τ
ψ
higher than this upper bound, the cost
of the prize paid out by the LTRP would exceed the increase in revenue
collected. Table 4 reports the exact value of this upper bound for some
population sizes.
3.6. Discussion of the Results
From what I showed above, it follows that, for any feasible prize amount of-
fered by the government, the individual dominant strategy for a Von Neumann-
Morgenstern Expected Utility maximize agent with any non-negative degree
of risk aversion, remains not to request an invoice. Individuals evaluating
the probabilities of winning the lottery prize multiplied by the prize amount
will always find that the expected gain deriving from the lottery is smaller
than the cost of asking for the receipt. Hence, if individuals behave as a Von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility maximizer, the LTRP would result in a failure
unless it is unrealistically assumed that individuals are risk-lovers.
Therefore, in light of the evidence of the success of the LTRP discussed
in previous sections, it seems that Expected Utility Theory is not the ap-
propriate theoretical background to analyze or explain individual decision
making in the context of the LTRP. The reason is that the LTRP introduces
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a probabilistic situation in which individuals choose over extreme elements:
an extremely low probability of winning a substantial prize. For this kind of
situation the linearity in probability weighting implied by Expected Utility
Theory seems unable to capture the underlying decision-making process.
CPT instead represents a more suitable theoretical background to analyze
the LTRP. Implementing the theoretical framework of CPT allows for making
ex-ante predictions on the successful implementation of the LTRP. In par-
ticular, once information about risk preferences and size of the population
of interest has been collected, a policymaker could determine if the lottery
prize associated to LTRP would be sufficiently large to persuade CPT-type
individuals to enforce invoices emission.
To proceed with this calculation it is necessary to acquire information on the
gambling and risk preferences of the population. In practice, it is necessary
to generate a quantitative description of the agents’ average behavior when
facing decisions under risk. To be technically precise, it is necessary to cal-
ibrate the parameter values of the model adopted in describing individuals’
behavior under risk and uncertainty. The successful implementation of the
LTRP in China does not guarantee that the same policy would achieve equal
results in a different environment, since it is well known that individuals’
risk-preferences greatly vary across societies. Given that many observable
(such as income per capita or average saving rates) and unobservable (such
as culture and social norms) factors are correlated with the taste for gambling
of a population, establishing the possibility of a successful implementation of
the LTRP in a specific environment requires a careful empirical investigation
of the characteristics of a population.
The verification whether a country with a higher level of income per capita
and different ethical norms than China shares a taste for gambling sufficiently
developed to implement the LTRP is an empirical issue. In order to clar-
ify how this estimation of population’s gambling behavior works in practice,
consider the situation in which a government wishes to apply LTRP. Before
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announcing the lottery prize, the government will want to check if the policy
described in an abstract context will work in this specific country. As a first
step, a quantitative characterization of the risk preferences of the population
has to be estimated. Statistical procedures and econometric techniques may
fulfill this task (see Andersen et al., 2008 for a detailed discussion of this
point). While a detailed discussion of these methodologies lies outside the
scope of the present chapter, it is useful to provide some examples. Survey
results and field data relative to lottery tickets sold could be used to estimate
the average part of income spent on lotteries and on gambling (Harrison et al.,
2007). Alternatively, it may be possible to directly elicit the risk-taking pref-
erences of representative random samples of individuals through interviews
or small incentivized acts of gambling. A detailed discussion of this last pro-
cedure, commonly used in experimental social sciences, is reported in Holt
and Laury (2002). Once a quantitative characterization of the population’s
risk preferences is obtained, it would be sufficient to incorporate those values
into the model presented above. Then it can be established whether, given
the estimated risk preferences, the population of the specific country is large
enough to attempt a successful implementation of the LTRP.
3.7. Possible Counter-arguments
The empirical evidence discussed above and the model presented in the pre-
vious section suggest that the LTRP could be an effective tool for policymak-
ers to achieve socially efficient outcomes. Nevertheless, a possible counter-
argument is that the policy requires a government at time zero to commit
to paying an ex-ante announced high monetary premium. However, the ef-
fective increase in tax revenue only occurs later. The prize amount initially
offered could be seen as an investment that can only partially guarantee fu-
ture returns as it is made under conditions of uncertainty. While the policy is
founded on a theoretical argument supported by experimental and empirical
evidence, the practical implementation and design of such a reward mech-
anism in real-life environments could be extremely complex and subject to
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failure.
Moreover, in some cultures there might be a moral aversion to lotteries, which
will make it politically difficult to implement the policy. When the Belgian
Minister of Finance only hinted at a lottery system for restaurant and bar
invoices in December 2009, it was immediately criticized by a Member of
Parliament. She seemed to fear that it might lead to a gambling addiction55.
Furthermore, the mechanism rests on the assumption that people’s taste for
gambling will not decrease over time. It should be tested if individuals’ will-
ingness to ask for invoices boosted by the excitement about the new gambling
opportunity in the periods immediately after the reward policy has been im-
plemented are followed by a progressive decline in interest (and in the request
for invoices) over time. Sustainability of the lottery ticket policy in the long-
run depends crucially on this factor56. For example Bird (1992) is skeptical
about what he calls ‘tax gimmicks’ as the LTRP. In his view the real secret
of success lies not in such gimmicks but in the more mundane task of estab-
lishing a more credible and effective tax administration. Bird acknowledges
that if tax administration is improved, then ‘gimmicks’ intended primarily
to increase the flow of information to the administration may provide some
extra benefit, but in his view these cannot take the place of improved ad-
ministrative effort. I agree with Bird that improving the tax administration
is extremely important to improve compliance. However, for countries that
do not have the means and knowledge for bringing their tax administration
up to the highest standard, policies such as the LTRP might be of help.
Also, when developing an LTRP, mechanisms must be introduced to reduce
fraud with invoices, such as falsified invoices. In Taiwan new systems of
e-invoices which are being proposed include the special function of auto-
55Re´ponse du vice-premier ministre et ministre des Finances et des Re´formes institu-
tionnelles du 08 mars 2010, a` la question n◦ 270 de madame la de´pute´e Vale´rie De´om du
07 janvier 2010, DO 2009201013743, QRVA 52 97, p. 82-83.
56As noted above, data on the results of the natural experiment occurring in China are
available only for a relative short period of time.
102
matically checking whether the invoice number matches the Uniform-Invoice
Prize Winning Numbers announced by the Ministry of Finance (Chang et al.,
2012). Such systems will also help to reduce falsification of VAT receipts.
Another problem with the Taiwanese system was the fact that as the lottery
numbers come per invoice and not per amount spent, there is an incentive
for customers to pay for every single item separately in order to get more
receipts (Giebe and Schweinzer, 2013). A possible solution for this specific
problem would be paying a lottery prize that is proportional to the invoice
value. This solution would drop customers’ incentives to pay for each item
separately, since the increase in probability of winning the lottery due to
the fact that the buyer collected multiple invoices is offset by the diminished
value of the lottery prize.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that targeted rewards may be more effec-
tive than scattergun rewards. Giving the chance to win lottery prizes to all
customers may not seem as effective as rewards to specific customers, such
as customers who report painters who offer them a discount for cash with
no invoice. While it is true that this mechanism could potentially increase
the lottery efficiency compared to LTRP, nevertheless, the practical imple-
mentation may also bring additional problems. A system that rewards only
customers who actively report irregular transactions implies that the indi-
vidual reporting the illegal action has to reveal personal data. This could
potentially restrain customers who want to remain anonymous when report-
ing illegal actions of sellers. For example, in Italy customers can report to
the Guardia di Finanza, the official monitoring authority, irregularities in
the issuance of invoices (in 2012 there have been more than 600.000 noti-
fications). On the basis of this information, the authority may decide to
impose an audit on the targeted business. While before 2012 notifications
were strictly anonymous, starting from April 2012 the Italian government
required personal data from the customer reporting the irregularity. This
decision of the Italian legislator provoked criticism since customers reporting
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irregularities could be identified and have often been subject to material and
moral retaliations. It is still difficult to empirically assess the effects of the
government policy. However, anecdotical evidence suggests that because of
it many customers reporting irregularities in the issuance of invoices switch
from the official Guardia di Finanza signaling system to an unofficial website
(www.evasori.info) created by a private citizen in order to report tax evasion
anonymously.
Finally, a special word of caution should be spent on the crowding-out effect
of voluntary requests for invoices. In some countries, a consistent percentage
of the population considers it to be an individual duty to enforce the issuance
of invoices, even without specific laws or monetary incentives. Unfortunately,
those customers who regularly request invoices may not carry on doing so
after LTRP is introduced. There is a growing body of literature both in psy-
chology and economics focusing on the direct and indirect detrimental effects
of monetary incentives (see, among others, Frey and Jegen, 2001; Le Grand,
1997; Benabou and Tirole, 2003). Those studies suggest that monetary in-
centives directly crowd out individuals’ willingness to behave pro-socially.
Furthermore, these studies suggest that these incentives indirectly affect the
proper functioning of a norm enforcing mechanism, increasing inefficiency.
Investigating this issue, Fuster and Meier (2010) set up a laboratory experi-
ment in order to verify the presence of the negative indirect effect of monetary
incentives. In each period, participants could allocate a fraction of their pri-
vate endowment to a public account. Money on the public account generated
interests that were distributed at the end of each period. However, interests
and capital on the public account were equally shared among all partici-
pants, independent of their individual contribution. This scenario mimics a
public goods situation: while it would be socially efficient for participants
to allocate the full private endowment to the public account, the individual
dominant strategy consists in free-riding on others’ contribution. As pre-
viously discussed, it is well known that without any external intervention,
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the level of resources allocated to the public account remains sub-optimal.
However, despite the theoretical prediction of zero contribution, it has been
shown that a proportion of participants always adopt the socially efficient
strategy, irrespective of what the other players are doing. The objective of
Fuster and Meier’s experiment is to verify the effect of a monetary reward on
the behavior of these altruistic participants. When monetary incentives for
adopting socially efficient behavior are introduced, altruistic agents did not
always carry on behaving consistently. Instead, while a number of free-riders
started behaving pro-socially because of the incentives, some of the altruistic
agents stopped allocating resources to the public account. In the end, the
combination of these effects leaves the net amount collected on the public
account unchanged in the situation with or without the private incentives
scheme. The possible explanation for this counter-intuitive and inefficient
result suggested by the authors is the destruction of intrinsic motivation
by extrinsic incentives and the framing effect of shifting from a social to a
monetary context.
Fuster and Meier’s results are important for the LTRP. These suggest that
LTRP could be effective and self-sustaining, leading to a stable, efficient,
equilibrium, only if a series of fundamental accessory conditions is present.
Specifically, it seems that the possible crowding out effect of monetary incen-
tives on norm enforcement would not be a problem in the case of widespread
and inefficient socially accepted behavior, such as tax evasion and not ask-
ing for an invoice. In situations with established inefficient social norms
little altruistic enforcing of the issuance of invoices is to be expected without
government intervention. Thus, a well specified system of incentives could
achieve a higher contribution level without leading to negative indirect ef-
fects.
3.8. Positive Long-term Effects
Despite the concerns emerging from possible side-effects, there are also pos-
itive externalities connected to the lottery policy. First of all, imagine the
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LTRP is introduced in a society where tax evasion, in the form of not issuing
invoices, is widespread and that this behavior is socially accepted or toler-
ated. If the LTRP is adopted, it is reasonable to assume that some consumers
will now react to private incentives and will start enforcing the issuance of
invoices even from suppliers that were used to systematically evade tax. The
negative aspects of the social costs of asking for a receipt are outweighed by
the chance of winning a prize.
Through the historical records of VAT or RST reported by companies, the
tax authorities can identify those businesses that have an abnormal peak in
the period in which the lottery policy is implemented. For example, it would
be straightforward to implement an algorithm that, after controlling for sea-
sonality and business cycles, automatically identifies the suppliers reporting
a statistically significant increase in supplies and tax. Hence, it would be-
come possible to separate such businesses from those that present continuous
payments of VAT or RST. This signal could be used as an indicator to direct
monitoring resources towards businesses that report discontinuous trends.
Thus, the LTRP could be of help in focusing auditing efforts. Businesses
that were used to evade taxes might even anticipate the increased proba-
bility of an audit and will review their behavior and increase their VAT or
RST payments permanently. As discussed before, it is possible that LTRP
will turn out to be unsustainable because the increased payments of VAT
and RST are not sufficient to pay the promised prize. If this happens the
government will have to incur a momentary loss. However, the benefits of
higher contribution levels deriving from more efficient screening and auditing
and a more effective sanctioning system will also produce a revenue increase
in subsequent periods when the lottery reward option has been abolished.
Moreover, the LTRP may not only be effective in combating VAT and RST
evasion, but also in tackling the evasion of taxation of business profits. As
invoices give an indication of retail sales, these can be used to establish
whether the reported taxable profit is consistent with such retail sales.
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Finally, an additional long-term possible benefit deriving from LTRP intro-
duction is the so called equilibria shift in a no pain no gain situation. Fol-
lowing Parisi (2000), we could interpret the apparently irrational presence
of Pareto-inefficient social norms (consumers accepting the evasion of tax by
their suppliers) as a point of local optimum that requires an initial loss of
utility to shift toward the global optimum. To clarify this point, consider as
an example the release of more efficient software. This new software is not
essential to perform fundamental operations, but individuals using the old
software are slower in performing certain minor tasks. Hence, while individ-
uals are not obliged to use the new software, sticking to the old one they
experience small disutilities that could be potentially eliminated, resulting
in a Pareto improvement (the “gain”). However, utilizing the new software
requires a training period during which it is not possible to conduct work
activities and an initial effort to learn the new code (the “pain”). If individ-
uals are not sufficiently forward looking (technically, are characterized by a
high time discount factor) or don’t have information about the benefits of
adopting the new software (are rationally bounded), they will refuse to incur
the once-and-for-all switching cost to the new software and lose the chance
of a permanent improvement.
Similarly, a society as a whole could experience a permanent Pareto improve-
ment if tax revenue increases and the state can provide better services. The
change of a social norm fostering tax evasion would be perceived only as a
cost in the short run, since less cash would circulate in the economy and less
competitive businesses would be likely to fail. Permanent benefits from a
change in the status quo will be experienced only in the medium and long
run, after the new equilibrium is reached. For example, if the increase in tax
revenue is used to finance new infrastructure, only after the project is com-
pleted will individuals experience an increase in utility. The introduction of
a lottery reward could work as a sort of compensation for the initial “pain”
that customers have to experience. Once the new, Pareto superior equilib-
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rium is reached, individuals will perceive the enforcement of the issuance of
invoices as the welfare-maximizing strategy, even if the LTRP is suspended.
Moreover, the external shock could lead to more consumers adopting socially
efficient behavior (asking for invoices) and thus initiate a process of changing
the norm. The mechanism of social norm creation is often characterized
by the so called “snowball effect”: an initial group of individuals adopting
socially efficient behavior because the external incentives might prompt the
rest of the population to ask for invoices as well (Aviram, 2004). Even if,
after the first prize is assigned, the government cannot repeat the lottery, it
is still possible that consumers will have already reached the new, Pareto-
efficient equilibrium and will, therefore, continue to ask for invoices. Asking
for an invoice will thus have become the social norm. While it is possible
that the initial investment and incentives mechanism will last for only for
a limited amount of time, the positive externalities may continue to spread
into the future.
3.9. Conclusions of chapter 3
The implementation of the LTRP in China increased RST revenue by giving
customers an incentive to request invoices, thus reducing RST evasion by
businesses. In this paper I have tried to explain this result and to provide
for a model which might help governments in deciding whether or not to
implement such a policy to combat RST evasion. Risk preferences, social
norms and population size have been discussed as important factors.
A major concern is the level at which lottery prizes must be set. A well
specified reward option must elicit a taste for gambling by consumers and
induce them to ask for an invoice even though this is not an efficient strat-
egy for a rational utility maximize individual. Given the peculiar situation
introduced by the LTRP (low probability of a possible high gain), in order
to describe a situation in which agents have to make a decision under risk
a generalized theoretical framework based on Cumulative Prospect Theory
has been proposed. This general theoretical framework allows for the testing
108
of the applicability of the LTRP in specific contexts. A key element from a
practical point of view would be the correct estimation of risk-preferences of
the specific population. I underlined the importance of this empirical task in
order to successfully implement the LTRP, since it is well known that risk-
preferences vary across populations and depend on individual wealth and
other factors. Moreover, I have discussed the possible positive and negative
side-effects. In order to limit the risk of crowding out virtuous behavior, I
suggest that the lottery only be introduced in countries with high levels of
VAT and RST evasion by businesses and a social norm of consumers not
asking for invoices or only in sectors with relatively high rates of tax evasion,
in countries which have an otherwise compliant norm. For example, where
the LTRP might be effective on a more general scale in Italy, it might be
best for the Netherlands to limit it to certain sectors, such as those involving
decorators and the carrying out of other odd-jobs for private individuals.
Regarding the positive long-term side-effects, I have pointed out how, in some
settings, the LTRP could help in deciding which businesses should be audited
and that it could result in asking for invoices becoming the social norm,
even if the policy is implemented for a limited time only. The side effect of
slightly increased waiting times at Milanese bakeries because every customer
demands a receipt and less juicy conversations during Dutch birthday parties
about decorators, will be outweighed by such benefits.
109
4. Social Influence on Third-Party Punishment: an Experiment57
Like chapter 3, the present chapter suggests an original contribution to the
field of behavioral public policymaking. I investigate the possibility to exploit
social influence effects in order to increase bystander altruistic intervention,
or using the language of economics, costly third-party punishment. While
both social influence and third-party punishment have been extensively in-
vestigated by scholars in the social sciences, this is the first study in either
law or economics that focus on the their interconnection.
I start proposing a model of social influence and deriving theoretical predic-
tions that diverge from results obtained by neoclassical models of decision-
making. I then test my model predictions empirically. In order to isolate the
causal effect of social influence on third-party punishment from confound-
ing factors, I rely on the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment
combined with the methodology of experimental economics.
Results of my experiments show that social influence is a major determinant
of third-party punishment. Moreover, they allow to identify the individual
characteristics that make an agent more sensitive to social influence. Finally,
I show that some subject respond to normative social influence (the ”need to
be liked” by peers), but their choices are not affected by informational social
influence (”the need to be right”).
My findings are relevant for policymakers and decisionmakers that consider
the possibility to implement policies based on third-party interventions. I
argue that costless and easy to implement social influence approaches would
increase the policies effectiveness and achieve welfare-improving results.
57I am grateful to the Alfred P. Sloan foundation for financial support. I am deeply
indebited to Emanuela Carbonara and Marco Casari for helpful comments and discussions:
this chapter would have not be written without their help. I also thank Maria Bigoni,
Andrea Geraci, Riccardo Ghidoni, Francesco Parisi, Louis Visscher, Roberto Weber and
seminar participants at Erasmus University Rotterdam for helpful suggestions and Stefano
Rizzo for valuable research assistance. The usual disclaimer applies.
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4.1. Introduction
Societies often rely on punishment for preventing and eventually responding
to rule violations. Punishment is a costly activity that inflicts negative conse-
quences upon wrongdoers and that is carried out both by formal centralized
institutions and by the decentralized actions of peers. When the punishment
activity is inflicted directly by agents that are bearing the costs of the rule
violation, we talk about second-party punishment. However, in groups com-
posed of a large number of agents interactions are often non-repeated and
the punishment activity is typically carried on by a third-party not directly
affected by the consequences of the rule violation. In these cases we refer to
third-party punishment.
While scholars’ attention has traditionally focused on second-party and cen-
tralized third-party punishment, in recent years a growing body of contribu-
tions analyzes empirically the role of decentralized third-parties in punishing
rules and norms violators (Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2002; Fehr et al., 2003; Fowler,
2005). However, despite there has been substantial progress in identifying
the determinants of decentralized third-party punishment (Bernhard et al.,
2006; Lewisch et al., 2011; Lieberman and Linke, 2007; Coffman, 2011), there
is only a partial understanding of what are its major determinants yet (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004a).
In this chapter I focus on decentralized punishment, examining the effects
of social influence on the punishment behavior of bystanders not directly
affected from the action of the wrongdoers58. By social influence I refer to
the effect of the endogenous interactions between a third-party’s preferences
for punishment and the preferences for punishment expressed by other by-
standers (Manski, 2000). Focusing on endogenous interactions means that I
investigate the influence that the punishment choices of other third-parties
have on the decision of a bystander to engage in punishment, ruling out the
58In order to minimize repetitions, when talking about decentralized punishment I will
employ the terms ”third-party” and ”bystander” interchangeably throughout the paper.
111
effects produced by self-selecting into the same group (contextual interac-
tions) or by sharing common individual characteristics (correlated effects).
Focusing on preference interaction means that I study how the utility of a
bystander is affected by information about other third-parties’ punishment
choices when this information does not modify her choice set and payoff
complementarity between bystanders is excluded.
Scholars report field and experimental evidence that social influence is a
major determinant of human behavior in a variety of settings characterized
by important economic consequences, like teenage pregnancy (Akerlof et al.,
1996), obesity (Christakis and Fowler, 2007), judicial voting patterns (Sun-
stein et al., 2006), investment strategies (Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh, 2003),
tax evasion (Fortin et al., 2007; Galbiati and Zanella, 2012) and other crim-
inal activities (Glaeser et al., 1996). However, empirically estimating social
influence effects on decentralized third-party punishment presents two major
identification problems. On the one hand, it requires to rule out problems
of self-selection and counfounding factors like correlated effects or the possi-
bility that third parties’ material payoff is modified as a consequence of the
exposure to social information. On the other hand, in most societies punish-
ment of rule violators is carried out by a centralized system based on codified
legal rules that coexists and sometimes overlaps with a decentralized system
based on informal norms (Akerlof, 1989; Cooter, 1998). As a consequence, it
is often impossible to isolate the effects of social influence on decentralized
punishment behavior analyzing field data. Therefore, I exploit the advantage
that the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment offers in order to
rule out self-selection problems and disentangle the effects of social influence
from those of possible counfounding factors.
Furthermore, Deutsch and Gerard (1955) suggest that social influence affects
the behavior of an individual agent through two possible channels. On the
one hand, under ”informational” social influence an agent derives utility from
doing what is the right action. Therefore, the agent’s behavior is influenced
112
by information received about peers’ choices because of an update of her
own beliefs regarding what is the correct thing to do. On the other hand,
under ”normative” social influence an agent derives (dis-) utility from being
(dis-) liked by her peers. Therefore the agent’s behavior is influenced by
information regarding peers’ choices because of the utility gain derived from
being liked or the disutility coming from being negatively judged by them.
Disentangling informational and normative social influence is important for
policy purposes because, while the former has persistent effects on individual
behavior, the effects of the latter is less robust and limited in time (Cason
and Mui, 1998).
Therefore, in this chapter I address the following questions: is social influ-
ence a major driver of third-party punishment? Does social influence play a
role in bystanders’ punishment decision through the channel of normative or
informational influence?
Results of my experiment show that social influence is an important determi-
nant of third-party punishment. Moreover, I find that bystanders engaging
in a high level of punishment are affected by social influence the most. I
also find that information about peers’ behavior influences individual choices
the most when the difference between a bystander’s beliefs regarding peers’
punishment and actual peers’ punishment is large. Finally, I find that some
subjects respond to normative social influence but not to informational social
influence.
I proceed in this way. In the next section I provide a literature review. In
section 4.3 the experimental design is presented. Section 4.4 specifies the
theoretical framework and the hypotheses I test. Section 4.5 presents the
experiment results and section 4.6 discusses my findings, suggests possible
directions for future research and states the conclusions.
4.2. Literature Review
Recognizing the importance of punishment in the societal framework scholars
have devoted great attention to the topic. Contributions in the early liter-
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ature were mostly concerned with second-party punishment (SPP) or forms
of centralized third-party punishment (TPP). The milestone of the literature
in law and economics could be considered the work of Becker (1968a). The
author analyzes the decision of a potential criminal to violate the law in the
framework of individual utility maximization, arguing that the criminal act
would be carried out only if its expected benefits exceed the expected costs.
Therefore, according to Becker’s argument, an increase in punishment level
and probability of being punished associated to criminal activities would re-
sult in the reduction of crime rate. Subsequent contributions extend Becker’s
original idea to the frameworks of regulation (Bose, 1995) and tax evasion
(Slemrod and Yitzhaki, 2002, for a survey).
In the field of experimental economics, the seminal work by Gu¨th et al. (1982)
introduces the concept of “irrational punishment” in the context of the so
called Ultimatum Game. In this game a receiver has to either accept or
reject the share of an amount of money offered by a Proposer. If the offer
is rejected, the receiver earns nothing but nullifies at the same time also
the earnings of the Proposer. Contrary to game-theoretical prediction, the
evidence shows that agents often prefer, at the price of leaving the offer of
the Proposer on the table, punishing by rejecting positive offers which she
regarded as unfair.
Since Guth’s contribution an extensive investigation of the determinants and
characteristics of SPP has been conducted. Among others, I mention the
contributions of Ostrom et al. (1992), Ga¨chter and Fehr (2000) and Fehr and
Ga¨chter (2002) that analyze costly punishment in commons and public goods
setting. These studies find that the presence of a punishment mechanism
substantially improves cooperation levels.
Subsequent articles further investigate the characteristic of SPP, suggesting
that it follows the law of demand (Carpenter, 2007) and it is driven more
by an emotional satisfaction than by a rational need for justice (Casari and
Luini, 2009), eventually leading to degeneration in riots and resources wasting
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(Nikiforakis, 2008).
Despite some pioneering contributions, (Axelrod, 1986; Bendor and Mookher-
jee, 1990; Ellickson, 1999), it is instead only starting from the last decade
that scholars begin to investigate decentralized TPP. The groundbreaking
articles are due to Fehr and Ga¨chter (2002); Fehr et al. (2003); Fehr and
Fischbacher (2004b). The authors show in laboratory experiments that third
parties voluntary incur costs in order to punish norm violations and that
the amount of punishment increases with perceived unfairness. Subsequent
works by Shinada et al. (2004) and Bernhard et al. (2006) report evidence
that humans in their punishment decisions are subject to “parochial altru-
ism”, tending to punish the rule-breakers more when he belongs to the same
reference group than when he is an outsider. Okimoto and Wenzel (2011)
confirm these findings showing that intra-group status influences TPP even
if only symbolic and limited to the context of an anonymous laboratory ex-
periment. Moreover Lieberman and Linke (2007) show that social categories
have a significant effect on the level of TPP provided and Hoff et al. (2011)
find that the legacy of cast culture in India influences norm enforcement,
determining less TPP within the casts considered at the bottom of the so-
ciety. More recently, Coffman (2011) shows that intermediation processes
reduce both TPP and rewards and Lewisch et al. (2011) suggest that TPP
suffers the free-riding problem when more than a single potential bystander
is present.
In a cross-cultural study among 15 small scale societies, Henrich et al. (2006)
find a significant variability on the level of TPP provided. Attempting to
account for these differences, Marlowe et al. (2008) show that societies char-
acterized by complex organizations and subject to frequent market interac-
tions engage in higher level of TPP compared to less articulated ones. As a
consequence, the authors argue that institutions and social structures play
a fundamental role in shaping our preferences for punishment. However,
possibly in contrast with Marlowe’s findings, Mathew and Boyd (2011) in a
115
following work show that third-party punishment could sustain large scale
cooperation among African nomadic tribes during warfare period, suggesting
that further studies are necessary in this area of research.
Contributions in applied psychology investigating the determinants of decen-
tralized TPP have also flourished in the last decades. Kurzban et al. (2007)
in a laboratory experiment find that subjects increase punishment when ob-
servers are present, arguing that TPP is influenced by the so called ”audi-
ence effect”. Subsequent works confirm that anonymity has a causal effect
on TPP (Piazza and Bering, 2008), suggesting that the third party decision
to sanction wrongdoers is influenced by a cost-dependent reputation effect
(Nelissen, 2008) and by emotions (Nelissen and Zeelenberg, 2009). Moreover
Lotz et al. (2011) suggest that differences in the level of third-parties punish-
ment provided within a group of agents could be explained by heterogeneity
in bystanders’ “justice sensitivity”. Finally, a promising branch of research
aims at explaining TPP through the investigation of the biological mecha-
nisms governing the human brain (Seymour et al., 2007; Buckholtz et al.,
2008) or the behavior of other animal species (Raihani et al., 2010).
While to the best of our knowledge there are no contributions linking social
influence effects and decentralized third-party punishment, nevertheless the
possibility that agents’ behavior is influenced by peers has since a long time
been the object of interest for social scientists. Depending on the field of
study and the context of the research, this behavior is called “social influ-
ence”, “neighborhood effect”, “taste for conformism”, “imitation” or “herd
behavior”. Starting from the pioneering work of Asch (1951, 1956), contribu-
tions in experimental psychology show how individuals tend to modify and
distort self-judgments under the influence of group pressure, culture influence
and taste for conformism (for a survey see Bond and Smith, 1996).
Economists have been mostly interested in the implications of social influ-
ence effects for the functioning mechanisms of financial markets. Indeed,
most of the contributions focus on the process of information acquisition in
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investment strategies (Cooper and Rege, 2008; Devenow and Welch, 1996;
Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; for a survey see Hirshleifer and Hong Teoh,
2003). Also, economic scholars investigated the effects of social influence on
the labor market. Studies report that peer pressure influences labor pro-
ductivity (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009) and that social
networks characterized by an elevated percentage of unemployed individu-
als could generate social norms perpetuating unemployment (Akerlof, 1980;
Topa, 2001). Moreover, reporting results of laboratory experiments, Falk and
Fischbacher (2002) argue that social influence is a major driver of criminal
behavior and Falk et al. (2010) and Krupka and Weber (2009) find that social
influence plays a role in determining pro-social behavior.
Finally, I signal a series of recent policy interventions that exploits social
influence effects in order to achieve welfare-improving results (for a discus-
sion of further similar policies see also Thaler and Sunstein, 2008). The first
framework of intervention is related to tax compliance. I already mentioned
in the previous chapter that for an individual the likelihood to engage in tax
evasion is affected by her peers’ rate of tax evasion . However, social influ-
ence properly combined with framing effect59 might also help in increasing
tax compliance. Indeed,Coleman (1996) reports the result of a field experi-
ment conducted in Minnesota with the objective to find a costless strategy
to increase tax compliance. In the experiment, a letter is sent to taxpayers
by the tax authority a few days before the annual tax file deadline. The
letter could contain different information according to different treatments:
a reminder to the civic obligation to pay taxes, information regarding the
procedure to follow, a simple reminder of the deadline or information regard-
ing the number of taxpayers that have already complied with tax payment
(a percentage above 90%, that a survey analysis reveals people typically
underestimated). This last treatment turns out to be the only treatment
59See the Introduction chapter for a discussion of the framing effect.
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registering a statistically significant increase in the number of compliant tax
payers.
Another example of behavioral public policy based on social influence is an
intervention that encourages socializing nondrinking. Perkins et al. (2010)
report results from a field experiment run in Montana, where surveys re-
vealed that college students systematically overestimate the fraction of peers
consuming alchoolic beverages. In the experiment, a random sample of col-
lege students were exposed to the (true) information that the overwhelming
majority of the people in the state and of the students on campus consumes
moderate quantities of alchol. Results show that those exposed to this infor-
mation decrease the consumption of alchool compared to peers in the control
group.
The last example I report is described in Cialdini (1993) and concerns a
field experiment run in the Petrified National Forest, Arizona. Apparently,
visitors tend to take home petrified fossils as a souvenir, a behavior that
over the years created serious concerns about the preservation of the park.
Signs along the park trails ask people not to take samples away. However,
Cialdini found that when the request on the sign is framed as an injunctive
norm (”Please do not remove fossils from the park in order to preserve the
Petrified Forest”) people are significatively more compliant than when the
request conveys information about other visitors’ unlawful behavior (”Many
past visitors have removed the petrified wood from the park, changing the
state of the Petrified Forest”). This finding confirm that social influence,
either for good or bad, represents a major driver of human behavior.
4.3. Experimental Design
The Game. I conduct a variant of Fehr and Fischbacher (2004) dictator game
with TPP. Following Cox et al. (2007) and Swope et al. (2008), in the game
a dictator has the possibility to take from a passive receiver some or all of
the experimental monetary units (tokens) of the initial endowment provided
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by the experimenter. The game has 3 possible roles: receiver (Participant
A), dictator (Participant B) and Third-party (Participant C).
The game has two periods. Each period of the game is divided in two stages.
At the beginning of each period, each participant is endowed with 30 tokens
by the experimenter. In the first stage of each period, Participant B has
the possibility to take from 0 up to 30 tokens (in multiples of 5) from A.
Participants A cannot undertake any action during the game.
In the second stage of each period, Participant C has the opportunity to
impose a costly punishment upon B. Specifically, C could use up to 20 units
of her initial endowment to reduce B’s payoff. For each token used by C,
the payoff of Participant B is reduced by 4 tokens. Participants C specify
how many tokens they use in order to reduce B’s payoff for each possible
action choosen by B (strategy method). The tokens C uses for punishment
in one period and the consequent reduction of B’s payoff have no effect on
the payoff of player A. Agents have full information regarding the rules of
the game.
Before the game starts, participants’ beliefs about the average punishment
choices of the peers are elicited. To do so, I use an incentivized coordi-
nation game similar to Krupka and Weber (2013). I refer to this part of
the experiment as the ”Beliefs elicitation game”. I present to participants
a hypothetical situation identical to the game described above. I ask each
participant to indicate, for each of the seven possible actions of B, the num-
ber of tokens [0; 20] that in their opinion C would use to punish B. I explain
that, once each participant present in the laboratory has provided her an-
swers, the computer selects one of the seven possible actions of B. For the
selected action, a participant earns 40 tokens if the number she indicated is
equal, bigger or smaller by one unit to the average number indicated by all
the participants in the experimental session. Therefore, in this part of the
experiment participants have incentives to reveal their true beliefs regarding
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peers’ choices of punishment60.
Treatments. I propose two effect treatments (INFORMATIONAL and NOR-
MATIVE) and a control treatment (CONTROL). The elicitation of beliefs
and the first period of the game are identical in all treatments. Specifically,
the amount of tokens B decides to take from A in the first stage is not imme-
diately observed by C. Instead in stage 2 of the first period C’s decisions of
punishment are elicited employing the “strategy method”: for each possible
action of B, C states his decision of punishment. Participants are informed
that only the punishment decision corresponding to the actual choice made
by B determines payoffs. The punishment tokens used by C in correspon-
dence to the other possible choices of B do not have payoff consequences.
First period earnings and choices of peers are not revealed to participants at
the end of the first period.
At the beginning of the second period, participants’ endowments are restored
to the initial level. Earnings of the first period are independent from those of
the second. The first stage of the second period is identical to the first stage
of the previous one: B is endowed with the same amount of tokens and may
take part or all of A’s endowment.
Also in the second stage of the second period, C has to indicate the level of
60One may argue that eliciting subjects’ beliefs regarding average peers’ punishment in
the first part of the experiment might influence subjects’ choice of punishment in later
parts. Indeed, it is possible that individuals anchors their punishment choice to the ex-
pected average punishment. I considered this point carefully in designing the experiment.
However, on the one hand there is an unavoidable trade-off between eliciting subjects’
beliefs and facing the risk of an anchoring effect. Given the importance that subjects’
beliefs have in my model, I could not avoid this stage. On the other hand, this concern
would be jusified for experiments that does not involve an incentive mechanism, while
is definitely less worrisome for my experiment that is based on the standards of experi-
mental economics. In fact, in my experiment subjects are paid according to their choices.
Therefore, for a subject interested in maximizing monetary earnings, the incentive schemes
proposed guarantees that in the second part of the experiment any anchoring effect would
be eliminated or reduced.
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punishment inflicted for each of the 7 possible actions of B (take 0 from A;
take 5 from A;...take 20 from A). The difference between treatments consists
in the kind and amount of information disclosed to participants C before the
punishment choices. In the INFORMATIONAL treatment, each participant
C receives information about the average number of tokens used to punish
B in the first period by the participants C taking part to the experimental
session.
In the NORMATIVE treatment, each participant C receives the same infor-
mation of INFORMATIONAL. However, she is additionally informed that
her punishment decisions of the second period will be revealed to 5 peers
randomly selected among the experiment participants. After observing these
choices, the 5 peers vote for sending an emoticon that will appear to the
screen of the participant C. The 5 peers could vote for a smiling emoticon or
a sad emoticon. If the majority vote for a smiling emoticon, on player C’s
monitor will appear a smiling emoticon. A sad emoticon will appear on the
screen otherwise. Participants are informed that the emoticon received has
no effect on earnings and that it disappears after one minute.
In the CONTROL treatment, no relevant information about participants
punishment choices is disclosed in the second period. However, I have to
rule out the possibility that a change in punishment behavior between pe-
riods is driven by factors other than the exposure to social influence. One
possible confounding factor is subjects’ experience that increases between
periods. Another possible confounding factor is that processing new infor-
mation imposes a cognitive effort to subjects. Hence these factors, not the
social content of the information received, could be responsible for a mod-
ification of the punishment choice. In fact, in the INFORMATIONAL and
NORMATIVE treatments subjects have to process some sort of informa-
tion, and there is evidence that individuals exposed to a cognitive load tend
to modify their behavior (for discussion on this point see Cason and Mui,
1998).
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In order to rule out these confounding factors and isolate social influence
effects, I then expose the CONTROL group to some social irrelevant infor-
mation. Specifically, I ask at the beginning of the session to each participant
her day of birth ∈ [1; 31] and I take the average. Since I do not ask nor
I report them neither the year nor the month of birth, reporting this mea-
sure does not convey any relevant social information. However, in this way
participants in CONTROL are affected by the same cognitive burden of par-
ticipants in TREATED and the only difference lies in the exposure to relevant
social information .
Endowments, Choice Sets and Payoffs.
Participants’s initial endowment in each period of the Dictator game is 30
tokens. The initial endowment is restored at the beginning of each period.
Earnings of the first period are independent from those of the second one.
In each period, first B decides how many tokens to take from A. B could
take from 0 up to 30 tokens in multiples of 5 from A. Then, C decides how
many tokens to use for punishing B. C could use from 0 up to 20 tokens of
his initial endowment. For participants C, the cost of reducing the payoff
of B of 4 tokens is 1 token. Only punishment of integer tokens is allowed.
Participants are informed that eventual negative earnings would be deducted
from the participation fee. C has to take 7 punishment decisions. In fact,
C does not observe the actual choice of player B. Instead, C reports his
punishment choice for each of the 7 possible B’s actions.
In all treatments, the per period payoffs are calculated as:
• ΠA = 30 - t
• ΠB = 30 + t - 4*p
• ΠC = 30 - p
where:
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• t = tokens taken by B from A
• p = punishment tokens used by player C
Results and earnings of the beliefs elicitation game and of the first period of
the dicator game are not revealed to subjects until the end of the experiment.
In order to calculate individual earnings, participants are randomly divided
in groups of 3. Each group is composed of one participant A, one B and one
participant C. The final payment for each group follows this procedure:
• In the dictator game, after the second period is concluded, one of the
two periods is randomly selected. This period will be called the ”pay-
ment period”.
• For each participant, earnings relative to the payment period are added
to earning collected in the beliefs elicitation game. Earnings from the
non-selected period are not paid out.
• A 5 euro participation fee is added to total payments.
Given the experimental design, I am able to isolate the effect of endogenous
interactions in the form of preferences interactions on TPP. This is possible
because I randomly select and assign participants to roles, I exclude payoff
complementarity among third-parties and I explicitly present them a choice
set that remains unchanged throughout the experiment. I also feel confident
that my design rules out the possibility that individuals are influenced by
”epistemic norms” (Hetcher, 2004). Epistemic norms emerge when agents
experience scarcity of information and so just ”follow the crowd” in taking a
decision. To be precise, epistemic norms are not even norms but conventions
motivated by simple self-interest (Kahan, 1997). Independently from how
these norms are named, I believe they are not playing a role in the experi-
ment, since every player has perfect information about possible actions in his
choice set, and payoff complementarity and strategic actions are ruled out
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by design.
The Procedure. The experiment was programmed using the software z-Tree
(Fischbacher, 2007). Every session was conducted at the Bologna Labora-
tory for Experimental Social Sciences at the University of Bologna, Italy,
between November and December 2013. Participants were for the vast ma-
jority graduate and undergraduate students of the University of Bologna, plus
some private citizens, and were recruited through the online system ORSEE
(Greiner, 2004). In each session participants were split into 5 groups of 3
subjects61. Overall, 9 sessions were run, 3 for each treatment, that results in
a total of 142 participants (56% female).
In each session, before each of the three parts of the experiment (elicita-
tion of beliefs, first period punishment and second period punishment), a
printed copy of the instructions was distributed and read aloud by the exper-
imenter62. Participants had additional images and tables summarizing the
instructions on their computer screen. Information regarding payoff func-
tions and rules of the game was common knowledge. Participants had the
possibility to ask questions before the experiment started.
At the end of each session participants completed a brief socio-demographic
questionnaire63. Each participant took part in one session only. Peers’ iden-
tities were maintained unknown even after the end of the experiment. In
order to guarantee anonymity, participants were individually and privately
paid after the experiment finished. No communication among participants
was allowed.
61In one session of the INFORMATIONAL treatment there were only 4 groups, for a
total of 12 participants.
62Original instructions are in Italian and are available upon request. A copy of the
instructions for the NORMATIVE treatment translated in English is included in Appendix
B.
63In one session of the INFORMATIONAL treatment subjects’ socio-demographic char-
acteristic were not recorded due to a technical problem.
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The part of the session concerning beliefs elicitation and treatments lasted
around 20 minutes. However, due to the impossibility of learning throughout
periods and the limited number of decisions each participant had to take, I
was concerned about the possibility that instructions were not fully under-
stood. In order to minimize this possibility, I adopt special care in writing
detailed instructions and providing multiple examples, and I also asked sub-
jects to correctly answer control questions before proceeding with each part
of the experiment. As a result, each experimental session lasted in total
about 45 minutes. Tokens where converted into euros at a rate of 5 tokens
for 1 euro. Subjects earned on average 11 euros for the experimental session.
4.4. Hypotheses
Following the customary assumptions, the predictions of the game outcomes
are straightforward. Agents’ utility is an increasing function of individual
wealth and agents are individual payoff maximizer. Hence, in any treatment,
no punishment should be observed, since the payoff-maximizing strategy for
third-parties is to punish nothing and keep the initial endowment. Antici-
pating the absence of punishment, dictators should take all the tokens from
receivers.
However past dictator game experiments have shown two behavioral regular-
ities. On the one hand, even in games where the dictator faces no threat of
punishment, positive amounts of tokens are transferred (in our setting: are
left) to the receiver. On the other hand, third-parties engage in costly pun-
ishment for dictator’s levels of transfer (in our setting: for dictator’s levels of
taking) perceived as unfair. In this study I am interested in verifying how,
given the action of a dictator, the punishment choices of other third-parties
affects the utility that a bystander derives from punishing the dictator.
Consider the choice of a third-party i to use p tokens of her initial endow-
ment in order to punish a dictator that takes z tokens from a passive receiver.
Third-parties’ individual utility is an increasing function of the final mone-
tary earnings x. Moreover, given a dictator’s action, third-parties have some
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inherent preferences pkz for the amount of tokens she wants to use for punish-
ment. pki,z could be interpreted as reflecting the individual sense of justice of
the third-party i. If a third-party chooses to punish the dictator a quantity
different from her inherent preference, she has to bear a cost s that increases
when the absolute difference between pk and the p increases.
Furthermore, third-parties have some beliefs E(p¯) regarding the average
amount of tokens that the other bystanders will use for punishing dictators.
A third-party incurs a cost c for punishing a quantity of tokens different from
E(p¯), and this cost becomes larger when the absolute difference between in-
dividual punishment and the average punishment of the peers increases. c
incorporates both the costs imposed by the other bystanders observing the
third-party that deviates from the average punishment and the disutility the
third-party experiences in not conforming with the peers’ behavior indepen-
dently from the fact that her action is observed.
Therefore, in her punishment decisions a third-party maximizes individual
utility taking into account the cost of using tokens for punishing a dictator
and so reducing her monetary payoff, the cost for deviating from her inher-
ent preference for punishment and the cost of not conforming to the peers’
average punishment:
max
pi,z,t
Ui,z,t = xi,z,t − (s(Ei(p¯z,t)− pi,z,t)2 + c(pki,z − pi,z,t)2)
s. t. yi = xi,z,t + pi,z,t
(24)
Where y is third-party’s initial endowment. Assuming an interior solution
exists, equation (1) generates the following first order condition:
p∗i,z,t =
sEi(p¯z,t) + cp
k
i,z − 1
s+ c
(25)
Therefore, according to our model of social influence the optimal punishment
choice of a third-party is an increasing function of the expected punishment
chosen by her peers. Furthermore, the higher the cost s of not conforming
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to other bystanders’ average punishment relative to the cost c of deviating
from inherent preferences, the higher will be for a third-party the tendency
to conform to the peers’ average punishment. Allowing for concavity of the
agents’ utility function, the intutition of the previous results will still work.
In order to test my predictions, as a first step I verify if there is a positive
association between a third-party’s beliefs regarding peers’ average punish-
ment and her first period punishment. As a second step, I then investigate
how participants modify their punishment choices between the first and the
second period. Assume that third-parties in TREATED revise beliefs about
average peers’ punishment substituting their initial priors with the actual
punishment level revealed to them after the first period, hence Ei(p¯z,t) =
p¯z,t−1. The punishment variation across periods is given by:
(p∗i,z,2 − p∗i,z,1) =
s(p¯z,1 − Ei(p¯z,1))
s+ c
(26)
For the moment, focus only on the distinction between participants in CON-
TROL and the other participants grouped together, that I call TREATED.
Third-parties in CONTROL are not exposed to socially relevant information
between period 1 and 2. Instead, bystanders in TREATED are exposed to
information that may induce them to update their initial beliefs regarding
peers’ average punishment and so influence their second period punishment
decision. Therefore, if social influence has an effect on third-party punish-
ment decision, I expect it to be more likely that participants in TREATED
modify their punishment decisions in the passage between the first and sec-
ond period punishment as compared to participants in CONTROL.
Thus, according to our model revealing to a bystander her peers’ average
punishment may trigger a change in her second punishment decision as a
consequence of a beliefs updating process. Specifically, for a bystander the
likelihood to change punishment decision in the second period increases when
the absolute difference between her beliefs regarding peers’ average punish-
ment and the actual average punishment of the first period is large. There-
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fore, I test the following hypothesis:
1. Zero Social Influence hypothesis: In the first period, punishment deci-
sions of bystanders are not influenced by their beliefs regarding peers’ av-
erage punishment. Moreover, bystanders in TREATED are as likely as
bystanders in CONTROL to modify their initial punishment decisions.
Second, I want to identify who are the bystanders more responsive to so-
cial influence. Third-parties deciding to use tokens for punishing a dictator
are reducing their final monetary payments. Hence, every time I observe a
bystander punishing a positive amount, according to our model I infer that
sE(p¯) + cpk− 1 is positive. This could mean that the bystander has inherent
preferences for punishing a positive amount (pk>0) and at the same time she
attaches a positive weight to this component of the utility function (c>0).
However, it is also possible that the bystander attaches a positive weight
to the social component of the utility function (s>0) and she expects peers
to punish on average a positive amount of tokens (E(p¯z,t)>0)
64. If this last
possibility is true, the higher a bystander’s punishment in the first period the
more she attaches weight to the social component of the utility function and
so the more likely she is to modify the second period punishment decision.
Now consider the difference between first and second period punishment of
a bystander. Inherent preferences for punishment are stable, so they do not
play a role in the decision to eventually modify punishment choice. Instead,
according to the prediction of my model, the larger is s for a bystander,
the more she responds to the social information regarding peers’ punish-
ment. Therefore, holding constant E(p¯z,t) - p¯z,t−1, I expect that the more a
bystander punished in the first period, the more she is likely to revise her
64Of course, it is possible that what it is observed is a combination of this two possibil-
ities.
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punishment decisions in the second period.
Moreover, I also consider the difference between a bystander’s beliefs regard-
ing peers’ average punishment and her first period punishment. In the first
period, a bystander could punish an amount different from her beliefs regard-
ing peers’ average punishment because she only cares about her monetary
payoff or because her inherent preference for punishment differs from the
expected average punishment and the cost s of non conforming to peers’ av-
erage punishment is small compared to the cost c of non following inherent
preferences. In both cases, the choice of the bystander reveals that in her
punishment decisions she is little influenced by peers’ behavior. As a conse-
quence, I expect the more a bystander punishes in the first period a quantity
different from her beliefs about peers’ average punishment, the less she will
be responsive to social influence.
2. Differential Social Influence hypothesis: Third-parties that engage in high
punishment in the first period are the most responsive to social influence.
Conversely, the higher the absolute difference between a bystanders’ be-
liefs regarding average peers’ punishment and first period individual pun-
ishment, the lower the bystander likelihood to modify punishment choices
in the second period.
Finally, I investigate the psychological mechanisms triggering social influ-
ence. In our experiment, I give bystanders in NORMATIVE and INFOR-
MATIONAL the same information about peers’ punishment. However, in
the INFORMATIONAL treatment, the second period choices of the third-
party are not observable ex post by other participants. As a consequence,
in the INFORMATIONAL treatment a third-party has no incentives to con-
form to peers’ punishment choices if her only goal is being liked by them.
Hence, a bystander would eventually modify his punishment strategy only if
informational social influence is at work.
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On the other hand, in the NORMATIVE treatment a bystander is aware that
her punishment decisions of the second period will be observed by peers and
that they will express a judgement regarding those choices. As a consequence,
for bystanders in NORMATIVE the cost s of not conforming to the average
peers’ punishment has been modified in the passage between first and second
treatment since I added a normative social influence component. Hence, if
some bystanders are responsive to normative but not to informational influ-
ence, the NORMATIVE treatment will show social influence effects different
from those resulting from the INFORMATIONAL treatment. The difference
in the way bystanders modify their punishment decisions between NORMA-
TIVE and INFORMATIONAL treatments isolates the effect of normative
social influence on third-party punishment.
3. Equivalence of Normative and Informational Influence hypothesis: Social
influence effects on third-party punishment are the same for subjects ex-
posed to informational and normative influence.
4.5. Results
Table 5 reports summary statistics relative to my data65. Dictators leave
approximatively 36% of receivers’ endowment. This finding is consistent
with results from other comparable experiments where dictators have to take
tokens from the endowment of a passive receiver (List, 2007; Krupka and
Weber, 2013)66.
65Additional summary statistics where I consider separately the seven possible punish-
ment choices in each period, are reported in Tables B.12 and B.13 in Appendix B.
66In the classical dictator game without punishment a dictator has the possibility to
give part of his endowment to a passive receiver. In a meta-study, Engel (2011) found
that on average dictators give roughly 25% of their endowment to the receiver. However,
in my design dictators has to take money from receivers’ endowment instead of giving
them. This difference and the possibility of being punished that characterizes my design
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Table 5: Summary Statistics
Treatment male age dictatorTake Beliefs PunishPer1 PunishPer2
Control
(Mean) .33 24.68 18.38 5.08 3.33 3.54
(Median) 0 25 20 4.29 2.71 2.71
(SD) .48 2.76 11.19 3.71 3.42 3.82
Normative
.58 26.18 18.28 4.80 3.30 3.03
1 25 20 4.57 3 2.29
.50 5.38 11.40 3.40 3.34 3.37
Informational
.37 25.15 17.32 5.41 4.15 3.81
0 25 16.25 4.86 4.29 3.86
.49 3.72 10.85 3.67 3.71 3.90
Total
.44 25.37 18.01 5.09 3.58 3.45
0 25 20 4.71 3.43 3.07
.50 4.17 11.08 3.57 3.48 3.69
On average bystanders punish approximately 3.5 tokens, decreasing punish-
ment amount in the second period. When the dictator takes all the money
from the receiver, third parties spend approximately 6 tokens in punish-
ment. Average punishment then progressively declines, reaching virtually
0, when levels of dictators’ taking decrease. Also this result is consistent
with previous findings on third-party punishment in dictator games (Fehr
and Fischbacher, 2004b). However, if I consider the 3 treatments separately,
are likely to explain the slightly more fair allocation I registered compared to the standard
dictator game (on this point, see also Krupka and Weber, 2013).
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I see that in CONTROL punishment slightly increases in the second period,
while in both NORMATIVE and INFORMATIONAL it decreases. Consid-
ering third-parties’ beliefs regarding peers’ punishment behavior, beliefs are
on average are higher than actual punishment.
I proceed considering, for each bystander in a single punishment period, the
average of her seven punishment choices corresponding to different levels
of dictator taking. I compare the cumulative distribution of this measure
in TREATED and CONTROL. Figures 4 and 5 report the cumulative dis-
tribution functions of punishment respectively in period 1 and 2. In the
first period, the cumulative punishment choice distribution in CONTROL
exceeds the distribution in TREATED for any possible punishment level.
However, a Kolmorgorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the null hypothesis that
the distributions are equivalent. In the second period instead, the cumulative
punishment choice distribution of TREATMENT exceeds the distribution of
CONTROL for some punishment levels greater than 5. However, also in the
second period a Kolmorgorov-Smirnov test cannot reject the equivalence of
the two distributions, nor the samples means are statistically different (t-test
two sided p-value 66%). Now I test my hypotheses.
4.5.1. Zero Social Influence Hypothesis
I start by investigating if bystanders punish in the first period according to
their beliefs regarding the average punishment they expect peers’ will use. As
a first step, I test if there is a significant difference between the punishment
used by a bystander and her beliefs about peers’ average punishment. I
conduct a t-test comparing the two averages under the null hypothesis that
they are the same. Third-parties punish on average 3.6 tokens in the first
period while their beliefs about peers’ average punishment is 5.1 tokens.
Results of the t-test reject our hypothesis and indicate that bystanders in the
first period punish significantly less than what they think peers on average
will do (t-test two-tails, p-value < 1%).
I want to verify if this result is driven by those third-parties that during the
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Figure 4: Punishment Period 1 Cumulative Distribution Function
experiment punish always 0 (I name them ”selfish”). Excluding selfish pun-
ishers from the sample, bystanders’ beliefs about peers’ punishment remain
higher than the punishment they provide (6.0 versus 5.4 tokens), however the
difference is not statistically significant (p-value 12%). This results suggest
that selfish subjects are responsible for the aforementioned gap.
I continue the analysis regressing the quantity of punishment tokens a by-
stander uses in the first period with her beliefs regarding peers’ average
punishment and a set of socio-demographic characteristics. Results are re-
ported in Table 667. The variable Beliefs Punish indicates bystanders’
67Table C.14 in Appendix C reports a description of each variable employed.
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Figure 5: Punishment Period 2 Cumulative Distribution Function
beliefs about peers average punishment. The coefficient is positive and sig-
nificant at the 1% level in all model specifications. According to the model
estimation, bystanders spend an additional 0.4 token for every unit of in-
crease in expected average peers’ punishment. Hence, data suggest that
third-parties are influenced in their first period punishment decisions by be-
liefs about peers’ punishment. This finding goes against the Zero Social
Influence hypothesis.
I proceed in the analysis verifying how third-parties in CONTROL and in
TREATED modify punishment choices between the first and the second pe-
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Table 6: Determinants First Period Pun-
ishment
(1) (2)
Beliefs 0.405∗∗∗ 0.432∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.06)
male -0.515 -0.407
(0.58) (0.62)
age -0.078 -0.047
(0.06) (0.07)
degree -0.842∗∗ -1.435∗∗∗
(0.41) (0.45)
worker 0.759 0.860
(0.74) (0.80)
social 0.378 0.399
(0.73) (0.85)
arts 0.234 0.021
(1.06) (1.28)
field other 0.409 -0.131
(0.63) (0.75)
risk 0.138 0.037
(0.10) (0.11)
logic -0.305 0.057
(0.40) (0.47)
impulsivity -0.636∗∗ -0.687∗∗
(0.27) (0.32)
Instruction 0.000 -0.000
(0.00) (0.00)
DictatorTake -0.007 0.026
(0.01) (0.02)
cons 6.246∗∗∗ 7.889∗∗∗
(1.90) (2.04)
N 924 630
R2 0.281 0.275
BIC 5203.7 3602.6
Notes:OLS regression: dep. var. Strat Punish,
SE clustered by subject. Significance lev-
els: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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riod. As a first step, I sort bystanders into two main categories: those who
never change punishment decisions across periods and those who change at
least once. In the TREATED group 53 subjects (61%) change at least one
punishment decision between periods, while in the CONTROL treatment 24
subjects (53%) do so. This difference is not statistically significant. If I repeat
the same test excluding selfish bystanders, it turns out that in TREATED
87% and in CONTROL 80% of third-parties change punishment decisions
at least once. However, also in this case the difference is not statistically
significant.
I also verify how many times on average each punisher changes decision
across periods. In TREATED bystanders change decision 2.5 times, while in
CONTROL they change 2.1 times. This difference is not statistically signifi-
cant and it remains roughly unchangend even if I exclude selfish bystanders.
Therefore, these results do not provide evidence against the Zero Social In-
fluence hypothesis. The result seems to be driven by the high percentage of
participants (53%) in the CONTROL group that modifies punishment choices
at least once, even if they did not receive any relevant social information.
As a second step, I test if there is a difference in the likelihood that par-
ticipants in CONTROL and TREATMENT change punishment decisions. I
create the dummy variable DummyP1p0 that takes the value 1 when punish-
ment in the second period differs from punish in the first one and 0 otherwise.
I implement a logistic regression to estimate the likelihood of changing pun-
ishment choice across periods. Results of the model are presented in Table 7.
The dummy TREATED equals 1 for participants in NORMATIVE and IN-
FORMATIONAL. The coefficient of the dummy is positive and statistically
significant in any of the model specifications68. Therefore, I conclude that
68Model 2 differs from Model 1 because it excludes selfish participants. Model 3 adds
the control variables Strat Punish, indicating punishment exerted in the first period, and
Abs0Belifs, reporting the absolute difference between a bystander’s punishment in the
first period and her beliefs regarding peers’ average punishment. Model 4 excludes selfish
participants from the sample.
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the results of the logistic regression do not support the Zero Social Influence
hypothesis and indicate that participants in TREATED modify punishment
decisions across periods more often than those in CONTROL.
As a third step, I investigated how third-parties modify their punishment
choices. In CONTROL bystanders reduce punishment in the second period
48 times (15%), increase 49 times (16%) and do not change 218 times (69%).
In TREATED, bystanders reduce punishment 140 times (23%), increase 93
(15%) and do not change 376 times (62%). These choices result for CON-
TROL in an average increase in punishment from period 1 to period 2 of 0.21
tokens (from 3.3 to 3.5) and in an average decrease in TREATED of 0.30
tokens (from 3.7 to 3.4). The mean punishment difference across periods is
not statistically different in CONTROL and TREATED (p-value 0.16, t-test
two-sided).
However, we could expect that bystanders have no reason to punish a dicta-
tor when she does not take any amount of money from the receiver. Hence,
when the dictator chooses to take 0 from the receiver, I expect little or no
punishment both in CONTROL and TREATED. In fact, if we exclude the
situations in which the dictator takes 0 from the receiver, the average dif-
ference between bystanders’ punishment in the two periods is weakly statis-
tically significantly higher in CONTROL versus TREATED (p-value 0.09).
Furthermore, if we consider only situations in which the dicator takes half
or more of receiver’s initial endowment, this difference between CONTROL
and TREATMENT becomes significant at the 5% level.
Hence, results of this third set of tests suggest that, at least for situa-
tions where dictators subtract positive amounts of tokens from receivers,
bystanders exposed to social influence significantly reduce the amount of
punishment provided compared to bystanders in CONTROL. These results
provide evidence against the Zero Social Influence hypothesis.
Fourth, I test the hypothesis that a large absolute difference between a by-
stander’s beliefs regarding peers’ average punishment and actual peers’ av-
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erage punishment increases the likelihood to modify the initial bystander
punishment choice. Third-parties receive information regarding actual peers’
punishment in the NORMATIVE and INFORMATIONAL treatments only,
so I restrict the analysis to these treatments. I test this hypothesis using
a logistic model. Results are reported in Table 7. From models 7 and 8, I
can see that the coefficient of the variable Abs BeliefAvgPunish is positive
as expected, however only weakly significant. The estimations suggest that
an increase of one unit in the difference Abs BeliefAvgPunish increases on
average the probability of modifying second period punishment by 3.5%69.
This result provides evidence against the Zero Social Influence hypothesis.
Finally, I report some descriptive statistics that account for the direction
of punishment deviation between periods70. The variable P1p0 reports the
difference between punishment in period 2 and period 1. Table 8 provides
summary statistics of this variable, grouping subjects according to the differ-
ence between individual beliefs about average punishment and actual average
punishment observed. When beliefs match exactly the average punishment
observed (P1p0 BAP = 0), subjects confirm punishment choices in the sec-
ond period 76% ot times. Instead, when beliefs are larger or smaller than the
actual average punishment observed (P1p0 BAP > and < 0 respectively),
subjects confirm first period choice respectively 51% and 73% of times.
Considering how subjects modify their decisions, I see that those observing
69I also consider the possibility that a large absolute difference between a bystander
punishment in the first period and the average peers’ punishment increases the likelihood to
change the punishment decision in the second period. I create the variable Abs Signalp0,
reporting the absolute difference between individual punishment in the first period and
average peers’ punishment. Results of the logistic estimations are reported in model 7 and
8 of Table 7. The coefficient of Abs Signalp0 is not statisticaly different from 0 in any
model specification. As a consequence, I conclude that Abs Signalp0 has no impact on
subjects’ likelihood to modify punishment decision.
70It would be interesting to test if the difference between agents’ punishment choices
across periods has the same sign of the difference between beliefs and actual average
punishment of the peers. However our data do not allow to distinguish between this
hypothesis and a simple regression toward the mean.
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Table 7: Probability modify punishment across periods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
male -0.219∗∗∗ -0.258∗∗∗ -0.168∗∗ -0.215∗∗ -0.098 -0.019 -0.089 -0.017
(0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.12) (0.14) (0.12) (0.14)
risk 0.030∗ 0.014 0.019 0.008 -0.015 -0.040 -0.020 -0.043∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
logic -0.077 -0.033 -0.061 -0.031 0.135 0.242∗∗ 0.149 0.246∗∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10)
TREATED 0.155∗∗ 0.131∗ 0.124∗∗ 0.122∗
(0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07)
Strat Punish 0.040∗∗∗ 0.021∗∗ 0.044∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Abs p0Belifs -0.010 -0.003 -0.026∗∗ -0.019∗ -0.032∗∗ -0.026
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
Abs Signalp0 0.002 0.006
(0.01) (0.01)
Abs BelAvgPun 0.024 0.023
(0.02) (0.03)
Beliefs 0.015 0.009 0.025∗∗ 0.021∗ 0.015 0.009
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Other contr Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 924 630 924 630 609 420 609 420
pseudo R2 0.092 0.059 0.207 0.095 0.206 0.101 0.226 0.123
Notes: Logistic regression: dep. var. DummyP1p0, marginal effect at means, SE clustered by subject. Significance
levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Other Controls include: degree worker social arts field other
DictatorTake impulsivity age.
actual average punishment smaller than beliefs reduce on average punish-
ment in the second period of 0.30 tokens. Instead, subjects observing actual
average punishment equal to beliefs reduce punishment of 0.14 tokens be-
tween the two periods, and those observing average punishment larger than
beliefs increase punishment in the second period of 0.27 tokens.
• Conclusion relative to the Zero Social Influence hypothesis: Bystanders’
punishment choices in the first period are positively associated with their
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Table 8: Punishment difference across periods
Treatment P1p0 P1p0 BAP>0 P1p0 BAP=0 P1p0 BAP<0
Informational 294 142 27 125
(mean) -.33 -1.04 -.11 .42
(sd) 3.28 3.96 .42 2.52
Normative 315 170 60 85
-.28 -.49 -.15 .06
2.58 3.09 1.63 1.90
Total 609 312 87 210
-.30 -.74 -.14 .27
2.94 3.52 1.37 2.29
Notes: Variable P1p0 indicate the difference between punishment in first and second period.
P1p0 BAP >, <, = 0 indicate respectively P1p0 when individual beliefs regarding average
punishment are >, <, = actual average punishment.
own beliefs about average peers’ punishment. However, I find that on
average bystanders punish less than the expected average peers’ punish-
ment. This result seems to be driven by those bystanders that always
decide not to punish dictators. I also found evidence that subjects in
TREATED are more likely to change punishment decision across pe-
riods. Moreover, in CONTROL the amount of punishment in the two
periods remains constant, while in TREATED it decreases. The mean
punishment difference across periods is statistically higher in CON-
TROL than in TREATED if I consider situations where dictators take
positive amounts from receivers’ endowment. Finally, a large absolute
difference between a bystander’s beliefs regarding peers’ punishment and
actual peers’ average punishment increases her likelihood to modify pun-
ishment decisions across periods.
These results provide evidence against the Zero Social Influence hypoth-
esis. Hence, I conclude that the Zero Social Influence hypothesis is not
supported by the results of the experiment.
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4.5.2. Differential Social Influence hypothesis
First, I want to verify if bystanders that engage in less punishment in the
first period are also less responsive to social influence. Third-parties receive
relevant social information in the NORMATIVE and INFORMATIONAL
treatments only, so I restrict the analysis to these treatments. For each of
the seven dictators’ decisions, I characterize bystanders that punish in the
first period above the median as ”high punishers”71. For each transfer level
considered, the percentage of third-parties modifying punishment decision
across periods among high punishers is almost double of that among the
other punishers. If I exclude selfish bystanders I still have similar results.
I test the hypothesis implementing a logistic model. I estimate the proba-
bility of modifying punishment decision including the independent variable
Strat Punish that reports the level of punishment provided in the first pe-
riod. Results are reported in Table 7. In any model specification, the co-
efficient associated with Strat Punish is positive and significant at the 1%
level. The coefficient of Strat Punish suggests that, holding constant at
their means the other controls, a bystander spending 1 additional token in
first period punishment is 3% to 5% more likely to revise her punishment
choice in the second period.
Hence, I conclude that this first set of results supports the Differential Social
Influence hypothesis.
Second, I want to verify if bystanders that choose to punish in the first period
a quantity different from their beliefs regarding average peers’ punishment
are less responsive to social influence compared to the other bystanders. I
implement a logistic regression estimating the probability that a bystander
modifies punishment decisions across periods. As independent variable, I
introduce Abs p0Belifs, the absolute difference between a bystander’s beliefs
regarding average peers’ punishment and her individual punishment in the
71Results are substantially the same if I choose the average punishment as a criterion
for classification.
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first period. I report results in Table 7.
The coefficient of Abs p0Belifs is negative and statistically different from
0 in model specification 7, in which I include all the controls72. The esti-
mations suggest that increasing the absolute difference Abs p0Belifs by one
unit decreases for a bystander the probability of modifying the punishment
decision across periods by approximally 3%.
Therefore, I conclude that also this second set of results supports the Differ-
ential Social Influence hypothesis
• Conclusion relative to the Differential Social Influence hypothesis: There
is evidence that the more a bystander punishes in the first period, the
more she is responsive to the social information received. I also find
evidence that the larger the absolute difference between a bystander’s
beliefs regarding peers’ average punishment and her first period pun-
ishment is, the less likely it is that she modifies punishment decisions
across periods.
Therefore, I conclude that the results of my experiment support the Dif-
ferential Social Influence hypothesis.
4.5.3. Equivalence of Normative and Informational Influence hypothesis
I conclude this section reporting results on the difference between bystanders
exposed to both normative and informational social influence and those ex-
posed only to the latter. From the summary statistics reported in Table 5, I
could see that in the first period third-parties in INFORMATIONAL punish
on average 4.1 tokens versus 3.3 of those in NORMATIVE. This difference
is not statistically significant (p-value 26%). In both treatments, on aver-
age bystanders reduce punishment between the first and the second period:
NORMATIVE of 0.28 tokens and INFORMATIONAL of 0.33. Also this
difference is not statistically significant.
72In model 8 I exclude from the analysis selfish bystanders and the coefficient becomes
not statistically significant.
142
I test the hypothesis that third-parties in NORMATIVE are more likely to
revise their second period punishment decisions. I create the dummy variable
NORMATIV E equal to 1 for third-parties in the normative treatment and
I implement a logistic regression. The dependent variable DummyP1p0 is
equal to 1 when punishment is modified across periods. Results are reported
in Table 9.
From the coefficient of NORMATIV E in model 1 to 4 I could see that, on
average, there is no statistical difference between treatments in the likelihood
of modifying punishment decision. When instead I disentangle the effect of
individual determinants of the probability to modify punishment decision
across periods it is possible to find differences between treatments. First,
consider the tests I did for the Differential Social Influence hypothesis. Mod-
els 7 and 8 of Table 7 suggest that increasing the absolute difference across
punishment in the first period and individual beliefs regarding the average
punishment in the session (the variable Abs p0Belifs) by one unit decreases
the likelihood to modify punishment between period by approximately 3%.
However, the result is only weakly significant. Nevertheless, the estimation
could be affected by the fact that in the models of table 7 I constrained
the slope of Absp0Belifs to be the same for NORMATIVE and INFORMA-
TIONAL. Therefore, in model 3 and 4 of Table 9 I introduce the interaction
term NorAbs p0Belifs, that isolates the effects of the absolute difference
between punishment in the first period and beliefs about peers’ average pun-
ishment for bystanders in the NORMATIVE treatment. The coefficient is
positive and significant at the 1% level for both model specifications, and the
coefficient of Absp0Belifs becomes negative and significant at the1% level.
Interpreting the coefficients, I can see that for third-parties in NORMATIVE
Abs p0Belifs has no effect on the probability of modifying punishment across
periods. Instead, for bystanders in INFORMATIONAL an increase of one
unit in Abs p0Belifs diminishes the probability of modifying punishment
across periods by roughly 8%. Therefore, the results contrast the Differential
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Table 9: Probability Modify Punishment Across Periods: Treated
Groups
(1) (2) (3) (4)
NORMATIVE 0.064 0.075 0.034 0.154
(0.11) (0.09) (0.17) (0.15)
Strat Punish 0.054∗∗∗ 0.039∗∗
(0.01) (0.02)
Abs p0Belifs -0.085∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
NorStratPunish 0.016 0.014
(0.02) (0.02)
NorAbs p0Belifs 0.103∗∗∗ 0.116∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
Abs Signalp0 -0.003 0.001
(0.02) (0.02)
NorAbs Signalp0 0.007 -0.003
(0.02) (0.02)
Abs BelAvgPun 0.094∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03)
NormAbs BelAvgPun -0.104∗∗∗ -0.117∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.04)
DummySignalp0 0.064 0.152
(0.10) (0.11)
NorDummySignalp0 0.095 -0.038
(0.14) (0.17)
Other contr Y Y Y Y
N 609 420 609 420
pseudo R2 0.092 0.092 0.316 0.221
Notes:Logistic regression: dep. var. DummyP1p0, marginal effect at means, SE
clustered by subject. Significance levels: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
Other Controls include: male age degree worker social arts field other risk
logic impulsivity Instruction DictatorTake.
Social Influence hypothesis for bystanders in the NORMATIVE treatment,
while the hypothesis finds support for subjects in the INFORMATIONAL
treatment.
As a possible explanation for this difference across treatments, I conjecture
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that for bystanders in NORMATIVE there are additional incentives to revise
their punishment decisions compared to bystanders in INFORMATIONAL.
In fact, in NORMATIVE bystanders are told that their punishment choices of
the second period will be revealed to other participants and that these peers
will express their judgements. Therefore, it seems that the threat of revealing
individual choices to other participants triggers the decision to modify first
period punishment.
Furthermore, consider the absolute difference between a bystander’s beliefs
regarding peers’ average punishment and the actual peers’ average punish-
ment. Models 7 and 8 of Table 7 indicate that increasing the coefficient of
the variable Abs BeliefAvgPunish by one unit increases for a bystander
the probability to modify punishment decision across periods by 3%. How-
ever, this result comes from models where I constrained the coefficient of
Abs BeliefAvgPunish to be the same in NORMATIVE and INFORMA-
TIONAL.
I verify if the coefficient is the same in both treatments estimating the effect of
Abs BeliefAvgPunish for the two groups separately. I do so interacting the
variable AbsBeliefAvgPunish with the dummy NORMATIVE and so creat-
ing the variable NormAbs BeliefAvgPunish. From the results of models 3
and 4 in Table 9, we can see that the coefficient ofNormAbs BeliefAvgPunish
is negative and statistical significant at the 1% level. On the other hand, the
coefficient of Abs BeliefAvgPunish in the unconstrained model becomes
positive and significant at the 1% level, while it was only weakly statistically
significant in the constrained model. Specifically, for subjects in the INFOR-
MATIONAL treatment an increase of one unit in Abs BeliefAvgPunish
raises the probability of modifying punishment across periods by approxi-
mately 9%.
In order to further investigate this result, I check how bystanders in the
two treatments modify their punishment choices across periods conditional
to the sign of the difference between beliefs regarding peers’ average punish-
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ment and actual peers’ average punishment. Table 8 reports these summary
statistics. Bystanders in both treatments reduce punishment in the second
period when actual average punishment is lower than expected. However,
bystanders in INFORMATIONAL on average reduce punishment by more
than 1 token, while those in NORMATIVE by less than 0.5. Conversely,
when actual average peers’ punishment exceeds a bystander’s expectations,
in INFORMATIONAL third-parties increase punishment by 0.4 tokens on
average, while bystanders NORMATIVE do not modify punishment deci-
sions.
It is possible that the lower variability registered in NORMATIVE derives
from the fact that individual choices are observable by peers. I conjecture
that in NORMATIVE bystanders refrain from modifying punishment deci-
sions, in particular from reducing punishment, because of the disutility of
being eventually judged and targeted with the ”sad” emoticon by peers.
Finally, I also test if the slope of the variable Strat Punish differs between
NORMATIVE and INFORMATIONAL. I created the variablesNorStrat Punish,
isolating the effect of Strat Punish for bystanders in the NORMATIVE
treatment. As expected, results for these unconstrained models reported in
Table 9 show that there is no statistical difference between treatments in the
data.
• Conclusion relative to Equivalence of Normative and Informational In-
fluence hypothesis: I find mixed evidence regarding my hypothesis. On
the one hand, at an aggregate level the likelihood to modify punishment
choices is the same in NORMATIVE and INFORMATIONAL. How-
ever, disentangling the determinants that push bystanders to modify
punishment choices across periods, I find differences between the two
treatments.
Therefore, I conclude that the empirical evidence is mixed and the hy-
pothesis is not fully supported by the data.
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4.6. Conclusions of Chapter 4
Human organizations need mechanisms to enforce rules and regulations upon
which they are founded. On the one hand, societies have developed a cen-
tralized apparatus of enforcement for this purpose. However this centralized
systems coexist with a decentralized practice of punishment carried out by
members of the society itself. Understanding the nature and characteris-
tics of decentralized punishment might help legal scholars and policymakers
to design effective policies in a variety of situations. Therefore, which are
the major drivers of decentralized third-party punishment is an important
question for social scientists.
In this chapter I examine through a laboratory experiment the effect of one of
these drivers, social influence, on the punishment decisions of third parties.
Scholars in psychology, law and economics underline the relevance of third
party punishment for the cohesion of human societies (Fehr and Fischbacher,
2004b; Marlowe et al., 2008) and the importance of social influence in various
fields of application (Bernheim, 1994; Turner, 1991; Kahan, 1997; Becker,
1991). However, this paper is the first work that investigates empirically
social influence effects within the framework of third party punishment.
In a modified dictator game, I elicit the punishment choices of third parties
before and after having exposed them to information regarding the punish-
ment behavior of their peers. I compare those choices with decisions made by
bystanders not exposed to social relevant information. The main finding of
this chapter is that social influence is a major driver of bystanders’ decision
to engage in third-party punishment. Results of the experiment show that
third-parties receiving information about peers’ punishment revise their pun-
ishment choices more often and on average reduce punishment across periods
compared to bystanders exposed to social irrelevant information. This last
effect seems to be driven by the fact that bystanders’ beliefs regarding peers’
average punishment are higher than the actual punishment peers exert. In-
deed, consistently with the model predictions, the empirical analysis shows
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that the larger the absolute difference between a bystander’s beliefs about
peers’ average punishment and peers’ actual punishment is, the more likely
the bystander is to revise her initial decisions.
I also disentangled the effect of two possible channels of social influence.
Results suggest that some third-parties are only responsive to the discom-
fort of disagreeing with the majority, that is at the base of normative social
influence and their punishment choices are not influenced by the ”need to
be right” on which informational social influence is based. Distinguishing
between these two channels of social influence is of primary importance for
social analysts, since previous studies document that informational social in-
fluence causes a permanent change in behavior (see for example Newcomb
et al., 1967). On the other hand, normative social influence is more ephemeral
and leads to modifications of behavior that are subject to specific circum-
stances73 (Deutsch and Gerard, 1955; Cohen and Golden, 1972; Burnkrant
and Cousineau, 1975).
These findings have two major implications. On the one hand, they stress
the importance in our societies of citizens’ perception about peers’ behav-
ior. This is expecially important in situations where beliefs of the general
population systematically overestimate the frequency of socially undesirable
behaviors, like frequently happens for perceived crime, benefit frauds or the
percentage of non-voters74. In these situations, policymakers might often
achieve welfare-improving results by means of ad-hoc communication strate-
gies that could outperform alternative and often more costly policies (see for
example Casal and Mittone, 2014, where the authors discuss an application
73Nevertheless, scholars proposed models of endogenous preferences, arguing that even
individuals initially adopting compliant behaviors by means of normative social influence
may endogenously modify their preferences (Akerlof, 1989; Klick and Parisi, 2008).
74For example, the Royal Statistical Society reports that 58% of the UK population
estimates that crime is rising, while data show how crime rate in the country is 19%
lower than the previous year and 53% lower than 1995. For discussion of other examples
and additional details see http://www.kcl.ac.uk/newsevents/news/newsrecords/2013/07-
July/Perceptions-are-not-reality-the-top-10-I-get-wrong.aspx.
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of social stigma to tax evasion).
On the other hand, even when population beliefs are not biased, the possi-
bility of resorting to social influence as a subsidiary tool for achieving com-
pliance has been advanced by scholars in an array of situations of economic
importance (Ela, 2008; Posner, 2000; Cooter, 1998; Zasu, 2007). As a society,
we invest a considerable amount of resources with the objective of shaping
individual beliefs and direct them toward social desirable outcomes. Policy-
makers might want to encourage, by means of a social influence approach,
third party interventions in situations where the lack of resources prevent
a centralized authority to perform effective interventions. This is the case
for example of the recent campaign aiming at prevention of social offenses
”Bringing in the Bystander” promoted in the UK by the National Sexual
Violence Resource Center. The campaign aims at reducing social offenses
employing a marketing campaign that explicitly encourages third parties in-
tervention75.
I agree with Mathew and Boyd (2011) that third-party punishment repre-
sents ”the cement of human societies”. In this chapter I argue for the first
time about the possibility for policymakers to take advantage of social influ-
ence effects in promoting third-party punishment, reporting evidence from a
laboratory experiment that social influence significatively affects bystanders’
interventions. Given the importance and wide possibilities of application in
the societal framework, I hope that future researches further investigate the
conection between social influence and third party punishment, in particular
verifying the robustness of my findings in a field setting and the persistence
of the effects in a longer term horizon.
75”Using a bystander intervention approach combined with a research component, this
program assumes that everyone has a role to play in prevention [...] The Know Your Power
campaign is the social marketing component of Bringing in the Bystander”.
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5. Conclusions
Government policy interventions might greatly improve the welfare of a so-
ciety. However, they could also result ineffective, wasting taxpayers money
without producing desired outcomes or be unreasonably invasive, reducing
people’s freedom of choice. Therefore, creating policies that on the one hand
are cheap to implement and on the other hand identifying those contexts
where they will prove effective are two major challenges for the policy ana-
lyst.
This book aims at discussing and contributing to behavioral public policy-
making, a social policy movement that, according to many scholars, satis-
fies both the requirements. Behavioral policies address systematic and pre-
dictable violations of rationality to steer agents’ behavior in directions that
are welfare-improving. The nonstandard behavioral regularities that the be-
havioral policy analysts identify and exploit are natural characteristics of
human decision-making process. Therefore, policy interventions proposed
are relatively easy and not expensive to implement, since they take advan-
tage of already established patterns of behavior to achieve the policymaker’s
goals. Moreover, a specific approach within the behavioral public policy-
making movment, the so called ”Libertarian Paternalism”, is respectful of
the individual freedom of choice if compared to the classical forms of pa-
ternalistic interventions. In fact, a key feature of libertarian paternalistic
policies is that they neither mandate to individuals any specific behavior nor
they increase the monetary costs of selecting certain outcomes. Therefore,
libertarian paternalism does not restrict agents’ choice set and minimize the
risk to reduce individuals’ welfare by constraining behaviors.
In the introductory chapter, I focus in particular on the fundamental method-
ological problem of behavioral public policymaking, which is finding a suit-
able welfare criterion. I stress how the behavioral analyst cannot perform
welfare analysis simply relying in the revealed preference principle used in
neoclassical economics. I also point out how scholars did not reach a consen-
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sus yet and how the debate in this area is evolving.
Moreover, in the last section of the introduction I argue that behavioral
scientists can and should exert more effort in order to influence policymaking.
I stress that scholars should balance the trade-off between scientific exactness
and policymaker’s need of clear and precise policy suggestions. I also point
out that behavioral scientists need to engage in more field experimentation
and that they should be able to reconcile theoretical and empirical works in
an unitary framework of analysis.
However, the main goal of this book is not to discuss methodological is-
sues but instead to contribute to the development of the behavioral public
policymaking movement by proposing methodological advances and original
contributions. In the next three sections I summarize my findings relative to
chapter 2, 3 and 4. In section 5.4 I then conclude underlying the academic
relevance and the policy implications of my results.
5.1. Chapter 2: Summary of Findings
In this chapter I focused on a critical methodological problem faced by pol-
icy analysts, that is the aggregation of individuals’ well-being in a unitarian
measure of social welfare. The anaytical tool that is used for aggregating
individuals’ well-being in an unitarian measure is called the social welfare
function. The social analyst that has to construct a social welfare function
follows a two-step procedure. As a first step, he has to make interpersonal
comparisons of utility and subsequently he aggregates the measures of indi-
vidual utilities. I discussed how the choices made by the social analyst in
both these steps reflect different normative value judgements. I then sum-
marized the different positions embraced by scholars that discussing which
is the most ethically and philosophically appropriate set of value judgements
for conducting welfare analyses. I underlined how the debate in this area is
still open and how the different positions embraced by scholars reflect the
heterogeneity in preferences for efficiency versus redistribution.
151
I then proposed my contribution to the debate. I argued that, while different
methods for aggregating individuals’ well-being reflect different preferences
for redistributions, nevertheless it is possible to identify quantitative rela-
tionships between the social welfare functions that the social analysts use.
There are no contributions neither in law nor in economics attempting to
identify these relationships. Therefore, I analyze the quantitative relation-
ship between the forms of social welfare function most commonly used by
social analysts.
As a first result, I formally showed that in general different social welfare
functions do not necessarily produce the same policy evaluation results. This
result might be intuitive for economists, however I am not aware of any
contribution proposing a formal proof of it. Therefore, I decided to close this
gap. Moreover, I showed that a subset of social welfare functions represents
an exception to my previous general results. In fact, I identified what are
the social welfare functional forms that in a policy evaluation result always
produce the same result.
After this, in the core of this chapter, I derive a quantitative conditions
necessary to generalize the policy evaluation results obtained implementing a
specific combination of individual utility and aggregation method to the other
social welfare functional forms considered. In this part, I also showed that it
is possible to derive general results if we impose some restrictive conditions
on the transfer of resources implied by the policy under consideration. I
performed this analysis and I derived the quantitative results both in a two-
agent scenario and in a two-interest group situation. My results show how
the quantitative relationship between different social welfare functions vary
as a function of the number of agents composing the interest groups.
5.2. Chapter 3: Summary of Findings
In the rest of the thesis I proposed two original contributions that discussed
the possibility to implement two libertarian paternalistic policies. In chap-
ter 3 I discuss a zero-cost policy intervention based on stochastic rewards
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that aims at combatting indirect tax evasion. In many countries, indirect
tax evasion represents an endemic problem and creates difficulties to the
sustainability of public finances. One major way to evade indirect taxes for
business owners consists in not releasing to customers invoices that register
business transaction The policy object of this chapters suggests the intro-
duction by the government of a lottery that links the possibility to win a
stochastic prize to the possession of an invoice. Therefore, customers are
incentivized to request the emission invoices to business owners.
Theoretical predictions derived from models of standard decision-making
state that this reward mechanism cannot be effective. In fact, according
to these models predictions, the reward that the government should offer to
customers in order to incentivize them to enforce invoices emission has to be
necessarily higher than the aditional tax revenue collected as a consequence
of the lottery introduction, resulting in a loss for the government. Despite
these predictions, this policy has been applied in few countries. Empirical
estimations of the effect of the policy introduction show that it is effective
in reducing indirect tax evasion and that the increase in tax collected more
than compensates the cost of the prize paid by the government. However,
it has not been explained why this policy proved to be successful and the
empirical evidence remains puzzling.
The objective of chapter 3 is to propose an empirical model that explains
the empirical evidence and that endows policymakers interested in apply-
ing the lottery policy with a theoretical framework to predict the policy
effects. I started discussing the empirical evidence showing the policy suc-
cess in the countries where it has been applied. I then showed that models
of expected utility, the benchmark for formal analysis of individual decision-
making, fail to explain these results. I then proposeed my original contri-
bution. I presented a model based on a theory of non-expected utility that
incorporates people’s behavioral tendency to overweight small probabilities
in risky choices. I formally showed that the predictions generated by my
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model are consistent with the empirical evidence registered. I then proposed
a calibration exercise and I derived the conditions necessary to register an
effective implementation of the lottery policy.
I concluded the chapter discussing side-effects connected with the introduc-
tion of the policy. On the one hand, there is the risk that the introduction
of the lottery policy could crowd-out the voluntary enforcement of invoice
emission carried out by ethically motivated citizens. Hence, the crowding-
out effect could potentially offset benefits deriving from the policy. On the
other hand, there are some positive side-effects connected with the lottery
introduction. First, even if the increase in tax revenue collected does not
compensate the prize paid out by the government and so the policy must be
abandoned, data collected during the time period when the policy is in place
might help the screening process of the authority sanctioning indirect tax
evasion. In fact, business whose owners were evading taxes would register a
spike in reported revenue when the policy is in place, since some customers
request the invoices emission. Therefore, these businesses could be selec-
tively targeted and monitored by the tax authority. This would increase the
effectiveness of the monitoring and sanctioning process and it would reduce
the amount of taxes evaded. Moreover, I argued that the lottery policy, even
if introduced for a limited period of time, might change people’s norm of
behavior with respect to enforcing invoices emission. If citizens become used
to asking for an invoice because of the opportunity to win the lottery prize,
they will possibly continue to do it even absent the prospect of a prize. In
fact, inertia and social norms of behavior once in place tend to persist in
the population. Therefore, the lottery policy might be implemented as a
temporary intervention that incentivizes people reticent to change behavior
to modify the status quo in favor of a welfare-improving alternative.
5.3. Chapter 4: Summary of Findings
In chapter 4 I investigated the possibility of creating a policy that exploits so-
cial influence effects. I focused on the effects of social influence on bystanders’
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likelihood to engage in costly punishment or, in the language of economics,
”decentralized third-party punishment”. Decentralized third-party punish-
ment is a form of altruistic intervention carried out by a private agent that
incurs material costs for sanctioning the behavior of a wrongdoer, even if
the punisher is not directly affected by the wrongdoer’s action. I discussed
the importance of third-party punishment for the existence of human orga-
nizations and I underlined that some scholars even consider it ”the cement
of societies”. While social sciences have extensively investigated aspects of
both social influence and third-party punishment, the contribution offered in
this chapter is the first that formally studies their interconnection.
My goal in this chapter was twofold. On the one hand, I proposed a model of
decision-making that takes into account social influence effects. This model
allows to derive sharp theoretical predictions that could be tested empirically.
On the other hand, I had to empirically test my model predictions and showed
that social influence causally affects punishment behavior of the third-parties.
Moreover, I also wanted to identify the channels of transmission of social
influence to individuals.
To achieve the first goal, I proposed a theoretical model of social influence.
According to my model, social influence agents exposed to social influence
would modify their individual behavior and choose actions that deviate from
the theoretical predictions of models of standard decision-making. I then
proceeded testing my model predictions. However, isolate social influence
effects is a challenging task and estimations of this effects performed with
field data suffer serious identification problems. Therefore, I exploited the
possibilities offered by the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment
for ruling out confounding factors and self-selection problems. I designed
and ran a laboratory experiment following the methodology of experimental
economics.
Results of my experiment are consistent with the predictions of my model.
I showed that social influence is a major driver of decentralized third-party
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punishment. Third-parties exposed to social influence are significatively more
likely to modify their punishment decisions compared to bystanders exposed
to irrelevant social information. In particular, I showed that the more the
initial beliefs of a third-party regarding their peers’ punishment choices is
incorrect, the more she is likely to change her punishment decision taken in
isolation when exposed to information regarding actual peers’ punishment.
Moreover, I identified the two channels through which social influence op-
erates. Contributions in psychology distinguish between normative social
influence, that corresponds to ”the need to be liked” by peers and infor-
mational social influence, that fulfill an agent’s ”need to be right”. I show
that some agents respond to the former type of social influence but not to
the latter. Disentangling the effects of these two channels of social influence
is relevant for policy purposes. In fact, researches show that the effect on
behavior of informational social influence are more persistent than those of
normative social influence.
5.4. Academic Relevance and Policy Implications
In this book I contributed to the discussion on the rising movement of behav-
ioral public policymaking. While the book contains a general introduction
that extensively discusses the ideas behind this social policy movement, its
critiques and fields for future research, nevertheless my main goal was to pro-
duce original research within the behavioral policy framework. I tried to do
so proposing an innovative methodological contribution and discussing two
new behavioral policies. The results of my research has potential implications
for scholars as well as for policymakers and decisionmakers.
In chapter 2, I derived the quantitative relationship existing between the
most common forms of social welfare functions used for conducting social
policy analysis. This chapter aims to further enrich the discussion regarding
the choice of the most appropriate social welfare function in policy analysis,
proposing an original methodological advance. The results derived in this
chapter are relevant for scholars and researchers that employ formal social
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welfare analysis. In fact, the quantitative relationships derived in this chapter
allow to verify to what degree the predictions derived by the social analyst’s
model are sensitive to the set of value judgements implied by the social
welfare function chosen. Moreover, results of this chapter are important for
decisionmakers that have to make the final choice regarding the possibility
to implement a policy. In fact, the quantitative relationships that I derived
allow to identify how general and respectful of the different ethical positions
in the population the result obtained by a policy analysts are. Indeed, we
have seen that any policy analysis necessarily reflects the value judgements
chosen by the policy analyst. Finally, I underline how the applicability of the
results derived in this chapter is not limited to the area of behavioral public
policy. Indeed, they are relevant also for social policy evaluations grounded in
traditional welfarist economics and also for extra-welfarist analyses of social
policy.
In chapter 3, I discussed a complementary policy to the traditional deter-
rence approach to VAT and RST evasion recently adopted by some Asian
and Latin-American countries. This policy incentivizes customers to enforce
invoices emission from sellers by linking the possession of an invoice to the
possibility to win a stochastic prize. The primary objective of this chapter
was to provide a theoretical model that explains why, contrary to standard
predictions, the lottery policy results successful in increasing VAT and RST
net revenue. I proposed a model based on Tversky and Kahneman’s Cumu-
lative Prospect Theory (1992) that is able to explain the puzzling empirical
evidence. Given the model specification and calibration of parameters, I then
introduced a test for verifying the applicability of the lottery in the specific
environment and population of interest. The implication of my results are
relevant for policymakers interested in applying the lottery policy. In fact,
I argue that risk preferences and social norms of behavior are key elements
to be taken into account by policymakers in forecasting the policy effective-
ness. My contribution consisted in having provided a theoretical framework
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that enables policymakers to generate sharp predictions based on empirical
measures. Therefore, the theoretical framework and the test I propose rep-
resent useful ex-ante indicators of the expected success of the lottery policy
in increasing the level of indirect tax compliance.
Finally, in chapter 4 I showed that social influence is a major determinant of
third-party punishment and I argued that the effectiveness of policies based
on bystanders’ intervention could be enhanced by the effects of social in-
fluence. The implications of the results derived in this chapter are twofold.
First, they suggest policymakers to use a social influence approach to encour-
age third party interventions in situations where the lack of resources prevent
a centralized authority to perform effective interventions. Campaigns aimed
at preventing bullyism or protection of victims of social offenses are possi-
ble fields of application for these plocies. More generally, my contribution
suggests the possibility to promote libertarian paternalistic policies based on
social influence in situations where agents’ perception of the frequency of an
event is wrong. In fact, it is often the case that agents systematically un-
derestimate the frequency of welfare-improving actions undertaken by their
peers. In these situations, results of my work show that the government could
increase the frequency of the welfare-improving behavior promoting policies
that convey correct information to the population. These policy interven-
tions are not expensive, easy to implement and would achieve long-lasting
effects, since affect agents’ behavior through the channel of informational
social influence.
I am confident that the rising field of behavioral public policy have the pon-
tential to further expand and dramatically improve people’s life. However,
a great amount of work has still to be done in order to meet this objective.
I hope that behavioral scientists and policymakers will increasingly devote
their energies to research in this area. I also hope that future quantitative
researches on the choice of the social welfare function will be conducted. In
particular, it would be interesting to extend the analysis presented in chap-
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ter 2 to other forms of social welfare functions and to verify if it is possible
to generalize additional results. I also hope that the model presented in
chapter 3 will direct the attention of researchers to the lottery ticket policy.
In particular, since some countries are planning to implement this policy in
the immediate future, it would be interesting to verify my model predictions
empirically. Finally, I hope that future researches further investigate the
conenction between social influence and third party punishment that I pre-
sented in chapter 4. In particular, I hope scholars will be able to verify the
robustness of my findings in a field setting and the persistence of the effects
in a longer term horizon.
Appendix A.
Proof of Proposition 1
I show my proposition using a proof by contradiction, that is a is a particular
kind, often use in mathematics, of the more general form of argument known
as ”reductio ad absurdum”. Without any loss of generality, I define SW 1 as
the SWF with the smaller ratio:
∂SW1
∂wj
∂SW1
∂wi
<
∂SW2
∂wj
∂SW2
∂wi
Define W = (w1, w2, ..., wn) and W
 = (w1, ..., wi+k, ..., wj−, ..., wn) where
k and  are positive real numbers. We want to show that there exist values
of k and  such that SW 1(W ) > SW 1(W ) and SW 2(W ) < SW 2(W ). To
show our result, first notice that for small enough :
SW 1(W ) ≈ SW 1(W ) + ∂SW 1
∂wj
(−) + ∂SW 1
∂wi
k and SW 2(W ) ≈ SW 2(W ) +
∂SW 2
∂wj
(−) + ∂SW 2
∂wi
k
If we can show that there exists a value of k such that:
(I) SW 1(W ) + ∂SW
1
∂wj
(−) + ∂SW 1
∂wi
k > SW 1(W )
and
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(II) SW 2(W ) + ∂SW
2
∂wj
(−) + ∂SW 2
∂wi
k < SW 2(W )
then, by continuity of the SWF, we can claim that for small enough :
SW 1(W ) > SW 1(W ) andSW 2(W ) < SW 2(W ); which proves our propo-
sition.
From (I) and (II), it follows that:
k >
∂SW1
∂wj
∂SW1
∂wi
k <
∂SW2
∂wj
∂SW2
∂wi
However, by assumption,
∂SW1
∂wj
∂SW1
∂wi
<
∂SW2
∂wj
∂SW2
∂wi
. Hence, there must be a range of val-
ues of k for which conditions (I) and (II) hold, thus proving our proposition.
Proof of Corollary 1
From proposition 1, we just need to show that for some i and j,
∂SW1
∂wj
∂SW1
∂wi
is
different for each criteria considered.
Now let any utility function be the maximand of each SWF. Functions’ partial
derivatives are:
• Bentham criteria: ∂SWB(W )
∂wj
= u′(wj)
• Nash criteria: ∂SWN(W )
∂wj
= u′(wj)Πi 6=ju(wi)
• Rawls criteria: ∂SWR(W )
∂wj
=
{
1, if wj < wi ∀i
0, if wj ≥ wi for some i
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Therefore, the ratio of derivatives is:
•
∂SWB
∂wj
∂SWB
∂wi
=
u′(wj)
u′(wi)
•
∂SWN
∂wj
∂SWN
∂wi
=
u′(wj)
u′(wi)
u(wi)
u(wj)
•
∂SWR
∂wj
∂SWR
∂wi
= either 0 or not existent.
The case where wealth is defined as the maximand can be simply con-
sidered a subcase where u(wj) = wj and u
′(wj) = 1
Given that the three derivative results are different, the three welfare criteria
are not equivalent when the same maximand is chosen.
Proof of Proposition 2
Since a SWF ranks states in an ordinal sense, any monotonic transformation
does not affect the ranking order. Therefore, if I show that by undertaking
monotonic transformations on a SWF among those described in proposition
2 I can achieve any of the others’ SWF form, I show that all the three
specifications yield the same rank.
As a starting point, consider a Nash-wealth SWF:
SWNw(W ) = ΠNi=1wi
by raising to the power of α we obtain:
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= ΠNi=1w
α1
i = SWN
pol(W )
this proves the equivalence with SWF Nash Polynomial.
I continue by taking the logarithm and dividing it by α:
=
∑N
i=1 lnwi = SWB
log(W )
this proves the equivalence with SWF Bentham Logarithmic.
Since all of the transformations above are monotonic, this implies that all
three specifications rank alternative states of the world in the same way, and
are therefore equivalent.
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Proofs Tables A.10
1. Bentham Case:
• Wealth: u(wi) = wi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.1)
⇐⇒ (w1 + k) + (w2 − ) ≥ w1 + w2 (A.2)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1 (A.3)
• Polynomial: u(wi) = wαi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.4)
⇐⇒ (w1 + k)α + (w2 − )α ≥ wα1 + wα2 (A.5)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

{[wα1 + wα2 − (w2 − )]1/α − w1} (A.6)
• Logarithmic: u(wi) = ln(wi)
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Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.7)
⇐⇒ ln(w1 + k) + ln(w2 − ) ≥ ln(w1) + ln(w2) (A.8)
⇐⇒ ln[(w1 + k)(w2 − )] ≥ ln(w1w2) (A.9)
⇐⇒ (w1 + k)(w2 − ) ≥ w1w2 (A.10)
⇐⇒ k ≥ w1
w2 −  (A.11)
• Exponential: u(wi) = 1− e−αwi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W )
(A.12)
⇐⇒ (1− e−α(w1+k)) + (1− e−α(w2−k)) ≥ (1− e−α(w1)) + (1− e−α(w2))
(A.13)
⇐⇒ −e−α(w1+k) − e−α(w2−k) ≥ −e−α(w1) − e−α(w2)
(A.14)
then dividing by −e−αw1 :
(A.15)
⇐⇒ e−αk ≤ 1 + e−α(w2−w1)(1− eα)
(A.16)
⇐⇒ k ≥ (−1
α
)ln[1 + e−α(w2−w1)(1− e−α)]
(A.17)
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2. Nash Case:
• Wealth: u(wi) = wi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.18)
⇐⇒ (w1 + k)(w2 − ) ≥ w1w2 (A.19)
⇐⇒ k ≥ w1
w2 −  (A.20)
• Polynomial: u(wi) = wαi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.21)
⇐⇒ (w1 + k)α(w2 − )α ≥ wα1wα2 (A.22)
⇐⇒ (w1 + k)(w2 − ) ≥ w1w2 (A.23)
⇐⇒ k ≥ w1
w2 −  (A.24)
• Logarithmic: u(wi) = ln(wi)
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.25)
⇐⇒ ln(w1 + k)ln(w2 − ) ≥ ln(w1)ln(w2) (A.26)
⇐⇒ ln(w1 + k) ≥ ln(w1)ln(w2)
ln(w2 − ) (A.27)
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raising both sides to the power e:
⇐⇒ w1 + k ≥ exp[ ln(w1)ln(w2)
ln(w2 − ) ] (A.28)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

{exp[ ln(w1)ln(w2)
ln(w2 − ) ]− w1} (A.29)
• Exponential: u(wi) = 1− e−αwi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W )
(A.30)
⇐⇒ (1− e−α(w1+k))(1− e−α(w2−k)) ≥ (1− e−αw1)(1− e−αw2)
(A.31)
⇐⇒ −e−α(w1+k) + e−α(w1+w2−k−) ≥ −e−αw2 − e−αw1 + e−αw1−αw2 + e−α(w2−)
(A.32)
⇐⇒ −e−αk(e−αw1 + e−α(w1+w2−)) ≥ −e−αw2 − e−αw1 + e−αw1−αw2 + e−α(w2−)
(A.33)
⇐⇒ e−αk ≤ 1− e
−αw2 + e−α(w2−w1)
1 + e−α(w2−)
(A.34)
⇐⇒ k ≥ (−1
α
)ln[
1− e−αw2 + e−α(w2−w1)
1 + e−α(w2−)
]
(A.35)
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Proofs Table A.11
(a) Bentham Case:
• Wealth: u(wi) = wi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.36)
⇐⇒
j∑
i=1
(wi + k) +
N∑
i=j+1
(wi − ) ≥
N∑
i=1
wi (A.37)
⇐⇒ jk− (N − j) ≥ 0 (A.38)
⇐⇒ k ≥ (N − j)
j
(A.39)
• Polynomial: u(wi) = wαi
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Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W )
(A.40)
⇐⇒
j∑
i=1
(wi + k)
α +
N∑
i=j+1
(wi − )α ≥
N∑
i=1
(wi)
α
(A.41)
⇐⇒ j(wA + k)α + (N − j)(wB − )α ≥ jwαA + (N − j)wαB
(A.42)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

[(
wαA +
(N − j)
j
[wαB − (wB − )α]
)(1/α)
− wA
]
(A.43)
⇐⇒ k ≥ (1/){[jw
α
A + (N − j)wαB − (N − j)(wB − )α
j
]1/α − wA}
(A.44)
• Logarithmic: u(wi) = ln(wi)
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Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W )
(A.45)
⇐⇒
j∑
i=1
ln(wi + k) +
N∑
i=j+1
ln(wi − ) ≥
N∑
i=1
ln(wi)
(A.46)
⇐⇒ ln(wA + k)j ≥ ln(wjAw(N−j)B )− ln(wB − )(N−j)
(A.47)
⇐⇒ wA + k ≥
(
wjAw
(N−j)
B
(wB − )(N−j)
)1/j
(A.48)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

( wjAw(N−j)B
(wB − )(N−j)
)1/j
− wA

(A.49)
(A.50)
• Exponential: u(wi) = 1− e−αwi
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Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W )
(A.51)
⇐⇒
j∑
i=1
(1− e−α(wi+k)) +
N∑
i=j+1
(1− e−α(wi−k)) ≥
N∑
i=1
(1− e−α(wi))
(A.52)
⇐⇒ je−α(wA+k) ≤ je−α(wA) + (N − j)e−α(wB) − (N − j)e−α(wB−k)
(A.53)
⇐⇒ e−αk ≤ 1 + (N − j)
j
e−α(wB−wA)(1− eα)
(A.54)
⇐⇒ k ≥
(−1
α
)
ln
[
1 +
(N − j)
j
e−α(wB−wA)(1− eα)
]
(A.55)
(b) Nash Case:
• Wealth: u(wi) = wi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.56)
⇐⇒ Πji=1(wi + k)ΠNi=j+1(wi − ) ≥ ΠNi=1wi (A.57)
⇐⇒ (wA + k)j ≥ w
j
Aw
N−j
B
(wB − )N−j (A.58)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

( wjAwN−jB
(wB − )N−j
)(1/j)
− wA
 (A.59)
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• Polynomial: u(wi) = wαi
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W ) (A.60)
⇐⇒ Πji=1(wi + k)αΠNi=j+1(wi − )α ≥ ΠNi=1wαi (A.61)
⇐⇒ Πji=1(wi + k)ΠNi=j+1(wi − ) ≥ ΠNi=1wi (A.62)
which is exactly the same case as for the wealth utility func-
tion, and therefore
(A.63)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

( wjAwN−jB
(wB − )N−j
)(1/j)
− wA
 (A.64)
• Logarithmic: u(wi) = ln(wi)
173
Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W )
(A.65)
⇐⇒ Πji=1ln(wi + k)ΠNi=j+1ln(wi − ) ≥ ΠNi=1ln(wi)
(A.66)
⇐⇒ (ln(wA + k))j ≥ (lnwA)
j(lnwB)
N−j
(ln(wB − ))N−j
(A.67)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

{
exp
[
(lnwA)
j(lnwB)
N−j
(ln(wB − ))N−j
]1/j
− wa
}
(A.68)
• Exponential: u(wi) = 1− e−αwi
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Proof.
SW (W ′) ≥ SW (W )
(A.69)
⇐⇒ Πji=1(1− e−α(wi+k))ΠNi=j+1(1− e−α(wi−)) ≥ ΠNi=1(1− e−αwi)
(A.70)
⇐⇒ (1− e−α(wA+k))j ≥ (1− e
−αwA)j(1− e−αwB)N−j
(1− e−α(wB−))(N−j)
(A.71)
⇐⇒ e−α(wA+k) ≤ 1−
[
(1− e−αwA)j(1− e−αwB)N−j
(1− e−α(wB−))(N−j)
]1/j
(A.72)
⇐⇒ k ≥ 1

{(−1
α
)
ln
[
1−
[
(1− e−αwA)j(1− e−αwB)N−j
(1− e−α(wB−))(N−j)
]1/j]
− wA
}
(A.73)
(A.74)
Proofs Proposition 3
(a) Robin-hood transfers
We proceed step-by-step by showing that the size of k (Table
2) is well-ordered for each setup in Proposition 3. For example,
In order to show that any Robin-hood transfer implying an im-
provement under Bentham-Wealth is also desired under Bentham-
Polynomial, we show that the minimum k required by the former
is greater than the minimum k required by the latter.
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• B-W implies B-P
Proof. Considering the values of k indicated on Table 2, we
need to show that:
(1/){[wα1 + wα2 − (w2 − )α]1/α − w1} ≤ 1 (A.75)
By rearranging terms and noting that  = λ(w2 − w1), λ ∈
(0, 1), since we assume that transfers do not increase inequal-
ity, we have:
wα1 + w
α
2 ≤ [(1− λ)w1 + λw2]α + [(1− λ)w2 + λw1]α (A.76)
Now we note that since wα is a concave function, it must be
the case that:
λ1w
α
1 + (1− λ1)wα2 ≤ [λ1w1 + (1− λ1)w2]α (A.77)
λ2w
α
1 + (1− λ2)wα2 ≤ [λ2w1 + (1− λ2)w2]α (A.78)
where λ1 , λ2 ∈ (0, 1)
By setting λ1 = 1 − λ and λ2 = λ, we can sum up the two
inequalities above and find:
wα1 + w
α
2 ≤ [(1− λ)w1 + λw2]α + [(1− λ)w2 + λw1]α (A.79)
This proves our proposition.
• B-P implies B-L , N-W and N-P
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Proof. From Table 2, we must show that:
w1
w2 −  ≤ (1/){[w
α
1 + w
α
2 − (w2 − )α]1/α − w1}
(A.80)
By rearranging terms and, once again, taking  = λ(w2−w1),
we find:
{(w1)α + (w2)α − [(1− λ)w2 + λw1]α}[(1− λ)w2 + λw1]α ≥ wα1wα2
(A.81)
Now define the left term from the inequality as f(λ) and note
that f(0) = wα1w
α
2 and f(1) = w
α
1w
α
2 . If we can show that
this is a concave function, by continuity it directly follows
that the inquality holds for any λ ∈ (0, 1) and we have proved
the result. By calculating the second derivative, we find:
f
′′
(λ) = (α2 − α)(wα1 + wα2 )(w1 − w2)2[(1− λ)w2 + λw1]α−2 ≤ 0
(A.82)
The second derivative is always smaller than zero, since λ ∈
(0, 1), w2 > w1 > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1). This proves our proposi-
tion.
• B-L, N-W and N-P imply N-P
Proof. From Table 2, we must show that:
(1/){e[
(lnwA)
j(lnwB)
N−j
(lnwB−)N−j
]1/j − wA} ≤ w1
w2 − 
(A.83)
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By rearranging terms and, once again, taking  = λ(w2−w1),
we find:
ln
(
w1w2
(1− λ)w2 + λw1
)
ln[(1− λ)w2 + λw1] ≥ lnw1lnw2
(A.84)
Once again, define the left term from the inequality as f(λ)
and note that f(0) = lnw1lnw2 and f(1) = lnw1lnw2. If
we can show that this is a concave function, by continuity it
follows that the inquality holds for any λ ∈ (0, 1) and we are
done. The second derivative is as follows:
f
′′
(λ) = −(w1 − w2)2[(1− λ)w2 + λw1]−2ln
(
w1w2
(1− λ)w2 + λw1
)
≤ 0
(A.85)
Indeed, the second derivative is always smaller than zero, since
λ ∈ (0, 1), w2 > w1 > 1 in the Nash-Logarithm form (oth-
erwise, we risk aggregating negative utilities by multiplying
them among each other). This proves our proposition.
• N-P implies Rawls
Proof. In the two groups case, any RH transfer will be de-
sirable under Rawls since it benefits the poorest group. In
a more general setup, any RH transfer is weakly preferred,
given that it strictly improves welfare when it enriches the
least well-off group. Otherwise, in the case in which the indi-
vidual granted with the transfer is not the least well-off, the
new allocation simply bears the same level of welfare under
the Rawlsian principle.
178
• B-W implies B-E
Proof. From Table 2, we must show that:
(1/){−(1/α)ln[e−αw1 + e−αw2 − e−α(w2−)]− w1} ≤ 1
(A.86)
By rearranging terms and, once again, taking  = λ(w2−w1),
we find:
eα[(1−λ)w1+λw2][e−αw1 + e−αw2 − e−α[λw1+(1−λ)w2]] ≥ 1
(A.87)
As before, we define the left term from the inequality as f(λ)
and note that f(0) = 1 and f(1) = 1, satisfying the inequality.
Subsequently, we study the sign of the derivative to prove our
proposition:
f
′
(λ) = α(w2 − w1)eα[(1−λ)w1+λw2][e−αw1 + e−αw2 − 2e−α[λw1+(1−λ)w2]]
(A.88)
We note that f ′(0) = α(w2 − w1)eαw1 [e−αw1 − e−αw2 ] > 0,
f ′(1) = α(w2 − w1)eαw2 [e−αw2 − e−αw1 ] < 0 and that f ′(λ)
sign depends exclusively on the term inside the brackets. This
term is strictly decreasing in λ and, therefore, the derivate
sign only changes from positive to negative at one point. This
implies that the inequality holds since f(λ) is continuous and
increasing at λ = 0, has only one maximum point for λ ∈
(0, 1) and satisfies the inequality at λ = 0 and λ = 1. This
proves our proposition.
• B-E implies N-E
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Proof. We need to show that:
1

{(−1
α
)
ln
[
1−
[
(1− e−αw1)(1− e−αw2)
1− e−α(w2−)
]]
− w1
}
≤
≤ 1

{(−1
α
)
ln[e−αw1 + e−αw2 − e−α(w2−)]− w1
}
(A.89)
By rearranging terms and, once again, taking  = λ(w2−w1),
we find:
[e−αw1 + e−αw2 ]e−α[λw1+(1−λ)w2] − e−2α[λw1+(1−λ)w2]]− e−αw1e−αw2 ≥ 0
(A.90)
As before, we define the left term from the inequality as f(λ)
and note that f(0) = 0 and f(1) = 0, satisfying the inequality.
Subsequently, we study the sign of the derivative to prove our
proposition:
f
′
(λ) = α(w2 − w1)eα[λw1+(1−λ)w2][e−αw1 + e−αw2 − 2e−2α[λw1+(1−λ)w2]]
(A.91)
Note that f ′(0) = α(w2−w1)eαw2 [e−αw1 +e−αw2−2e−2αw2 ] > 0
and that f ′(λ) sign depends exclusively on the term inside the
brackets. This term is strictly decreasing in λ and, therefore,
the derivate only changes sign at one point, if ever. This
implies that the inequality holds since f(λ) is continuous and
increasing at λ = 0, has at most one maximum point for
λ ∈ (0, 1) and satisfies the inequality at λ = 0 and λ = 1.
This proves our proposition.
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• N-E implies Rawls
The exact same reasoning used to show that N-P implies
Rawls also holds here.
(b) Efficiency-Improving Transfers
The proof of proposition 3 for E-I transfers follows analogously to
those of the R-H case, with the difference that w2 −w1 < 0 and 
is now bounded by w2 (an individual cannot be left with negative
wealth) instead of w2 − w1.
181
Appendix B.
F
ir
st
P
e
ri
o
d
P
u
n
is
h
m
e
n
t
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t
S
tr
a
tP
0
S
tr
a
tP
5
S
tr
a
tP
1
0
S
tr
a
tP
1
5
S
tr
a
tP
2
0
S
tr
a
tP
2
5
S
tr
a
tP
3
0
C
on
tr
ol
(m
ea
n
)
1.
18
2.
07
2.
40
2.
96
4.
13
4.
82
5.
79
(m
ed
ia
n
)
0
0
2
3
4
5
5
(S
D
)
3.
31
4.
09
2.
74
2.
97
3.
94
4.
68
5.
72
N
or
m
at
iv
e
.3
6
1.
73
2.
58
3.
58
4.
29
4.
87
5.
73
0
1
2
2
4
5
5
1.
05
2.
86
3.
13
4.
36
4.
44
5.
03
6.
01
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
al
1.
38
1.
90
3.
36
3.
74
5.
14
6.
17
7.
33
0
1
3
4
5
6.
5
8.
5
3.
60
2.
16
3.
83
3.
63
5.
00
5.
48
6.
15
T
ot
al
.9
6
1.
90
2.
77
3.
42
4.
51
5.
27
6.
26
0
1
2
3
5
5
6
2.
88
3.
14
3.
25
3.
69
4.
46
5.
06
5.
96
T
ab
le
B
.1
2:
A
v
er
ag
e
F
ir
st
P
er
io
d
P
u
n
is
h
m
en
t
b
y
L
ev
el
s
o
f
d
ic
ta
to
r
T
a
k
in
g
.
S
tr
a
tP
0
=
d
ic
ta
to
r
ta
ke
0
to
ke
n
s
fr
o
m
re
ce
iv
er
182
S
e
co
n
d
P
e
ri
o
d
P
u
n
is
h
m
e
n
t
T
re
a
tm
e
n
t
P
u
n
is
h
0
P
u
n
is
h
5
P
u
n
is
h
1
0
P
u
n
is
h
1
5
P
u
n
is
h
2
0
P
u
n
is
h
2
5
P
u
n
is
h
3
0
C
on
tr
ol
(m
ea
n
)
1.
02
2.
02
2.
73
3.
36
4.
42
5.
02
6.
22
(m
ed
ia
n
)
0
1
2
2
4
4
6
(S
D
)
3.
18
3.
45
3.
49
3.
58
4.
38
5.
24
6.
26
N
or
m
at
iv
e
.6
2
1.
69
2.
47
3.
18
3.
87
4.
2
5.
18
0
1
2
3
3
4
4
1.
99
2.
86
3.
27
3.
63
4.
31
4.
83
6.
02
In
fo
rm
at
io
n
al
1.
5
2.
26
2.
95
3.
60
4.
60
5.
48
6.
31
0
1
3
4
5
6
8
4.
07
3.
92
3.
66
3.
87
4.
24
4.
83
5.
54
T
ot
al
1.
04
1.
98
2.
71
3.
37
4.
29
4.
89
5.
89
0
1
2
3
4.
5
5
6
3.
16
3.
41
3.
45
3.
67
4.
29
4.
96
5.
93
T
ab
le
B
.1
3:
A
v
er
ag
e
S
ec
on
d
P
er
io
d
P
u
n
is
h
m
en
t
b
y
L
ev
el
s
o
f
d
ic
ta
to
r
T
a
k
in
g
.P
u
n
is
h
0
=
d
ic
ta
to
r
ta
ke
0
to
ke
n
s
fr
o
m
re
ce
iv
er
183
Appendix C.
Description of the Variables Used in the Regressions
Table C.14: Variables
Variable Description
degree 1 if subject completed 8th grade (”scuola me-
dia”), 2 if subject completed high school, 3 if
subject has a bachelor degree or equivalent, 4
if subject has a master degree or equivalent,
5 if subject has a PhD or equivalent
worker binomial variable, 1 if worker
male binomial variable, 1 if male
age subject’s age
social binomial variable, 1 if subject is a student in
social sciences and medicine
arts binomial variable, 1 if subject is a student in
arts or humanities
field other binomial variable, 1 if subject not in social
or arts
DictatorTake total amount of tokes a subject when choos-
ing as a dictator takes to the reeiver in the 2
periods
risk ∈ [1, 10], 1 if to question ”In general, do you
consider yourself ready to take risks?” the
answer is ”Not at all”, 10 if the answer is
”Totally ready to take risks”
logic ∈ [0, 2], 1 point for each correct answer. See
figures C.6 and C.7 below for the 2 questions.
impulsivity ∈ [0, 3], 1 point for each correct answer. See
figures C.8, C.9 and C.10 below for the 3
questions.
NORMATIVE binomial variable, 1 for subjects in normative
treatment
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Variable Description
TREATED binomial variable, 1 for subject either in nor-
mative or in informational treatments
Strat Punish punishment first period
Beliefs Punish beliefs about peers’ average punishment first
period
Abs p0Belifs absolute value (Strat Punish - Be-
liefs Punish)
Abs Signalp0 absolute vale (Strat Punish - Peers’ average
punishment period 1)
Abs BelAvgPun absolute value (Beliefs Punish - Peers’ aver-
age punishment period 1)
NorStratPunish NORMATIVE*Strat Punish
NorAbs p0Belifs NORMATIVE*Abs p0Belifs
NormAbs BeliefAvgPunish NORMATIVE*Abs BeliefAvgPunish
Figure C.6:
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Figure C.7:
Figure C.8:
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Figure C.9:
Figure C.10:
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English Translation of the Original Italian Instuctions
Welcome! This is a study on individual decision-making. Participants’
answers are completely anonymous. It will not be possible for data
analysts to link individual answers to the participants that provided
them. You earned five euro for showing up on time today. Additionally,
you can collect other earnings. The amount of these earnings depends
on your choices and from the choices other participants will make during
the study. During the study you will earn “tokens”. For each 10 tokens
earned, one euro will be paid out to you. In the unlikely case you
will collect negative earnings, those losses will be subtracted from your
participation fee. If you have questions at any time, please raise your
hand and wait for a researcher that will answer your questions privately.
Please switch off and remove from the table any electronic device, do
not talk or communicate with other participants during the study. The
study is composed of more parts. Earnings obtained in each part of the
study are independent from those obtained in the other parts. Your
final earnings are composed by:
• Euro 5 of the participation fee
• Earnings collected in the first part of the study
• Earnings collected in one part after the first one. At the end of
the study the computer will randomly select the part after the
first one of which your earnings will be paid out to you
Final earnings will be paid privately and cash at the end of the study
First Part Instructions: description of the situation (Instructions on
this part are the same in the 3 treatments)
Consider a situation with 3 people. Each person is randomly assigned
to a role: one “Person A”, one “Person B” and one “Person C”. A, B
and C could make decisions and earn tokens.
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• Person A receives 30 tokens and does not make decisions
• Person B receives 30 tokens. Moreover, B could take some or all
A’s tokens and add them to his own earnings without incurring
costs. Precisely, B could take 0, 5, 10, 15, 20, 25 or 30 tokens from
A.
• Person C receives 30 tokens, observes B’s action and could elim-
inate some of B’s tokens, incurring a cost. For each 4 tokens
eliminated from B’s earnings, A has to pay 1 token. Person C
could use up to 20 tokens to reduce B’s earnings. C’s decision
does not affect A’s earnings
Therefore, A, B and C earnings are:
• Person A: (30 initial tokens) – (tokens taken by B)
• Person B: (30 initial tokens) + (tokens taken from A) – (4*tokens
used by C)
• Person C: (30 initial tokens) – (tokens used for reducing B’s earn-
ings)
Example 1) (please look at your computer screen): B takes 25 tokens
from A. After observing B’s choice, C decides to use 5 tokens to reduce
B’s earnings. Therefore participants’ final earnings are:
• Person A = 5 tokens (tokens left by B)
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• Person B = 35 tokens (30 initial tokens + 25 tokens taken from A
– 5*4= 20 tokens coming from the 5 tokens used by C to reduce
B’s earnings)
• Person C = 25 tokens (30 initial tokens – 5 tokens used to reduce
B earnings)
Example 2) (please look at the computer screen): B takes 5 tokens from
A. After observing B’s choice, C uses 8 tokens to reduce B’s earnings.
Therefore participants’ final earnings are:
• Person A = 25 tokens (left by B)
• Person B = 3 tokens (30 initial tokens + 5 tokens taken from A –
8*4=32 tokens coming from the 8 tokens used by C to reduce B’s
earnings
• Person C = 22 tokens (30 initial tokens – 8 tokens used to reduce
B’s earnings)
Your actions and earnings
Person C observes how many tokens B takes from A. You and the
other participants in the laboratory have to indicate the number of
tokens, an integer between 0 and 20, that C in your opinion will use.
When everyone has answered, I calculate the average of the individual
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amounts indicated by you and the other participants. If the number
you indicated is equal to, or bigger or smaller by one unit than the
average, you receive 40 tokens that will be added to your final earnings
(if you indicate 0, you will receive the forty tokens if the average is 0, 1
or 2; if you indicate 20, you will receive the 40 tokens if the average is
20, 19 or 18). Instead, you do not earn tokens in this part of the study
if the number you indicate is bigger or smaller by more than one unit
with respect to the average.
Example 1) (please look at the computer screen): Consider the action
of B “take 20 tokens from A and collect 50 tokens, leaving 10 tokens
to A”. You indicate that C uses 11 tokens. You receive 40 tokens if on
average all the participants to the study indicated “11”, “10” or “12”
tokens. If the average is different from these numbers, you will not earn
tokens for this part of the study
Example 2) (please look at the computer screen): Consider the action
of B “take 0 tokens from A and collect 30 tokens, leaving 30 tokens
to A”. You indicate that C uses 3 tokens. You receive 40 tokens if
on average all the participants to the study indicated “3”, “2” or “4”
tokens. If the average is different from these numbers, you will not earn
tokens for this part of the study.
You are required to indicate how many tokens Person C uses for each
possible action of B (B takes 30 tokens from A; B takes 25 tokens. . . ;
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B takes 0 tokens from A). At the end of the study, the computer will
randomly select one of the 7 actions of Person B. Relatively to this ac-
tion, I will verify if you earned the 40 tokens. Your decisions and those
of the other participants relative to other possible actions of Person B
will be discarded and will not affect your final earnings.
Before starting this first part of the study, I ask you to answer some
control questions. Answers to these control questions will not affect
your final earnings.
(Participants answer control questions on their computers. The Ztree
file containing the control questions is available upon request to the
authors).
Instruction second part: description of the situation (instructions on
this part are the same in all treatments)
Consider the same situation described in the first part, where 3 people
are present, A, B and C, that can make decisions and earn tokens.
Exactly as in the first part:
• A receives 30 tokens and does not make decisions
• B receives 30 tokens and could take some or all of the tokens of A
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• C receives 30 tokens, observes the action of B and could reduce
earnings of B paying a cost (for every 4 tokens of reduction of B’s
earnings C has to pay 1 token)
Your actions and earnings
In this second part you and the other participants have to make deci-
sions first as “Person B” then as a “Person C”. Therefore, you have to
indicate:
• First, as “Person B”, how many tokens you take from A
• After, as a “Person C”, for any possible action of B how many
tokens you use for reducing B’s earnings
Why do you have to make decisions both as “Person C” and as a “Per-
son B”? In calculating final earnings, each participant is associated to
an unique role: either Person A or Person B or Person C. However, you
and the other participants will not know which role has been assigned
to you until the end of the study today. Indeed, you and the other
participants will be randomly divided in groups of 3.
Within the group, each one of the 3 participants is assigned either to
role A, B or C.
Assignment to groups and assignment of roles is completely random
and each participant has 1 possibility over 3 of being assigned a spe-
cific role. Therefore, if you are assigned the role “Person A”, your final
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earnings are determined by the tokens left you by the Person B that
is in your same group. Other decisions you make as a Person B or C
will be discarded and have no influence on your final earnings nor on
the earnings of the other participants. Similarly, participants assigned
to the role “Person B” determine their final earnings and those of the
other group components only by the decisions make as Person B. Deci-
sions made as Person C have no effects on final earnings. Finally, also
Participants assigned to role “Person C” only influence final earnings
only by decisions make as C.
During this second part of the study I will also ask to indicate the day
of the month in which you where born (E.g. if you were born January
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25th 1983 you should report “25”).
Earnings of A, B and C in this second part are determined exactly as
in the first part:
• Person A: (30 initial tokens) – (tokens taken by B)
• Person B: (30 initial tokens) + (tokens taken from A) – (4*tokens
used by C)
• Person C: (30 initial tokens) – (tokens used for reducing B’s earn-
ings)
Before starting this first part of the study, I ask you to answer some
control questions. Answers to these control questions will not affect
your final earnings.
Instruction third part (Normative Treatment; instructions for Control
and Informational are available upon request)
Now the third and last part of this study starts. After the end of
this part, I will ask you to fill in a brief questionnaire and then I will
proceed with payments. Consider exactly the same situation of the
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second part of the study, same roles of A, B and C, same possible
decisions that B and C have to make and same initial endowments and
possible earnings. As in the second part, you have to make decisions
first as a Person B then as a Person C. Additionally, in this third part
before making your decisions you will receive information regarding the
other participants. You will receive information on decisions made as
Person C by the participants at today study. You will know how many
tokens on average participants used in the second part of the study to
reduce B’s earnings. You will receive this information for any of the 7
possible B’s choices.
Furthermore, before the end of the study, individual decisions as “Per-
son C” that you are going to make in this third part will be revealed
to 5 participants randomly selected. Similarly, you will received infor-
mation regarding the individual choices made as Person C by 5 other
participants
Each participant will be randomly assigned to an ID number. The ID
number assigned is independent from the number of the PC you sit on.
After you saw the individual choices of the other 5 participants, you
and the other participants will be able to vote for sending a smiling or
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sad emoticon
You receive a smiling emoticon if the majority of the five participants
that saw your choices vote for “smiling”. Otherwise you will receive a
sad emoticon. The emoticon will remain on your screen for one minute,
then disappears automatically. After this minute has passed, you will
know your final earnings.
If you have questions, please raise your hand and I will answer to you
privately. Otherwise push the “Continue” button and start with the
198
third part.
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